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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 REVITALIZING COMMUNITIES
Changing global economic conditions frequently require communities to reinvent 
themselves in order to retain their vitality and remain economically viable. This requires 
that community organizations become involved, decide on a vision, create goals, 
develop plans to meet those goals, and follow those plans through to completion.
1.1.1 PROBLEM STATEMENT
The development of effective citizen participation is an incredibly complex, time 
consuming process that often discourages many potential practitioners. This paper will 
focus on two major challenges faced by community organizations involved in urban 
revitalization:
1. the importance of creating and maintaining broad based community 
organizations focused on a general topic rather than a single issue. Such broad based 
community organizations allow development of extensive “networking” between 
interested individuals, improved consensus building skills, detailed understanding of the 
local political jurisdiction’s planning process peculiarities, and favor long term planning. 
This is in contrast to the more frequent “single issue” nature of most community groups, 
a limited focus that leads to a short organizational “life cycle” and none of the preceding 
advantages enjoyed by more broad based organizations.
2. popular misconceptions of what constitutes project success. Community 
organizations, quite naturally, are activist organizations often engaged in a number of 
different initiatives to improve their area’s vitality and economic viability. Unfortunately, 
many of these projects fall the test of “a public action that will produce a sustained and
1
widespread private market reaction,” because proponents failed to address any one of 
the following elements necessary for project success: market, location, design, 
financing, entrepreneurship, or timing. Examples include:
...housing where there is no market, commercial centers that are in the 
wrong location, civic centers for which financing is not available, places 
whose design makes them unpleasant and unsafe areas in which to 
congregate, economic development projects whose completion is beyond 
the entrepreneurship of the responsible public agency, and public works 
whose time has passed but are still under way.
(Alexander Garvin 1996)
1.1.2 STATEMENT OF PURPOSE
This thesis seeks to discover successful methods for creating, maintaining, and 
enhancing urban viability and vitality. Using the Downtown Improvement Association 
(DIA) of Honolulu as an example, emphasis is on private interests, their interaction with 
one another, and their interaction with government. This is done by providing 
documentation and analysis of the major initiatives by the DIA, and then evaluating the 
legacies resulting from those DIA activities. The evaluation employs a multi-disciplinary 
approach, including planning theory, planning history, existing government programs, 
economics, and stakeholder participation.
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1.1.3 GOALS OF THE THESIS
This thesis has five goals:
1. documentation of the role of private business interests, especially 
landowners, in post-World War II urban renewal efforts in central city areas, particularly 
the DIA in Honolulu.
2. examination of public-private cooperation in the planning process.
3. analysis of how successful the Downtown Improvement Association was in its 
efforts. The stated goals of the DIA for individual “key” projects will be compared to the 
results to determine whether the project contributed to the vitality and viability of the 
central city.
4. analysis of the “Planning” and “Built” legacies designed to aid in the 
understanding of today’s downtown Honolulu.
5. identification of successful project elements that can be replicated elsewhere.
1.1.4 WHY STUDY DOWNTOWN HONOLULU?
The Downtown Improvement Association of Honolulu provides an excellent example of 
long term citizen participation in the planning process. The DIA, a collection of business 
organizations and individuals with a vital interest in maintaining and improving the 
economic climate of Honolulu’s Downtown district, operated from 1958-96. During that 
time the DIA employed the considerable skills and resources available to its members, 
and entered into coalitions with groups such as the O’ahu Development Conference, the 
Honolulu Redevelopment Agency, and the Hawai’i Housing Authority, to turn much of its 
vision into reality. Although the DIA did not realize all of its goals for the Downtown 
district, it provides a model of private sector planning initiative and success.
3
Downtown Honolulu has undergone a similar journey in urban metamorphosis as 
have other American cities. This includes transportation mode change, decline of 
central retail function, blight, peripheral mall development, urban renewal, changing 
demographics, office development, and issues of government attention.
Private citizens and government have a long history in Honolulu of both separate 
and cooperative efforts toward civic projects. Efforts by community groups and 
government entities mean that downtown Honolulu enjoys close government-business 
proximity, renewed physical plant, and increasing numbers of mixed income residential 
projects.
1.2 APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY
The thesis takes a case study approach to examine strategic initiatives, programs and 
projects that the Downtown Improvement Association undertook in its efforts to realize 
its vision of downtown Honolulu. “Strategic” is defined as a project deliberately designed 
by the DIA to act as a catalyst to ignite desired complementary functions within a district.
1.2.1 INFORMATION GATHERING METHODS
Three types of information gathering were undertaken during the thesis. These were 
background research, examination of original source materials, and interviews.
Background information gathering was done to understand the national, 
historical, and philosophical context of urban renewal efforts. Topics included intra- and 
inter-government interaction, and public-private and private initiatives. Materials were 
gathered from the Sinclair and Hamilton Libraries of the University of Hawai’i, and the 
State of Hawai’i Main Library.
Research of original resource materials included review of documentation from
the Downtown Improvement Association; O’ahu Development Conference; City and
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County of Honolulu’s Honolulu Redevelopment Agency and Department of Housing and 
Community Development; the State of Hawai’i’s Hawai’i Housing Authority; period 
articles from the Honolulu Advertiser, Honolulu Star Bulletin, Pacific Business News, 
Hawai’i Business, and Hawai’i Business and Industry. These materials can be located at 
the Honolulu Municipal Reference and Records Center; the University of Hawai’i Sinclair 
Library, Hamilton Library Hawaiian and Pacific Collection, Department of Urban and 
Regional Planning Document Center; the State of Hawai’i Main Library Hawaiian 
Collection, the Bernice Pauahi Bishop Museum, and the Hawai’i State Archives.
Personal and telephone interviews were conducted with individuals having 
intimate knowledge of events. Individuals interviewed included members of the DIA and 
the ODC, Fort Street Mall merchants, government planners and politicians, and private 
developers and landowners. Such interviews were conducted during 1997-98.
1.2.2 CONTEXT DISCUSSION
Utilizing the materials gathered from the preceding research effort, a context discussion 
of post Depression urban renewal efforts within the United States was developed. Also 
included in this discussion are development factors specific to Honolulu during the same 
period.
1.2.3 EVALUATION OF DIA INITIATIVES, PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS
Specific DIA initiatives, programs and projects within the thesis are organized in 
chronological order to explain prevailing urban renewal theory; district, economic and 
government conditions; and introduce participants involved.
Detailed evaluation of the DIA’s revitalization effort was undertaken using two 
methodologies.
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The first uses a series of criteria developed by Alexander Garvin, involving 
background requirements for successful projects, framework of government programs to 
encourage private investment, and ingredients for specific project success.
The second method involves examination of the “Planning” and “Built” Legacies 
left behind by individual projects. This methodology was patterned after those contained 
in a paper by Gail Atwater, entitled Best Laid Plans: An Historical Analysis of Land Use 
Planning on Oahu 1900-1964. The criteria for the Planning Legacy includes envisioning 
desired futures, development and implementation of new concepts, use of strategic and 
large scale planning, and effectiveness in meeting declared goals. The Built Legacy 
includes the physical manifestation of the project, how it functions within its environs, 
evidence that the project impacted the shape and form of nearby development, and 
aesthetics.
Both evaluation strategies are displayed in tabular form to standardize the 
evaluation process and to ease comparison of project features.
1.2.3.1 The Methodologies of Alexander Garvin
Alexander Garvin, formerly a New York City Deputy Commissioner of Housing 
and the Director of Comprehensive Planning, and in 1996 a faculty member at Yale 
University and member of the New York City Planning Commission, defines urban 
planning as a “public action that will produce a sustained and widespread private market 
reaction” (Garvin 1996). Thus planning must be viewed in the context of change; 
creating positive change and preventing negative change.
Garvin believes that, “much of the nation’s unsuccessful urban planning arises 
from the erroneous belief that project success equals urban planning success.” He has 
subsequently developed a three tier evaluative methodology for urban revitalization
6
efforts: Background Requirements for Successful Programs and Projects, Framework of 
Government Programs to encourage Private Investment, and Ingredients of Project 
Success.
Background Requirements for Successful Programs and Projects
Garvin believes that there are four necessary elements in any successful plan: effective
input from all stakeholders; understanding what planning can and cannot accomplish;
understanding how physical changes to the urban environment can improve the
economy, quality of life, and city function; and examination of how the project or program
in question has created positive change or prevented negative change.
TABLE 1.1. GARVIN’S BACKGROUND REQUIREMENTS FOR SUCCESSFUL 
PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS
Necessary Element Explanation
Effective input from all 
stakeholders
Too often in-depth participation by all stakeholders is 
left out of plan development by planners “who believe 
their job is to establish municipal goals and provide 
blueprints for a better city...the efforts of these 
planners end without much consideration of how they 
will obtain political support for their proposals, who will 
execute them, or where the money to finance them will 
come from.” Plans developed without adequate 
constituencies not only suffer from lack of support, 
they face greater potential opposition.
Understanding what planning 
can and cannot accomplish
“While it cannot change human nature and is therefore 
not a panacea for all urban ills, it surely can improve a 
city’s physical plant and consequently affect the safety, 
utility, attractiveness, and the character of city life.”
Thus planners must study the message they make to 
the public to ensure that they do not raise unrealistic 
expectations.
Understanding how physical 
changes to the urban 
environment can improve the 
economy, quality of life, and 
city function
Projects often have primary, secondary, and even 
tertiary impacts, all of which must be studied to ensure 
that the context in which the project operates is well 
understood, and to limit undesirable effects.
Table 1.1 is continued on the next page.
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TABLE 1.1. (CONTINUED): GARVIN’S BACKGROUND REQUIREMENTS FOR 
SUCCESSFUL PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS
Necessary Element Explanation
Examination of how the project or program 
in question has created positive change 
and prevented negative change
Create Positive Change
The impacts that the project had, planned 
or otherwise, that improved the area. 
Prevent Negative Change
The impacts the project had that prevented 
further area deterioration.
Source: Garvin 1996.
Garvin’s Framework of Government Programs to Encourage Private 
investment
Garvin believes that government officials must realize that their actions create a climate 
that encourages or discourages private revitalization efforts. Government must view 
revitalization as a public-private partnership.
TABLE 1.2. GARVIN’S FRAMEWORK OF GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS TO 
ENCOURAGE PRIVATE INVESTMENT
Framework Explanation
Strategic investment in 
infrastructure, rather 
than routine capital 
spending, to 
encourage private 
investment
Private organizations seeking to invest in revitalization look to
government to ascertain whether or not government assistance 
(or resistance) will accompany their projects. If government 
engages in strategic investment in new facilities that 
complements private investment, private organizations will 
proceed. If government is not willing to engage in new 
strategic investment, private organizations will have increased 
difficulty raising necessary capital, etc. for their projects in an 
area where the government obviously discourages 
development or simply neglects.
Regulatory policies
that set the character 
of an area or lessen 
private investment risk
Character of the Area
Zoning laws and building codes determine land use and 
development character.
Lessen Private Investment Risk
Government policies facilitating the development process can 
increase the potential pool of investors by lowering costs and 
thus investor risk. Government “red tape” can do the opposite, 
raising costs and discouraging investment in new development
Incentives for desired
private development
Government incentive programs such as the 1978 Revenue
Act, which provided investment tax credits for rehabilitation of 
older buildings, provide a “carrot” in favor of private 
organization developments.
Source: Garvin 1996.
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Garvin’s Ingredients of Project Success
Garvin has examined many less than successful developments and feels that 
developers, both public and private, often do not understand what needs to be 
addressed for a project to elicit a favorable private market response. Six major 
ingredients must be satisfactorily addressed for a project to succeed. These are market, 
location, design, financing, entrepreneurship, and time.
TABLE 1.3. GARVIN’S INGREDIENTS OF PROJECT SUCCESS
Ingredient Explanation 
Market Public and private organizations must ask themselves if there are 
sufficient numbers of people desiring the program or project, and will 
those people be willing and able to pay the project’s capital and 
maintenance costs? Private efforts will entail sales or user fees; 
public activities must be subsidized by taxes.
Location Location consists of two elements:
Inherent Site Characteristics
Properties specific to a particular place that aid or hinder a specific 
type of development.
Proximity
This is a site’s relationship to other locations. Proximity itself is 
dependent upon the dominant transportation technology, which 
introduces a temporal travel factor, alters the benefits of nearness, 
and changes the definition of proximity.
Design Design is not limited to architectural style. It includes the 
arrangement of elements, their relative size in comparison to each 
other, and their individual characteristics. Individual elements 
directly impact the project cost, attractiveness and usefulness.
Proper design organizes the elements into a mutually supportive, 
identifiable project.
Financing Financing for public projects usually comes in the form of taxes, with 
occasional gifts from private benefactors. Financing for private 
projects generally involves several types of capital: start up (for 
planning, etc.), development loans (for interim expenses until the 
project has completed construction), and permanent mortgage 
financing (much like the traditional thirty year loan on a private 
home). The “cost” of money may vary over time due to differing 
interest rates and the amount of equity-stake financing required of 
the developer to-get the project moving. Because projects require 
long lead times to fruition, large amounts of capital are involved, and 
any project must compete with other potential lender investments; 
therefore projects must have firm support before any work 
commences.
Table 1.3 is continued on the next page.
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TABLE 1.3. (CONTINUED): GARVIN’S INGREDIENTS OF PROJECT SUCCESS
Ingredient Explanation
Entrepreneurship Someone is needed to assemble, design, coordinate and inspire all
the participants in a project to ensure that the plan becomes a reality. 
This is true for both private and public projects.
Time Time affects a project in three ways:
Immediate
How much time does it take to walk across a project? This is often 
important as to scale and character.
The 24 Hour Day
Will the project have enough diversity of use to be active throughout 
the twenty-four hour day?
Decades
Will the project be able to weather changes in political and economic 
fortunes, and adapt to new uses?
Source: Garvin 1996.
1.2.3.2 The “Planning” and “Built” Legacies
Examination of the long term results of the project resulted in two distinct legacies. 
TABLE 1.4. THE “PLANNING” AND “BUILT” LEGACIES
Legacy Explanation
Planning Legacy How plans from a program or project affected subsequent 
plans and processes.
Built Legacy How the program or project affected the physical environment, 
and how the project exists today.
Source: Atwater 1995.
1.3 LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE
Lessons for the future refer to how successful elements identified within the preceding 
analysis could be replicated elsewhere.
TABLE 1.5. LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE
Lesson for the Future Application in the Project Possible Future Use
What has been learned. How this applied to the
DIA’s efforts in this project.
Where the lesson could 
potentially be applied later.
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1.4 ORGANIZATION OF THIS DOCUMENT
This document is divided into the following sections;
Chapter 1 - The Introduction includes the Problem Statement, Statement of 
Purpose, Goals of the Thesis, Why Study Downtown Honolulu, Approach and 
Methodology, and Organization of the Document.
Chapter 2 - The Contextual Framework of Urban Revitalization Study is detailed.
Chapter 3 — The Downtown Improvement Association, including its background, 
philosophy, objectives, intellectual sources, topics of concern, and vision is examined.
Chapter 4- Hawaii State Capitol, constructed 1965-69, was developed to 
symbolize the new State of Hawaii, and was necessary to accommodate an expanding 
State government. The DIA sought to place the new Capitol near Downtown in order to 
increase access to government, and to increase demand for Downtown services.
Chapter 5 - Financial Plaza of the Pacific, constructed 1965-68, was the first new 
major Downtown office project, filling an entire block. The DIA supported this project as 
a “catalyst” for further Downtown office construction.
Chapter 6 - Fort Street Mall, constructed 1968-69, created a pedestrian mall on 
four blocks of the city s historical retailing street. The DIA and City government sought 
to revive the area’s retail activities, or at least stop their further erosion.
Chapter 7 — Kukui Gardens, constructed 1968-70, provided modern low-rise 
housing for “gap group” citizens, and is located on former urban renewal land. The DIA 
backed this project because it brought housing back close to Downtown, provided 
businesses there with patrons, and extended the daily use of Downtown facilities.
Chapter 8 - Cultural Plaza, constructed 1970-74, houses four Chinese 
benevolent societies and two language schools. The DIA participated in this project.
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hoping to maintain the area’s cultural identity as a tourist attraction to revitalize 
Chinatown retailing.
Chapter 9 - Tamarind Park and Bishop Square, constructed 1970-72 and 1981- 
83, consists of two high-rise office towers, a large parking structure, and a one acre 
privately owned and maintained park in the heart of the Financial District. The DIA 
supported the demolition of the landmark Alexander Young Hotel, construction of 
additional office space, and creation of this “people place” because the DIA wanted a 
modem, active Downtown.
Chapter 10 - Fort Street Mall Renovation, constructed 1992-93, rebuilt the 
original 1969 Mall. The DIA supported renovation of the Mall, but had desired private 
maintenance as a means of improving the long term look of the area.
Chapter 11 - Aloha Tower Marketplace, constructed 1993-94, replaced aging 
passenger pier facilities at the Waterfront with a “festival marketplace.” The DIA 
supported most of this project, desiring another “people place” at the Waterfront, close to 
Downtown.
Chapter 12 - Conclusion, presents a summary of observations and conclusions 
about the activities of the DIA, and makes recommendations about how successful DIA 
organization or projects could be replicated elsewhere.
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CHAPTER 2. CONTEXTUAL FRAMEWORK
2.1 NATIONAL TRENDS
Any examination of the DIA requires an understanding of the underlying forces changing 
urban America during the 20**’ century.
2.1.1 CRITICAL FACTORS THAT AFFECTED THE HEALTH OF AMERICAN 
DOWNTOWNS IN THE 20™ CENTURY
In his book The Rough Road to Renaissance, Jon Teaford examined the evolution of 
American cities from densely developed urban cores dependent upon the streetcar to 
metropolitan giants characterized by automobile driven development and resource 
disparity between suburbs and the central city. He made a number of observations of 
the problems facing inner cities as the 20*'’ century progressed:
1. The inability of most inner cities to retain higher-income residents, and thus 
preserve the tax base, affected a city’s ability to redevelop itself. Many cities, such as 
Boston, Philadelphia, and Cleveland, suffered greatly from eroding tax bases. Harland 
Bartholomew in 1940 warned that, “the whole financial structure of cities, as well as the 
investments of countless individuals and business firms, is in jeopardy because of what 
is called ‘decentralization’.’’ Only a few cities, such as Cincinnati, Ohio, were able to 
maintain enclaves of middle or upper class residents within their borders.
2. Suburbs had the ability to offer “the best of both worlds’’ to area residents at 
the expense of the central cities. Metropolitan wide contract agreements guaranteed 
small urban peripheral cities such services as water delivery and sewage disposal, 
services that usually required massive investment and operated most efficiently on a 
large scale. Suburbs also enjoyed tailor made programs aimed at homogeneous
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3. The changing organization of politics altered how and where money would be 
spent. Prior to World War II, party organizations had provided order and consensus by 
mediating conflicts between groups, doling out patronage and providing reliable blocks 
of support along party lines. After the War the decline of party loyalty led to a 
fragmented political structure and the rise of officeholders who loudly proclaimed their 
independence. Such conditions made it harder to develop the political consensus 
necessary to attack urban problems.
4. Federal policies favored new development over old. The Federal Housing 
Administration viewed inner city housing as potentially affected by “blight,” and thus a 
higher risk for federal mortgage guarantees than suburban housing. The federal 
Department of Transportation, meanwhile, constructed “ring” freeways that allowed
citizens to bypass the original centralizing “spoke” highway system and ignore the inner 
city altogether (Teaford 1990).
populations while central city residents had to deal with government agencies concerned
with the needs of a multitude of special interests.
2.1.2 PLANNING APPROACHES TO URBAN REVITALIZATION 
WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 1920+ ''*=vi i alizatioN PRACTICED
Jon Teaford also categorized the response of inner city leaders to the metamorphosis 
that their communities were undergoing:
1. 1930s-early 1940s; Inner city businessmen, property owners, politicians, 
planners and journalists recognized something had to be done to restore the central 
urban areas to their traditional dominance.
2. Late 1940s-early 1950s: Cities tried to adapt to the changing transportation 
technology and lifestyles through major public works projects. Cities such as 
Philadelphia, Pittsburgh and Cincinnati sold bonds and borrowed billions of dollars to
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finance the construction of highways and airports, build new housing, purchase more 
open space, and eliminate air and water pollution. These projects were designed to 
provide the inner cities with suburban-like amenities that would prevent the flight of 
middle and upper class populations.
When confronted with the prospect of possible decline, city leaders did 
not, then, choose to cut back municipal responsibilities or retrench in 
preparation for a bleak future. Instead they chose to defy the centrifugal 
drift toward suburbia and sought to perpetuate the central city’s 
preeminent position in metropolitan America.
(Teaford 1990)
3. 1950s — early 1960s: Office building booms were shadowed by vacant urban 
renewal properties and the disruptive and dividing effects of interstate highway 
programs.
4. 1960s: Concerns for human renewal rather than physical renewal gave rise 
to the federal War on Poverty. Washington increasingly demanded control over 
programs it funded, and municipal policies increasingly based their decision making on 
the availability of federal money.
5. Late 1960s and early 1970s: Disillusionment set in over the inability of the 
War on Poverty programs to improve conditions for the poor. Inner cities began to focus 
on their traditional strengths, including mass transit, rehabilitation and the value of old 
fashioned neighborhoods.
6. 1980s: Downtown building booms, festival marketplaces and restoration of 
urban neighborhoods renewed hope for inner cities (Teaford 1990).
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2.2 DOWNTOWN HONOLULU
Downtown Honolulu was indeed impacted by many of the changes affecting other 
American cities. Foiiowing is a discussion of Honoiuiu’s inner city physical layout, how 
centralization and then decentralization progressed, and the distinct advantages 
Honoiuiu had in promoting revitaiization.
2.2.1 GEOGRAPHY OF DOWNTOWN HONOLULU
(See Figure 1.)
Downtown Honolulu, for the purposes of this study, is defined as the area 
between Nu’uanu Stream, Honoiuiu Harbor, South Street, and the Lunalilo Freeway 
(also known as H-1).
Downtown Honolulu is aiso defined as having districts, each of which has its own 
distinctive character.
The Kukui Redeveiopment District occupies the north eastern (mauka) part of the 
study area. The area was once occupied mostly by high density, low-rise, non-code 
structures. In 1961 the City and County of Honolulu’s Honolulu Redevelopment Agency 
began land acquisition there, and eventually bulldozed most of the original structures. 
Over 1200 families and 400 businesses were relocated (Hawai’i Industry April 1962b).
In 1998 the area is occupied by a mixture of government assisted housing, market 
apartments, the Cultural Center, and mixed use structures.
Chinatown historically represented an entertainment area for seamen, a center 
for small business activity conducted by ex-plantation workers, and a residential area for 
single men. Originally occupied by individuals of Chinese descent, more recently the 
area has held elderly Filipino residents and Vietnamese businesses. The area contains
16
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Figure 2.1. Downtown Honolulu districts and major developments, 1996. (Honolulu is 
located at 21 18 N, 157°58’W.) Source: Downtown Improvement Association
November 1995.
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mostly low-rise fireproof structures built after the 1900 Chinatown fire, interspersed with 
City developed high-rise mixed income and mixed use buildings.
The Fort Street District today is a local commercial retail center and occupies 
only a small portion of the area where once Honolulu’s finest shops operated. Declines 
in Fort Street’s retail supremacy led to private and public efforts to redevelop the street 
(from Beretania Street to Nimitz Highway) into a pedestrian oriented mall. The new Fort 
Street Pedestrian Mall was opened in 1969 and rebuilt in 1993.
The Financial District’s business activity was built upon providing operating 
capital to island sugar and pineapple plantations and shipping businesses. The 
Financial District originally developed along Merchant Street, migrated largely to Bishop 
Street in the early 20*'’ century, and has expanded onto Fort Street since the 1960s.
The Waterfront at the base of Downtown was the original reason the town 
existed. Provisioning of ships, unloading of cargo, and the processing of passengers 
made the Waterfront the center of the city. Changes in technology have put cargoes into 
containers and most passengers into airplanes, both of which are now handled 
elsewhere. The result was, for many years, a nearly deserted Waterfront. Today the 
Waterfront accommodates cruise ship activity, and contains the tourist oriented Aloha 
Tower Marketplace and the Maritime Museum.
The Capitol District developed around the lolani Palace and Judiciary Building, 
expanding over the years to include the Governor’s Mansion (Washington Place), the 
new State Capitol, various State office complexes, and the Federal Building.
2.2.2 TRANSPORTATION MODAL CHANGES AND THEIR EFFECT ON 
DOWNTOWN HONOLULU
Downtown Honolulu after World War II was a city undergoing the same transportation 
modal changes and decentralization processes faced by mainland cities.
Downtown Honolulu had developed as a densely occupied district due to three
factors:
1. The O’ahu Railway and Land Company (OR&L), founded 1888, connected 
sugar and pineapple plantations from Kahana Bay. around Kaena Point, Wai’anae and 
Ewa to downtown Honolulu and the docks. A separate line ran to Wahiawa. The OR&L 
was instrumental in locating the pineapple canneries near Downtown (Yardley 1981).
2. The Honolulu Rapid Transit and Land Company (HRT&L and later HRT), 
founded 1898, ran an extensive system of street cars focused on Fort Street in 
downtown Honolulu (Melvin 1960).
3. The Honolulu Harbor was the only natural harbor in the Hawaiian Islands, 
and thus the only location handling the large ships that carried passengers and cargo 
both inter-island and elsewhere. The main docks lay immediately makai of Downtown.
Technological challenges to the three traditional transportation modes instituted 
the beginning of the “decentralization” process:
1. Paradise of the Pacific magazine in March. 1905 estimated that there were 
twenty-five automobiles on the roads of Honolulu (Paradise of the Pacific March 1905).
In 1915 the HRT&L tested its first trolley bus, and by 1934 the HRT&L had employed 
enough trolley buses that it began to dismantle its rail network (Melvin 1960). The 
retirement of street cars, the growing use of diesel buses and the increasing use of 
automobiles changed the character of Honolulu. Bus service, freed first from the rails 
and then the overhead electric grid, could travel anywhere across the city. Transfer
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points developed outside of Downtown. As a result, Fort Street no longer had a 
monopoly on the sale of goods and services, as first order retail functions began to be 
met by the small neighborhood stores in Kaimuki. Kalihi. Mo’ili’ili and other locations.
2. At the same time, the OR&L was gradually losing traffic, especially during the 
Depression, when the government began development of a circle island highway 
system. The new highway pitted OR&L against a government subsidized transportation
competitor, and meant that people no longer had to pass through Downtown to get to the 
“country”.
3. The increasing use of air transportation slowly eroded the use of Downtown 
passenger piers. The development of containerization would also remove activity from 
the docks nearest Downtown in favor of facilities at Piers 1 & 2 and Sand Island.
There was official concern about the effects of these transportation induced 
changes. The Honolulu City Planning Commission, in Honolulu’s Master Plan, A 
Progress Report, January 1941, stated that;
During past years traffic through the business area has increased 
annually until many of the streets have reached their saturation 
points... and only a small percentage of the patrons coming into the 
business district can find parking space. These patrons in looking for 
non-existent parking places, are, to a great extent, responsible for the 
acute traffic congestion throughout the area.
Perhaps the most serious situation in Honolulu at the present time from the 
standpoint of many taxpayers, is the decentralization or disintegration of our 
central business district. This has been going on for a number of years at a rate 
much greater than is generally realized. If continued as at present, in only a few 
more years this section of the city will have many vacant store buildings, now 
occupied by some of our best business enterprises. The result will be a great
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reduction of rental values followed by an enforced reduction of taxation values of 
practically all the high valuation property in the business section. This 
decentralization has not yet progressed so far that the devaluation stage has 
been reached, but in only a few more years it will appear unless a concerted 
move IS made by the Municipal Government and the property owners involved.
(City and County of Honolulu 1941)
The City of Honolulu 1939-1944 Master Plan made recommendations for a series 
of municipal parking lots throughout Downtown, and an elevated highway across the 
Waterfront designed to remove through traffic from Downtown streets.
During World War II. private use of automobiles was severely curtailed.
Downtown again thrived because of restrictions on gasoline and the use of private 
automobiles. After the War. however, the automobile immediately returned to popularity. 
OR&L. for example, had carried 20 million passengers and earned $4.5 million in 
revenues in 1945. only to carry a disappointing 7.5 million passengers and earn $2.5 
million in revenues in 1946 (Kneiss 1957). The last Kahuku-Honolulu O’ahu Railway run
occurred on DecemberSI. 1947 (CinePac 1970). Rail then ceased to be an economic 
factor in downtown Honolulu.
The impacts of automobiles steadily grew worse in downtown Honolulu. The 
February 14. 1949 edition of the Honolulu Advertiser uo\e6 that “Shoppers May Shun 
Traffic Congestion in Downtown Area” (Honolulu Advertiser 2/14/1949).
Small regional retail strips in Wahiawa and Kaimuki were not the only threat 
created by automobile mobility. A small article in the October 28. 1949 Honolulu Star 
Bulletin reported that a preliminary public hearing was to be scheduled before the City
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Figure 2.2. Proposed Off-Street Parking Lot System, necessitated by increasingly 
difficult access and parking problems in Downtown. (Honolulu is located at 21° 18’ N, 
157° 58’W.) Source: Master Plan: City of Honolulu 1939-1944.
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Figure 2.3. Corner of Bethel and Beretania Streets (1958). Note the cars parked along 
the curb and the “For Rent” sign in the Schnack Building window. Downtown Honolulu’s 
economic lifeblood was retailing, but downtown access difficulties encouraged 
customers to frequent new shopping complexes in Wai’alae, Aina Haina, Kailua, 
Kane’ohe and other surburbs. Source: Camera Hawai’i, Inc.
Figure 2.4. Union Street looking Ewa-makai (1958). This is an example of Downtown 
business evolution. The Kress store on the left, a typical early 20"’ Century “five and 
dime,” would be replaced by an office complex. The Fronk Clinic (on the right) relocated 
to Beretania Street. Source: Camera Hawai’i, Inc.
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Planning Commission to discuss a proposed shopping complex on Dillingham 
Corporation property along Ala Moana Boulevard. This would become the Ala Moana 
Shopping Center (Honolulu Star Bulletin 10/28/1949).
In 1953, the Downtown Merchants Association was formed. The organization 
spent $85,000 promoting Downtown activities over the next five years (Wheeler 1958).
In 1957, forty-one upper Fort Street merchants banded together, declaring 
themselves the “Upper Fort Street Shopping Center.” Spokesman Samuel Kramer 
stated that, “The idea is to encourage people to shop in this area... New shopping areas 
are springing up and we want people to continue their downtown shopping habits” 
(Honolulu Advertiser 11/28/1957).
Meanwhile, the Dillingham Corporation continued its development of a new 
shopping complex based on the use of the private automobile. Many established 
Downtown retailers leased space in the new Ala Moana Shopping Center, including 
Longs Drugs, F.W. Woolworth, M. Mclnemy, Hartfields, and the Ritz. Richard Wheeler, 
of Andrade and Company, urged other merchants not to “throw in the sponge” by 
moving out to Ala Moana (Honolulu Star Bulletin 3/24/1958). The Ala Moana Shopping 
Center opened for business on October 29, 1959 (Honolulu Star Bulletin 10/28/1959).
2.2.3 ADVANTAGES FACILITATING REVITALIZATION OF DOWNTOWN 
HONOLULU
The DIA was fortunate that Downtown Honolulu enjoyed significant advantages in any 
revitalization program.
1. The City and County of Honolulu is a single political jurisdiction, consisting of 
the whole island of O’ahu. This facilitates the planning process and nearly eliminates 
the possibility of “tax and job flight” experienced by many mainland jurisdictions.
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2. Downtown Honolulu is within walking distance of State of Hawaii and federal 
government offices (and decision makers and funding sources). This is unusual within 
the United States.
3. The limited land area of the island encourages recycling of underutilized 
properties and districts.
4. The small size of downtown Honolulu meant that individual revitalization 
projects would have greater potential impact than projects of similar size in large urban 
districts.
5. State land use policies have until recently discouraged the development of 
agricultural land and instead promoted more density in the Honolulu primary urban core.
6. Until the early 1990s Hawaii enjoyed a healthy economy.
7. Until recently, most major corporations were locally owned, and were active 
participants in civic activities.
2.2.4 SPECIAL CHALLENGES IMPACTING THE REVITALIZATION OF 
DOWNTOWN HONOLULU
Political changes occurring in Hawaii during the early years of the DIA could have made 
cooperation between government and business difficult to accomplish.
Since the end of the Hawaiian monarchy in 1893, Hawaii’s politics and economy 
had been controlled by a small group of mostly Caucasian and Republican individuals. 
Opportunities for other groups had been limited.
The Democratic Party after World War II became the vehicle for these non- 
represented groups to enter the political and economic arenas. In 1954 the Territorial 
Legislature became Democratic, and in 1962 the Democrats also captured the powerful 
Governor’s Office.
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While the DIA and other pro-business groups had been expanding their 
membership to include a broader base of the population, major island businesses were 
still heavily representative of the old economic and political aristocracy.
It is thus to the credit of these political and business leaders that they were often 
able to put their differences aside and cooperate in long term programs for economic 
revitalization.
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CHAPTER 3. THE DOWNTOWN IMPROVEMENT ASSOCIATION
3.1 BACKGROUND
A headline of the March 24, 1958 edition of the Honolulu Star Bulletin reported that 
“Downtown Stores Band to Save Area: Hope to Fight Shopping Trend to Suburb Rim” 
(Honolulu Star Bulletin 3/24/58). It erroneously reported that “merchants” were 
organizing an effort to keep shopping centers from digging too deeply into Downtown 
business pockets. The article said the group called itself the Downtown Improvement 
Association (DIA).
The article illustrates a popular misconception as to who was organizing 
and why. Mr. William Grant, Executive Director of the Downtown Improvement 
Association in 1996, described the situation:
When the Downtown Improvement Association began in 1958, the 
owners of the land on which the city stood knew that a boom was coming 
with statehood and they didn’t want to be left out.
Understand, most of our members are landowners, with a few merchants 
mixed in.
At that time, downtown Honolulu was the headquarters for plantation 
agriculture and the high-class retail center of the Islands: Liberty House, 
Mclnerny, quality jewelry and shoe stores. Property owners were making 
their money from retail stores on the first floor.
(Krauss 1996)
Unlike the retail shop owners who saw opportunity at the new Ala Moana 
Shopping Center and could “hedge” their bets by opening branches there, the owners 
had significant investments in non-portable assets Downtown. Retail operations had
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been the historical means to gain high income from commercial real estate. The 
property owners founded the DIA because they wanted to protect their investments.
The original members of the DIA represented some of the most economically 
powerful corporations in the Hawai’i business community. Membership in such circles 
represented access to resources not usually enjoyed by other community groups. 
TABLE 3.1. ORIGINAL MEMBERS OF THE DOWNTOWN IMPROVEMENT
1. Alexander Young, Ltd.
2. Hawaiian Telephone Company, Ltd
3. C. Q. Yee Hop & Company, Ltd.
4. Theo. H. Davies & Company, Ltd.
5. Pantheon Building Company, Ltd.
6. Estate of James Campbell
7. N. Kamuri, Ltd.
8. L. McCandless Estate
9. Bernice P. Bishop Estate
10. American Factors, Ltd.
11. Bishop Trust Company, Ltd.
12. Bishop National Bank of Hawai’i
13. Hawaiian Trust Company, Ltd.
14. Bank of Hawai’i
15.
Qr^i ir
Cooke Trust Company, Ltd.
Source: Downtown Improvement Association April 1978.
During its thirty-eight year life span, the Downtown Improvement Association, 
would consistently reflect the interests of the business, and especially landowner, 
community within Hawai’i.
Mr. William Grant, DIA Executive Director, in 1998 stated his belief that 
community organizations with the most longevity are those organizations whose 
members feel their interests are under long term “threat”. The threat creates 
cooperation and cohesion to provide long term direction and goals. In the case of the 
DIA, member landowners and tenants would benefit from vitality and economic viability 
downtown. Anything that threatened Downtown as a place to do business would be
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Iactively addressed or opposed, and any new activity that promoted business would be 
actively supported (Grant 1998).
A list of DIA presidents illustrates who the DIA represented and the longevity the 
organization enjoyed.
TABLE 3.2. PRESIDENTS OF THE DOWNTOWN IMPROVEMENT ASSOCIATION
Name Company Term
R. Alexander Anderson Von Hamm Young
Company
1958-1964
Robert R. Midkiff American Trust Company 1965
Clarence T. C. Ching Loyalty Enterprises (land 
development)
1966
Moses L. Randolph Campbell Estate 1967-72
Richard H. Wheeler Andrade & Company (retail 
operator)
1975-76
Jack K. Palk Security Title Company 1977-79
Donald M. Kuyper Hawaiian Telephone 
Company
1980-83
Aaron M. Chaney Chaney Brooks & Company 
(real estate)
1984-85
Richard W. Gushman II DGM Group (real estate 
development and 
redevelopment)
1986-91
Thomas M. Foley Attomey-at-Law 1992-94
Andrew D. Friedlander Monroe & Friedlander (real 
estate)
1995-96
Source; Downtown Improvement Association September 1996b.
3.2 INTERNAL ORGANIZATION OF THE DIA
3.2.1 ADMINISTRATION
The internal organization of the DIA was designed to provide continuity.
The general membership annually had the option to vote for or against a slate of 
candidates for the Board of Directors.
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The Board of Directors set policy, recommended new members for the Board, 
hired the Executive Director, elected the President, and approved special projects and 
the creation of special purpose committees.
An Executive Committee, elected by the full Board of Directors, worked directly 
with the President and Executive Director. This Committee usually had between eight 
and ten members.
The President of the DIA often focused on special projects such as Robert Midkiff 
did with the State Capitol or Moses Randolph with the Fort Street Mall. The President 
usually helped coordinate support for projects or positions within the Downtown 
community, and often met with government officials.
The Executive Director handled collection of dues, ran the office, supported the 
President at public meetings, and met with government planners. The architectural 
background of Mr. Grant often made him a go-between when building density 
negotiations were underway between the City government and DIA members (Grant 
1998).
3.2.2 BUDGET
DIA activities were financed through dues and special project contributions.
Landowner dues amounted to a percentage of their real property assessments.
As the percentage was fixed and the assessment public knowledge, both the landowner 
member and the DIA itself could estimate the amount and plan accordingly. Lessees 
(retail establishments, architectural firms, etc.) negotiated their membership dues. The 
annual budget for the DIA, separate from special projects, was approximately $150,000 
in 1996 (Grant 1998).
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Special project contributions would be solicited by the President and/or Executive 
Director through mutually known intermediaries for projects approved by the Board of 
Directors (Grant 1998). Examples of such projects include the Union Mall in 1962 and
the Chinatown Police Station in 1988 (Downtown Improvement Association September 
1963 and November 1988).
3.2.3 COMMITTEES
Besides the Executive Committee, the DIA had standing.committees such as those for 
Membership and Planning.
The Membership Committee would actively recruit new members.
The Planning Committee’s responsibility was to pull together a broad range of 
Ideas and proposals for Downtown, and organize them into a coordinated action plan. 
Areas included urban design, urban renewal..regulatory issues, open space and the 
malls system (Downtown Improvement Association July 1981).
The Environmental Committee was formed to deal with issues affecting the 
quality of working and living Downtown, including safety, cleanliness, enjoyment and 
area appearance (Downtown Improvement Association June 1981).
Special projects committees would also be formed when the need arose.
One such committee was the Waterfront Committee which sought to promote 
redevelopment of the area immediately adjacent to Downtown into a people oriented 
complex (Downtown Improvement Association February 1981c).
Another special project committee was the Chinatown Committee whose work 
evolved from the almost total clearance programs of the Kukui Redevelopment Project 
into restoration and redevelopment programs under the rules of the Chinatown Historic 
Cultural Scenic District (Downtown Improvement Association April 1981).
3.1
Figure 3.1. Shop owner placing the DIA logo on his front window display (Iate1950s or 
early 1960s). The DIA’s standing Membership Committee was responsible for recruiting 
new participants in the DIA’s programs. Source: Camera Hawai’i, Inc.
Figure 3.2. DIA Master Plan Committee viewing Downtown revitalization concepts 
contained in the Wou Plan of 1962. Source: Camera Hawai’i, Inc.
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3.3 PHILOSOPHY
The DIA felt that private redevelopment of Downtown offered the best opportunity to 
provide desired aesthetic features and spur economic growth.
R. Midkiff, DIA President in 1965, declared that:
We believe that the techniques of owner-redevelopment, under the 
umbrella of city and federal authority, will enable like-minded men to work 
together. It can lead to the renaissance and new growth in the cities of 
America on a far sounder economic basis than through purely 
government action. We must have close partnership with government, 
however, since the over-all plans for the city, the area, and each block 
must be economically and aesthetically related. If landowners have a will 
to achieve, together with a willingness to conciliate the interests of other 
property owners, plus the help and authority of enlightened government, 
great works can be accomplished in our cities.
(Midkiff 1965)
3.4 OBJECTIVES AND PURPOSES OF THE DIA
The Charter of the DIA, issued in 1958, listed four objectives and purposes for the 
Downtown Improvement Association:
1. To cultivate, develop and maintain the Central Business 
District of Honolulu as the dominant core and focal point of trade and 
commerce on O’ahu.
2. To enlist the active interest and financial support of individuals, 
firms, and corporations concerned with the development and
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improvement of the Downtown Honolulu area, particularly property 
owners and tenants located within the Central Honolulu Business District.
3. To promote and encourage rehabilitation and redevelopment 
of blighted areas in the Central Business District, promulgating and 
devising physical plans and standards for structural rehabilitation and 
improvement to prevent the spread of blight.
4. To collaborate and cooperate with public agencies. Federal,
State, and Municipal, especially with the Mayor and the Council of the 
City and County of Honolulu, the Planning Commission and other 
improvement associations, including the Chamber of Commerce of 
Honolulu, whose functions may in any manner relate to any of the 
objectives hereunder.
(Downtown Improvement Association 1973)
3.5 INTELLECTUAL SQURCFS
The DIA was constantly looking for new ways to improve business Downtown. 
Information came from national and international business groups; presentations and 
studies by out of state experts; and Aaron Levine of the O’ahu Development 
Conference.
3.5.1 NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS GROUPS
The DIA was involved in several national and international business groups, including 
the:
1. International Downtown Executive Association (I.D.E.A.). The DIA hosted the 
midwinter 1976 meeting. I.D.E.A. represented 30,000 business and industry
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organizations from 120 cities in the United States and Canada (Downtown Improvement 
Association November 1976a).
2. The International Downtown Association, a business group that monitored 
trends in Downtown retailing, mall development and redevelopment (Downtown 
Improvement Association November 1986a).
3.5.2 PRESENTATIONS AND STUDIES BY OUT OF STATE EXPERTS
Private sector organizations such as Pittsburgh’s Allegheny Conference on Urban 
Development, throughout the 1950s, received widespread publicity for urban 
environmental reform, slum clearance and revitalization (Teaford 1990). The DIA 
responded by hiring a number of mainland consultants to do a series of economic and 
transportation studies for Downtown and regularly inviting mainland experts to speak on 
planning issues at its annual meetings. Examples of imported speakers include;
1. In 1962, Dr. Chester Rapkin, Wharton School Economist, described city 
planning and economic growth.
2. In 1967, Edgardo Contini, of Victor Gruen Associates, discussed Downtown 
revitalization.
3. In 1976, Knox Banner, Executive Director of the National Capital Downtown 
Committee, Inc., Lucius Williams of the Downtown Development Authority of Miami] and 
Dan Sweat of Central Atlanta Progress, Inc., reported on transit projects in their cities 
(Downtown Improvement Association January 1983).
4. In 1990, Robert Barron, Jr., President of Enterprise Development Company, 
an affiliate of the Rouse Company, discussed the festival marketplace concept and how 
it would be applied to the Aloha Tower development (Downtown Improvement 
Association February 1990).
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3.5.3 AARON LEVINE AND THE O’AHU DEVELOPMENT CONFERENCE
Perhaps the greatest long term influence on the DIA came from Aaron Levine. Aaron 
Levine was President of the O’ahu Development Conference (ODC), “A volunteer 
organization devoted to the long-range planning and sound growth of O’ahu and the 
State of Hawai’i” (O’ahu Development Conference 1986). Levine was a firm believer in 
citizen participation in the planning process and the need to develop consensus. He had 
been Director of the Philadelphia Citizens Council on City Planning, and former Senior 
Planner of the Philadelphia City Planning Commission. Levine was recruited in 1962 by 
Al Boeke of Oceanic Properties and LeRoy C. Bush (Grant 1998), who conducted a 
national search for an experienced community based planner they felt was needed to 
tackle planning concerns for the whole of O’ahu. The search was financed by 
contributions by the twenty-five largest private corporations in the State of Hawai’i 
(Sutton 1998).
The purposes of the ODC were to:
1. encourage sound planning.
2. help preserve Hawai’i’s natural beauty.
3. prepare and distribute research information.
4. assist public agencies and community groups.
5. conduct educational programs on planning issues.
ODC activities included:
1. community leadership seminars.
2. the University Community Plan.
3. the State Land Use Commission.
4. resolution of Diamond Head zoning issues.
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DIA members served on both the ODC Board of Directors and committees. 
While the ODC worked on citizen participation on an O’ahu-wide and later State-wide
level, the ODC and the DIA cooperated on projects of interest to Downtown. Areas of 
mutual interest there included:
1. Hawai’i Capitol District
2. lolani Palace
3. Honolulu Waterfront Study
4. harbor plans for O’ahu
5. Aloha Tower Plaza
6. Honolulu zoning code
7. mass transit
8. City Development Plans
9. urban renewal (O’ahu Development Conference 1986).
A6 MAJOR TOPICS OF COISICERNI FOR THE DIA
Robert R. Midkiff. former President of the Downtown Improvement Association, listed 
three major areas of interest for the organization immediately after its inception; 
enhancing economic activity; access, parking and transportation; and the need for an 
overall master plan (Midkiff 1980). The continuing growth of Downtown would expand 
the breadth of each of these areas, requiring the DIA to develop a newsletter (originally 
entitled simply the Newsletter, later Data and finally the Downtowner), and to issue 
periodic position papers, in order to better explain its policy decisions. Included below 
are the major immediate areas of concern, and the DIA responses over time.
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3.6.1 ENHANCED ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
In 1959 the DIA hired mainland real estate consultant James Downs to evaluate 
Downtown’s economic future. Downs felt that three steps were needed:
1. Anchor the major City, State and federal government decision making centers 
Downtown.
2. Anchor the business decision center of the state Downtown.
3. Revitalize downtown retailing by inducing tourists to visit the area.
3;6.1.1 Anchor the Major City, State and Federal Government Decision-Making
Centers Downtown ---------- -----------
This would require locating the new State Capitol near lolani Palace, the projected 
municipal office addition near City Hall, and the proposed Federal Building as close to 
Downtown as possible.
Potential sites for the Hawai’i State Capitol included lolani Barracks, Fort 
Armstrong, the Ala Wai Golf Course, and Kane’ohe. A DIA “Friends of the Civic Center” 
committee got 10,000 signatures in favor of the site bounded by Richards, Hotel, 
Punchbowl and Beretania Streets. The DIA used this support to push for release of 
State funds to buy the site. DIA member Midkiff, along with State Representative 
George Scotty” Koga, became the two key members of the committee that selected 
both the architect and the design for the new Capitol.
City agencies also needed a new site, having long outgrown City Hall and the
Mission Memorial Buildings Diamond Head of the original complex. A Citizen’s Advisory
Committee was set up to advise John Carl Warnecke and Associates in the
development of a Honolulu Civic Center Master Plan (1965). One feature of the Plan
was a new City office tower to be located in the block bounded by Kapi’olani Boulevard,
and King, Alapa i and Beretania Streets. Members of the community who served on the
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Committee included DIA representatives R. Alexander Anderson and Robert Midkiff, and 
Aaron Levine of the O’ahu Development Conference.
The DIA lobbied hard for a new Federal Building site at Fort Armstrong close 
enough to Downtown to have government services easily available to Downtown 
business concerns.
3.6.1.2 Anchor the Business Decision Center of the State Downtown
A “Rockefeller Center” style first class office development was felt necessary to serve as 
a business catalyst. This development would become the Financial Plaza of the Pacific 
in 1968. Six owners of the block bordered by Fort, Merchant, Bishop and King Streets, 
namely Castle and Cooke, Bishop Trust Company, the Wilcox Development Company, 
Territorial Savings and Loan, American Savings and Loan, and the Austin Trust, agreed 
to develop the largest commercial real estate condominium in the United States. The 
project involved a series of property exchanges and relocation of Bishop Trust across 
King Street at the old Bank of Hawaii site.
3^6,1.3 Revitalization of Downtown Retailing bv Inducing Tourists to Visit the
Area
Making Downtown an attractive place for tourists and local residents called for three sets 
of projects:
1. restoration of lolani Palace, the Mission Houses Museum and other unique 
Downtown historical sites. DIA member Midkiff became a member of the policy 
committee overseeing the Palace restoration (Midkiff 1980).
2. development of the Fort Street Mall. The Mall was part of the Downtown 
Gruen master plan and a personal project of DIA President Moses Randolph. Adjacent 
property owners contributed $1,208,201.44 toward developing the Mall, which included
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fountains, a children’s sandbox, plazas at Beretania Street and at King Street, and a
pedestrian underpass below King Street (Downtown Improvement Association February 
1969).
3. the Chinese Cultural Plaza, now known simply as the Cultural Plaza. 
Clarence T. C. Ching, DIA President, organized the non-profit Chinese Cultural Plaza, 
Inc, in 1965. Participants included the Sun Yat Sen and Mun Lun Schools; and the 
Chee Kung Tong, Kuo Min Tang, Leong Doo, and Lung Doo Societies. The project was 
designed to include language schools for the young, meeting halls for senior citizens, 
and shops, restaurants and cultural events to attract both residents and tourists (Hawai’i 
Business April 1979).
3.6.2 PARKING, THE BUS, AND MASS TRANSIT
3.6.2.1 Parking
The DIA viewed parking as its ‘tirst order of business.”
The City had instituted a public off-street parking development program in 1952.
Known as Improvement District 80, the program had exempted Downtown properties
from parking requirements in return for an assessment system that covered the cost of
constructing the lots. The DIA paid eighty per cent of the costs of a study that
established the need for parking structures in the Downtown area in the early 1960s.
Parking structures were subsequently erected by the City in 1960-61 at Alakea-Richards
(288 stalls), Smith-Maunakea (395 stalls), and Nimitz-Bethel (395 stalls) (Downtown
Improvement Association September 1960, November 1961 and 1970d).
After assuming office in 1969, new Honolulu Mayor Frank Fasi began postponing
purchase of land and construction of additional public parking structures in favor of using
planning resources for rapid transit. The lack of an operating rapid transit system and no
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additional public parking led the DIA to constantly inventory the number of parking 
spaces available across the Downtown area, estimating the number of stalls the DIA felt 
were necessary, and recommending measures to mitigate automobile dependencies, 
including Downtown apartments, expansion of the bus system, and rapid transit. The 
DIA specifically monitored the design and speed of housing construction on District 80 
and Honolulu Redevelopment Agency lands that had been previously pressed into 
parking use, as such construction removed valuable parking opportunities. The DIA also 
suggested that repeal of the District 80 parking rules and imposition of Comprehensive 
Zoning Code (CZC) parking requirements be considered to add even more additional 
parking. Downtown landowners and developers did indeed respond to the parking 
crunch by doing as the DIA suggested, increasing the amount of privately built parking 
even in excess of District 80 and CZC regulations. By September, 1996, eighty-five per 
cent of Downtown parking was privately owned (Downtown Improvement Association 
September 1996).
3.6.2.2 The Bus
The DIA supported the City and County of Honolulu’s acquisition of the Honolulu Rapid 
Transit Company bus system, expansion of the bus fleet, and creation of a “fare free 
zone” Downtown. The DIA was quick to recognize the impact bus patrons had on 
Downtown: in 1970 DIA surveys showed that approximately twenty-five to thirty-three 
per cent of all Downtown shopping was directly created by bus patrons (Downtown 
Improvement Association 1975a).
3.6.2.3 Mass Transit
The DIA was perhaps the most vocal proponent in the city for a rapid transit corridor 
along Hotel Street, rather than other suggested alignments along Beretania or King
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Streets. The DIA felt that Hotel Street was more central, had better access to retailing, 
and that any additional costs incurred by using the Hotel Street corridor would be offset 
by additional favorable growth in the center of the Downtown district (Downtown 
Improvement Association 1970f).
3.6.3 MASTER AND LARGE SCALE PLANNING
As business organizations and individuals, the members of the DIA were very concerned 
about planning from a macro perspective. The DIA itself felt that, unfortunately, too 
often “we find largely independent planning going forward. The end result of this might 
or might not be a congenial or compatible whole” (Downtown Improvement Association 
1975c). These concerns made the DIA a champion of large scale planning.
3.6.3.1 Early Downtown Studies and Master Planning
Over the years the DIA financed a series of studies and plans of downtown Honolulu in 
order to understand economic changes and planning possibilities. These plans will be 
discussed in detail later, but are listed here to provide an overview of DIA planning 
efforts:
1. Economic Analysis of Downtown Honolulu (1959) by the Western Real Estate 
Research Corporation.
2. Central Business District of Honolulu (1961) by Belt Collins and Associates; 
Harland Bartholomew and Associates; Community Planning, Inc.; and Charles Bennett 
and Associates.
3. A Master Plan for the Central Business District (1962) by Leo Wou, A.I.A., 
architect-planner and David Tom, planning consultant (i.e., the Wou Plan).
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4. Economic Trends and Planning for the Central Business District of Honolulu, 
Hawaii (1963) by Dr. James Gilles, Assistant Dean of the UCLA Graduate School of 
Business, and C. E. Elias, Jr., Research Analyst.
3.6.3.2 The Victor Gruen Master Plan
The DIA encouraged the City and County of Honolulu to hire Victor Gruen & Associates, 
developers of the first permanent pedestrian mall built in an American downtown, to 
prepare a master plan for downtown Honolulu.
The DIA strongly endorsed the planning recommendations made by Gruen in the 
Report of the Studies and Recommendations fora Program of Revitalization of the 
Central Business District of Downtown Honolulu (April 1968). The Gruen Plan included 
creation of downtown “superblocks” for pedestrians, a feature of master plans popular 
both on the mainland and included in the previous Wou Plan. This would be 
accomplished by:
1. widening of Alakea Street and Nu’uanu Avenue to reroute traffic away from 
the Central Business District.
2. creation of a mall on Fort Street between Nimitz Highway and Kukui Street.
3. a mall along Hotel Street, from King to Punchbowl Streets.
4. the addition of large scale public parking structures (Gruen 1968; Downtown 
Improvement Association 1970c).
3.6.4 Attract Other Businesses and Amenities into Downtown
As its initial programs were completed, the DIA turned its attention to bringing 
other new businesses and amenities to Downtown. The longest term project was to 
reestablish a business hotel in Downtown. Honolulu was one of the few cities of its size
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Figure 3.3. Wou Plan Planning Concept. While the Master Plan for the Central 
Business District did not contain a legend for this map, examination of the document 
leads to the following conclusions: parks are designated green, buildings blue, retained 
roadways solid gray, and pedestrian malls marked in gray with trees. (Honolulu is 
located at 21° 18’ N, 157° 58' W.) Source: Wou 1962.
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Figure 3.4. The Wou Plan Land Use Concept. (Honolulu is located at 21° 18’ N, 
157° 58’W.) Source: Wou 1962.
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in the United States without such an establishment. Hawaii Visitors Bureau statistics for 
1973 listed 125,381 business travelers in that year (Downtown Improvement Association 
1975b), and the DIA wanted them spending their time in Downtown. Benefits of such a 
Downtown hotel would include:
1. common rooms, convention and banquet facilities.
2. ease of access to business and government offices.
3. potential addition to late afternoon and evening social events Downtown, thus 
making Downtown more active and attractive “round the clock” (Downtown Improvement 
Association 1975b).
The DIA’s effort was proven successful when the Executive Center turned 120 of 
its offices into hotel suites. In 1996 all were booked solid (Krauss 1996).
3.7 DIA DISTRICT VISIONING
3.7.1 FINANCIAL DISTRICT
The DIA consistently wanted the Financial District to be densely developed and 
compact, growing to the maximum height allowed under zoning. This would allow an 
“efficient, lively, crowded and heterogeneous high value center” where business 
decisions could be made that required “frequent face-to-face contacts.” Thus there was 
no need for important commercial development immediately outside of Downtown. 
Downtown should “develop up, not out” (Downtown Improvement Association 1970b).
3.7.2 CHINATOWN REDEVELOPMENT AREA
Chinatown was always considered part of Downtown by the DIA. The DIA supported 
retention of the Oriental character of the area, commercial ground level uses and 
residential development above.
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1958 Landmarks
1 Aloha Tower
2 American Factors
3 Alexander & Baldwin 
^ Theo. H. Davies
5 First National Bank
6 Alexander Young Bldg
7 lolani Palace
8 Armory ■
--------------------------------------------------- - ---------------------------------—------- -------------------
Figure 3.7. Representative drawing of downtown Honolulu at the founding of the 
Downtown Improvement Association in 1958. Downtown’s infrastructure had not 
significantly changed since the 1930s. Source: Downtown Improvement Association 
February 1988.
49
j
DOWNTOWN HONOLULU 1958-1988
FROM THE TERRITORY’S SLEEPY DOWNTOWN 
TO THE 50TH STATE'S FINANCIAL CENTER
Thirty Years Later
In commemoration of DlA's 30th Anniversary 
we are pleased to publish these sketches 
which depict those three decades of change.
In 1958 (above) Downtown was headquarters 
for plantation agriculture and the Territory's 
financial center. Fort Street was the Island's ^ 
major retail concentration and would soon be 
eclipsed by the Ala Moana Shopping Center.
The Legislature met in the lolani Palace.
Downtown's street network was mostly two- 
way and parking meters accepted pennies.
The HRT Bus lines were privately owned and 
ridership was declining. Public open space 
in Downtown was almost nonexistent. Oahu's 
population was approximately one-half million 
and Downtown's daytime business population 
was probably about 10, 000 persons.
In 1988 (right) Oahu's population has doubled 
but Downtown’s daytime population has 
increased four fold to over 50, 000 persons. 
There are approximately 8 million square 
feet of floor area, 80% of which is contained 
in high rise office buildings, constructed 
since the mid-1960's.
Downtown has an extensive system of public 
plaza's and arcades in the Financial District. 
Retailing is still on Fort Street, a pedestrian 
Mall since 1968, and serves the Downtown 
office workers. Chinatown is redeveloping as 
a historic district with food markets, specialty 
retail and cabarets.
1988
KEY TO LANDMARKS
7 Aloha Tower 
Hawaii Maritime Ctr 
Ocean View Center 
Kuhio Federal Bldg 
Campbell Building 
Amfac Center 
Crosvenor Center
8 Harbor Square
9 Alexander & Baldwin 
10 Davies Pacific Ctr
7 7 Financial Plaza
12 Pioneer Plaza
13 Bishop Trust Bldg
14 Executive Centre
15 Bishop Square
16 First Hawaiian Bank
17 Central Pacific Plaza
18 CB Financial Ctr
19 Hawaii State Capitol
20 District Courts Bldg
21 Howciian Telephone
22 1164 Bishop Street
23 Century Square
24 Kukui Plaza
25 Beretania North
26 Honolulu Tower
27 Smith Beretania
28 Hale Pauohi
29 Maunokea Market
30 A ala Park
drawings by William A. Grant, 
DIA Executive Director
j%4j
Figure 3.8. Representative dra\A^ing of downtown Honolulu in 1988. High-rise office 
buildings have replaced most of the early 20'^ century buildings along Bishop Street and 
near the State Capitol. Source: Downtown Improvement Association February 1988.
The DIA expected financial activities would expand in the Ewa direction along 
King Street. The 1970 edition of Objectives, Purposes, and Policies of the Downtown 
Improvement Association stated that “land assembly by condemnation is probably the 
only effective method of achieving the necessary land assembly to support economically 
large scale redevelopment of the area” (Downtown Improvement Association 1970a).
The inclusion of Chinatown on both the State of Hawaii and National Registers 
of Historic Places forced the DIA to rethink the proper role of Chinatown and its 
relationship to the Financial District. The historical designation diminished the potential 
for high-rise landuse within Chinatown, reinforcing the “up and not out” development 
pattern within the Financial District. The Chinatown historic designation also directly 
affected how landowners could use their property. —. ^
No notification or public hearing was required in 1974 in naming a site to either 
State or Federal Register. Owners or developers could find themselves having already 
incurred considerable preliminary project expenses before discovering that the project 
was potentially cancelled (Downtown Improvement Association May 1974).
The DIA noted that:
While the State and Federal governments have established ways of 
identifying many sites worth saving, they have not provided the economic 
means sufficient to preserve those sites. When government funds are 
available, they are usually channeled to highly visible public projects such 
as restoration of lolani Palace. Private preservation funds are ordinarily 
geared to single buildings or residential areas. The economic burden of 
preserving urban commercial buildings thus falls almost entirely on their 
owners.
(Downtown Improvement Association May 1974)
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Problems faced by landowners of older buildings included:
1. rising land values, which mandate intensive use of central sites.
2. inefficient design of interior spaces for modem use.
3. zoning and tax laws that encourage parcel assembly and “highest use.”
The DIA declared that “to survive, buildings must be both culturally worthwhile
and economically viable.”
The DIA responded to these problems by forming a Historic Sites Committee, 
under the direction of architect Paul Jones, and sought government assistance to 
landowners in the form of “development rights transfers, tax abatements and adaptive 
new uses of old buildings” (Downtown Improvement Association May 1974).
Changes in federal legislation such as the Federal Tax Reform Act of 1976, 1978 
Revenue Act, and Tax Recovery Act of 1981 encouraged private rehabilitation of 
numerous buildings in Chinatown in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Schmicker 1982). 
The DIA supported rehabilitation of such commercial buildings, even listing them in the 
Downtowner (Downtown Improvement Association June 1984).
3.7.3 KUKUl REDEVELOPMENT AREA
The DIA was particularly concerned about Honolulu Redevelopment Agency plans for 
the Kukui Street and Queen Emma areas. Since the land was being cleared, it 
presented an excellent opportunity to integrate redevelopment there with new 
development elsewhere using a master plan (Downtown Improvement Association 
September 1961a).
Honolulu Redevelopment Agency had designated much of the 75 acre Kukui 
Redevelopment Project for commercial use. There was little market demand for the land 
in the early 1960s, however, and the area remained mostly vacant. The DIA,
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recognizing the scarcity of adequate housing in the city, recommended the development 
of high density housing within the Kukui area instead (Downtown Improvement 
Association September 1961a).
The continued vacancy of HRA lands mauka of Beretania brought another DIA 
initiative for housing in the Kukui area in 1971. DIA President M. L. Randolph noted that 
the vacant Block F (Maunakea-Beretania-Nu’uanu-Kukui) was still zoned commercial, 
while housing continued in short supply. The DIA President felt that extension of 
retail/commercial exclusive zoning “cannot help and is sure to hurt the established area 
of Downtown which would amount to ‘urban sprawl’.” Instead, he recommended mixed 
use developments such as the upcoming Kukui Plaza (Downtown Improvement 
Association June 1971).
3.7.4 ALOHA TOWER REDEVELOPMENT
DIA interest in the Waterfront increased over time:
In Position Paper No. 8-68 (adopted August 1968), entitled “Honolulu Harbor and 
Downtown”, the DIA recognized that it had not paid much attention to the harbor area in 
the past because it felt the area was walled off from the Central Business District by 
Nimitz Highway. The DIA was, however, concerned with “dangerous, ugly or noxious 
activities” and requested that such activities operate away from areas adjacent to 
Downtown (Downtown Improvement Association 1970e).
The 1968 Victor Gruen Downtown area plan encouraged the DIA to look at the 
Waterfront as a potential park and recreation site linked to Downtown by a pedestrian 
bridge across Nimitz Highway (Downtown Improvement Association 1970e).
By 1970 the DIA strongly recommended a joint venture between the State of 
Hawai’i and private enterprise to redevelop the terminal area around Aloha Tower. The
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object would be to restore the area as a “people place,” while preserving maritime uses, 
beautifying the area, and retaining low development densities. The project should mean 
replacement of existing buildings with new ones of significant architectural merit 
(Downtown Improvement Association 1975d).
In 1975 the DIA formed a Waterfront Committee, with Harold Elchelberger, 
Campbell Estate Trustee, as Chairman. In 1976 the Committee issued a “Waterfront 
Design Concept” for Honolulu Harbor that promoted the opportunities of harborside 
development, taking view planes, legal and physical constraints into consideration 
(Downtown Improvement Association 1976).
The DIA consistently met with State representatives, overseas developers and 
financiers to promote Waterfront revitalization. In 1980 the State created a semi- 
autonomous Aloha Tower Development Corporation (ATDC) to oversee redevelopment 
of the area, and the DIA gained representation on the ATDC Board. Initial State plans 
for the site had included an international trade center, evolving into an office and hotel 
complex. The key decision by ATDC Executive Director Randall Iwase to allow potential 
developers to determine how best to rebuild the area was a historical turning point in the 
project (Grant 1998). When the request for proposals was closed the DIA folded its 
Waterfront Committee. The ATDC signed an agreement with Aloha Tower Associates to
develop a $700 million complex that included offices, a hotel, luxury condominiums, and 
a festival marketplace.
Unfortunately, subsequent financial difficulties and rising project costs brought 
proposals from the developers to drop two features from the plan, underground parking 
and a pedestrian bridge across Nimitz Highway to Fort Street, and to request the use of 
Irwin Park as the site for an above ground parking garage. The DIA fought the use of 
Irwin Park for the garage, noting that the Aloha Tower Associates’ original design had
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called for restoration of Irwin Park as a green focus for marketplace activities. Aloha 
Tower Associates is currently looking at a site Diamond Head of the Hawaiian Electric 
power plant to augment their meager parking (Gushman 1998).
3.8 EXPIRATION OF THE DIA
The DIA Executive Director, William A. Grant, retired in September of 1996. The Board 
of Directors disbanded the organization in November 1996.
At its demise, the organization had 400 members, a 46 seat Board, and two full 
time staff members.
The closing Downtowner newsletter declared that many DIA objectives 
had been achieved:
Downtown is the premier office center for the State, the Capitol District 
has been developed. Downtown has become an attractive place of 
residence for many and the area is rapidly evolving as an entertainment 
and cultural center...
The public issues facing Downtown now are mostly social concerns. They 
are far different than the economic and physical ones which confronted us 
in the post-war period. Today, the major problems are crime, 
homelessness and street people, pervasive issues which require very 
different remedies than a business group can provide.
(Downtown Improvement Association September 1996)
3.9 LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE
Examination of the thirty-eight year life span of the Downtown Improvement Association 
leads to a number of useful lessons about organizing a long term community 
organization engaged in economic revitalization.
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TABLE 3.3. ORGANIZATION OF THE DOWNTOWN IMPROVEMENT ASSOCIATION:
LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE
Lesson for the Future Application with the DIA Possible Future Use
Communities organize 
when members of a 
neighborhood feel 
something of value to them 
is in danger of being lost (“a 
threaf).
Landowners feared 
potential declines in the 
value of their properties 
Downtown, and organized 
the DIA to revitalize the 
economy of the area.
Aiea, Hilo, Lihue and 
Waipahu all have historic 
commercial districts that 
have been negatively 
impacted by nearby 
shopping centers. 
Landowners, businessmen 
and civic leaders could 
organize groups similar to 
the DIA.
A distinct constituency 
provides group cohesion 
and a sense of direction.
The Downtown
Improvement Association 
represented mostly 
landowners and included 
some area businessmen.
The organization allowed 
members to feel that their 
problems were shared by 
others and gave them the 
confidence that something 
could be done.
Similar groups of 
merchants, property 
owners, financial 
institutions, chamber of 
commerce members, 
schools, neighborhood 
boards and civic clubs 
could organize to 
economically rehabilitate 
formerly vibrant local 
commercial areas. Allies of 
such groups could be 
consumers who want 
convenience, the local 
municipal or county 
government which desire 
tax revenue, and historical 
preservation groups that 
want restoration.
A mission, well defined 
goals and objectives are 
useful tools in providing a 
sense of belonging and 
direction.
The DIA membership’s 
direct interest in the future 
of Downtown provided them 
with a sense of mission.
This mission was 
subsequently organized 
into a set of goals and 
objectives promoting 
development of a vital, 
active Downtown that would 
be a positive place to do 
business.
Community organizations 
interested in economic 
revitalization also need this 
same sense of mission 
because of the amount of 
time and effort necessary 
for success.
Table 3.3 is continued on the next page.
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TABLE 3.3. (CONTINUED): ORGANIZATION OF THE DOWNTOWN IMPROVEMENT
ASSOCIATION: LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE
Lesson for the Future Application with the DIA Possible Future Use
Organized, consistent 
funding allows members to 
predict their expenses and 
creates a sense of 
belonging to the group; 
allows the organization to 
plan its annual expenses; 
and provides credibility to 
the association in the eyes 
of government and other 
bodies because it suggests 
permanency. The ability to 
request funding for special 
projects can be useful in 
meeting unexpected 
opportunities for social 
betterment.
The DIA’s main funding 
source was dues from 
landowners, based on a 
percentage of their real 
property taxes. Retail 
organizations negotiated 
their own rates.
Special projects 
were funded through 
networks of affected 
corporations and 
individuals. Special 
projects included parking 
studies and the Nu’uanu 
Avenue Police Substation.
Perhaps the role of the DIA 
has not been finished in 
Downtown Honolulu.
Current area issues include 
a park for local residents on 
Smith Street at Beretania, 
the need for a new 
occupant for the F.W. 
Woolworth space on the
Fort Street Mall, new ideas 
for a rapid transit system, 
etc. Only a long term 
oriented, well financed 
organization can make itself 
felt as well as the DIA once 
was on such issues of 
concern for the Downtown 
area.
Two types of committees 
need to be organized in 
order to focus personnel 
resources: standing and 
special projects 
committees.
Standing
committees could include 
an Executive Committee, 
charged with identifying 
opportunities and threats, 
and engaging in long term 
planning; a Board of
Directors to set policy; and 
a Membership Committee 
to encourage new 
membership.
Special projects 
committees, in contrast, 
would concentrate on 
specific areas of 
opportunity or threat.
This was the organizational 
pattern of the DIA, allowing 
both long term focus and 
new opportunities to be 
addressed by talented, 
motivated individuals. The 
DIA, for example, set up a 
special Waterfront
Committee in addition to its 
standing Executive 
Committee.
Standing committees in Hilo 
could develop plans to have 
the bulk of government 
services remain in 
downtown rather than move 
to outlying areas such as 
Kaiko’o Mall.
A special project 
committee in Hilo could 
help develop a railway 
museum downtown to tell 
the story of the Hawaii 
Consolidated Railway.
Such a facility could be 
patterned after California’s 
popular state railway 
museum in Sacramento.
Another special 
project committee that 
might exist in downtown 
Honolulu would concentrate 
on the economic health of 
Fort Street. Included in its 
agenda would be finding a 
replacement for F.W. 
Woolworth.
Table 3.3 is continued on the next page.
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TABLE 3.3. (CONTINUED): ORGANIZATION OF THE DOWNTOWN IMPROVEMENT
ASSOCIATION: LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE
Lessons for the Future Application with the DIA Possible Future Use
Organizations engaging in
economic revitalization 
need a professional staff 
person who can “talk shop” 
with government officials 
and other experienced 
individuais in the private 
sector. Such a person 
furthers stability, gives a 
voice of authority to policy 
positions, implies credibility, 
creates a contact center, 
provides information, and 
organizes volunteers.
The DIA was fortunate in 
that it could afford an 
experienced, professional 
Executive Director. William 
Grant, for example, helped 
member organizations 
negotiate with government 
officials over such issues as 
building envelopes for new 
construction.
Many organizations may 
not have the financial 
resources available that the 
DIA had in order to get 
experienced staff. If this is 
true, organizations seeking 
a professionai staff 
member(s) could hire a 
retired architect, planner or 
engineer. Newly licensed 
individuals could also be 
considered. Partial funding 
might even be considered 
from the local municipal 
government, but it should 
be noted that such funding 
may become political in 
nature.
An economics education
program for members, 
especially decision makers, 
is important to minimize 
unpianned or undesired 
results of policy. Included 
should be:
1. understanding 
the relationship between 
economic activity, property 
values and tax revenues.
2. the business 
cycle, including supply and 
demand.
3. the development 
process, including creating 
project proposals, 
estimating costs, hiring of 
architects and contractors, 
complying with building 
codes, managing risk, 
determining necessary 
equity capital, application 
for construction loans and 
permanent financing.
One major advantage that 
the DIA enjoyed in pursuing 
its agenda of economic 
revitalization was that its 
members were mostly 
landowners and other 
business people well 
versed in economics. They 
understood that 
encouraging economic 
activity was the key to 
growth in land values and 
the tax revenues necessary 
to support area services.
This knowledge and their 
long term outlook allowed
DIA members to wait out 
tough economic times until 
the business cycle returned 
to a more positive mode. 
Confidence in themselves 
furthered innovation in such 
projects as the Financial 
Plaza’s condominium 
concept.
Understanding the 
development process and 
the skills of a professional 
staff can allow revitalization 
organizations to become 
more and more proactive - 
to engage in larger, more 
complex projects. Thus 
revitalization efforts could 
move from simply assisting 
area maintenance to 
teaching members about 
the tax advantages of 
rehabilitation, or perhaps 
even acting as developer of 
low cost housing. In
Honolulu, for example, 
community groups could 
follow the role of the DIA 
and the Hawai’i Council for 
Housing Action to develop 
more residences in 
underutilized areas such as 
Iwilei.
Table 3.3 is continued on the next page.
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Organizations based upon
meeting serious broad 
based problems require a 
long term outlook. Such 
perception allows 
development of resources 
such as expertise and 
economic support that 
improves opportunities for 
program success.
The DIA was founded by
landowners and 
businessmen wishing to 
address a complex problem 
- economic revitalization - 
that could not be solved by 
any single action. The
DIA’s long term outlook 
allowed it to identify and 
develop a program of 
enhanced economic 
activity, improved access 
and large scale planning.
Economic revitalization of 
downtown Hilo, Lihue, and 
Waipahu will require the 
same long term 
commitment by local 
community organizations.
A long range, 
comprehensive 
revitalization plan results 
from such long term 
thinking. It should include 
the following:
1. assisting 
existing businesses to 
improve customer service.
2. finding tenants 
for existing unused or 
underutilized space.
3. promoting the 
downtown as a place to do 
business.
4. examination and 
inventory of local market 
conditions, identifying 
problems and opportunities.
5. formation of a 
plan to exploit identified 
opportunities.
6. work with 
government to provide 
necessary amenities and 
develop projects that the 
market alone cannot 
provide.
The DIA undertook a series
of economic, land use and 
transportation studies 
immediately after its 
creation. These studies 
inventoried the area, and 
evaluated its strengths and 
weaknesses. Based upon 
the information gathered, 
the DIA created a three tier 
plan to reinvigorate the 
area. This led to locating or 
retaining state and private 
decision making Downtown; 
assisting the City in 
development of a master 
plan; and increasing 
economic activity with the 
construction of pedestrian 
retail malls.
An inventory of local market 
conditions that identifies 
problems and opportunities 
can identify industries that 
have successfully located in 
similar areas. The results 
of this “opportunity” 
inventory could be shared 
with the local
entrepreneurial community 
to encourage startups.
Table 3.3 is continued on the next page.
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ASSOCIATION: LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE
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Coalition building, 
information dissemination 
and other efforts to garner 
community support are 
necessary to win success 
for the organization’s 
program.
The DIA was always willing 
to form coalitions with other 
groups interested in 
maintaining the economic 
viability of Downtown. 
Alliances were thus formed 
periodically with the O’ahu 
Development Conference, 
the Chamber of Commerce, 
Historic Hawai’i Foundation, 
and the Outdoor Circle.
The DIA also was an active 
lobbyist at both the State 
and City levels. During the 
State Capitol project the
DIA also financed 
information gathering and 
petition methods to gain 
public support.
Economic revitalization 
organizations will need to 
work with other community 
groups, businesses, social 
agencies, etc., in helping 
determine where the 
community itself wants 
government amenities such 
as a rapid transit system.
This improves their 
chances of government 
listening to their wishes.
Economic
revitalization groups can 
also develop themselves as 
accurate sources of 
information. This is useful 
to themselves, government 
and media, and can be the 
basis for improved 
relationships between all 
three.
Public-private relationships
will increasingly include 
partnerships where both 
parties will contribute 
resources to a common 
project.
The DIA preferred that
government provide 
strategic infrastructure 
improvements and then 
leave redevelopment to 
private business. The 
Financial Plaza of the
Pacific demonstrated this.
However, the DIA 
did engage in public-private 
partnerships where the DIA 
felt it had an effective voice 
and the project made 
economic sense. For 
example, the placement 
process for the Hawai’i
State Capitol involved a 
close working relationship 
between the DIA’s Robert 
Midkiff and the Legislature’s 
George Koga.
The City is again 
considering the possibility 
of a rapid transit system 
and will probably be 
seeking private assistance 
in paying for it. Community 
organizations intent on 
economic revitalization of 
their areas could act as 
facilitators with local 
businesses and civic 
groups to plan the route 
and station sites.
Table 3.3 is continued on the next page.
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Community organizations 
intent on promoting their 
downtowns must prepare 
“new generations” of 
member/leaders to continue 
the effort after the present 
generation wishes to retire. 
Although the particular 
problems and economic 
opportunities may change, 
downtowns will always 
need promotion of their 
interests.
As had the ODC before it 
when Aaron Levine retired, 
the DIA expired with the 
retirement of William Grant. 
The organization’s 
leadership said that the 
challenges facing
Downtown had changed 
from those upon which the 
organization was founded.
Downtown Honolulu today 
(1998) still faces problems 
of parking, park space, 
retail turnover, 
transportation, etc., which 
will become more difficult 
when economic health 
returns. An organization 
promoting Downtown’s 
economic health is still 
needed.
CHAPTER 4. HAWAI’I STATE CAPITOL PLACEMENT (1969)
4.1 GOAL: PLACING THE NEW HAWAII STATE CAPITOL DOWNTOWN
Anchor the government decision making center by locating the new State 
Capitol in central Honolulu, thus ensuring that all State, City and federal 
headquarters buildings were part of downtown.
(Midkiff 1980)
4.2 DESCRIPTION OF THE PROJECT
The Hawai’i State Capitol Building occupies the center of the Richards-Hotel-Punchbowl- 
Beretania block.
The Hawai’i State Capitol is organized as follows:
1. Underground: Legislative chambers, large meeting rooms and parking.
2. Ground Floor: Open rotunda.
3. Second Floor: Senate offices.
4. Third-Fourth Floor: House of Representatives offices.
5. Fifth Floor: Governor and Lieutenant Governor offices.
The openness of the Hawai’i State Capitol is its most significant feature. “Bridge 
like’’ entrances crossing ponds lead into a large open central rotunda. The rotunda 
offers views on either side of the State Senate and House Of Representatives below. 
Above, expansive open walkways on each office level offer informal areas to conduct the 
people’s business.
Architects: John Carl Warnecke and Associates and Belt, Lemmon and Lo. 
Contractor: Reed and Martin, Inc. Cost: $28 million. Constructed: 1965-1969,
(Honolulu Advertiser 10/16/1968; Bilby 1969).
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4.3 BACKGROUND OF THE PROJECT
During most of the Territorial period, lolani Palace had contained both legislative and 
executive functions. The Palace had been designed to meet the needs of the monarchy 
of an isolated, thinly inhabited kingdom, and not those of a much more populous 
democracy. Hawai’i’s new State government needed large scale meeting facilities and 
greatly expanded office space. A new facility would accommodate the new needs of the 
State and allow restoration of lolani Palace into a museum representing the monarchy 
period.
As a result, in 1959 the Legislature appropriated $100,000 for the design of a 
new Capitol. The location of the new Capitol was expected to become a major activity 
center and raise land values within the selected neighborhood. Potential sites included:
1. Fort Armstrong, where extensive landfills were projected to provide a large 
enough site for the project. Atherton Richards proposed a large fountain of water 
cascading from the roof of a new Capitol building located at this Waterfront site as a 
landmark attraction.
2. Kane’ohe, at the present site of Hawai’i Pacific University, with the lush 
Ko’olau Mountains as a backdrop. This site would be donated by Harold Castle, whose 
family owned extensive lands in the- area under the name Kane’ohe Ranch.
3. the Ala Wai Golf Course, already government owned land, supported by 
Senator Oren E. Long.
4. various proposals made to locate the new structure on the neighbor islands, 
supported by representatives from those locations (Midkiff 1980).
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4.4 DIA INVOLVEMENT AND PROJECT EVOLUTION
As mentioned previously, the DIA hired mainland real estate consultant James Downs, 
in 1959 to evaluate Honolulu’s real estate future. Downs strongly recommended the 
location of government headquarters in downtown Honolulu. The largest possible site 
near the existing Palace was the block immediately mauka -the area bordered by 
Richards, Hotel, Punchbowl and Beretania Streets. This site offered Downtown 
businesses the best access to government officials and potential government customers. 
This site would also maintain central government authority in the historic government 
district. Its main drawback was the location of the historic lolani Barracks within the 
proposed Capitol block.
After a citizens’ committee chaired by Frank Midkiff narrowly approved the Fort 
Armstrong site, competition firmed around either Fort Armstrong or the civic center site. 
The DIA had established a Civic Center Committee, with Robert Midkiff as Chairman. 
The DIA Committee had a scale model of the proposed Civic Center built, showing how 
a new Capitol would fit within the site, and providing walking access times from the new 
Capitol to other key government offices.
When property values began skyrocketing around the potential new Downtown 
site, inappropriate development threatened to overshadow the area. A DIA “Friends of 
the Civic Center” group gathered 10,000 signatures supporting the DIA favored location. 
The Legislature barely passed the required funding bill, and a high-rise at Hotel and 
Punchbowl Streets was averted.
Meanwhile, the DIA model was presented to then Governor, William Quinn, with 
a request for release of the $100,000 Capitol design appropriation. Governor Quinn 
appointed an architect selection committee. DIA member Robert Midkiff and State 
Representative George “Scotty” Koga became co-chairmen. Included in the 12 person
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Figure 4.1. Aerial photograph of the Richards and Hotel intersection prior to 
development of the State Capitol. The area consisted of a mixture of warehouses, office 
buildings, parking lots, a church, and the Armed Forces YMCA. Of the buildings shown 
in the photograph, less than a third would remain standing in 1998. Source: Camera 
Hawaii, Inc.
Figure 4.2. The DlA’s scale model of the proposed State Capitol District. Source: 
, Camera Hawaii, Inc.
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committee were neighbor islanders; legislative members from both parties; and 
representatives from the Governor’s office, the City of Honolulu, and the federal General 
Services Administration.
It was decided that the committee would choose both the architect and design for 
the new Capitol directly, rather than through an AIA style design competition. Architects 
from around the world were welcomed to submit proposals, provided they worked in 
conjunction with a local design and engineering team, so that local building codes, 
zoning and climate would be followed.
Of the 39 architectural firms that originally showed interest, 28 actually made 
presentations. The winning design was patterned after a proposed U.S. Embassy 
planned for Bangkok, Thailand, and was the work of the national firm John Carl 
Wamecke and Associates and a local company. Belt, Lemmon and Lo (lyiidkiff 1980).
The committee headed by Midkiff and Koga accepted the 13th submittal by the 
Wamecke-Belt, Lemmon and Lo architectural group for a structure with an open center, 
rising from reflecting pools. According to John Carl Warnecke, the original design idea 
for the building was a heiau (native Hawaiian religious structure). This would be a 
long, low platform with offices below and one story above ground. Above 
this was a great plaza, over which floated a sculptural form...The plaza 
evolved into a spacious pavilion, the two floors of the heiau scheme were 
elevated into the air, and the openness of the sculptural canopy was 
retained in a wide open dome and the entire structure was floated in 
water to reflect and symbolize the island state... (The final design 
integrated) the never-changing relationship of man to scale through the 
ancient and classical use of columns which made it possible to retain the 
open, airy feeling of the original concept. They serve a very practical
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Figure 4.3. Signature petitions gathered by the DIA in support for a new Downtown 
State Capitol building. The photograph was taken on the steps of lolani Palace. Source: 
Camera Hawaii, Inc.
Figure 4.4. State Senator Daniel Inouye endorsing the Capitol design and plan. Source; 
Camera Hawaii, Inc.
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Figure 4.5. Hawai’i State Capitol 1998, looking Ewa-makai. Note the high-rise office 
redevelopment that has occurred on the right, as the DIA had hoped. The high-rises 
include both private and State construction. Source: Author.
Figure 4.6. Interior courtyard of the Hawai’i State Capitol, with a view of legislative 
chambers on the left, and open lanais (patios) conducive to discussing government 
business fronting offices above. Source: Author.
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I.
purpose also: the legislative and department office levels are suspended 
from these fluted, tapered and towering columns.
(Warnecke 1969)
In 1962 new Governor John A. Bums accepted the proposed Capitol design 
(Midkiff 1980).
4.5 ANALYSIS OF THE PROJECT
4.5.1 ALEXANDER GARVIN ANALYSIS
TABLE 4.1. GARVIN’S BACKGROUND REQUIREMENTS FOR SUCCESSFUL 
PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS
Requirement Evaluation
Effective input from all 
stakeholders
The project deliberately strove to include all members of 
the community, including the city, state, and federal 
governments, civic, religious, business and ethnic 
groups, and O’ahu and neighbor islanders.
Understanding what planning 
can and cannot accomplish
In contrast to lolani Palace, which was designed in part 
as a private residence, architects of the new Hawai’i
State Capitol sought to create an open, inviting and 
centralized activity center for political interaction. The 
democratic symbolism of easy access to all levels is 
deliberate.
Understanding how physical 
changes to the urban 
environment can improve the 
economy, quality of life, and 
city function
The DIA favored the site for providing Downtown 
businesses with access to government functions.
Traffic, land valuation and other impacts were studied. 
Potential negative economics such as height restrictions 
in an extended Capitol District were addressed.
Creating positive change and 
preventing negative change
Create Positive Change.
The new Capitol created positive change through 
increased open space in the heart of the city. The site 
ultimately encouraged new private construction along 
the Ewa side of Richards Street, and makai of Queen 
Street.
Prevent Negative Change.
The project prevented negative change by discouraging 
blight between Downtown and the new Capitol District.
An example of this is the successive development of the 
makai side of Hotel Street between Richards and
Alakea Streets, where “adult entertainment’’ has been 
replaced by the Alii Place office complex (Author).
69
TABLE 4.2. GARVIN’S FRAMEWORK OF GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS TO 
ENCOURAGE PRIVATE INVESTMENT
Government Program Evaluation
Strategic investment in 
infrastructure, rather 
than routine capital 
spending
Construction of the new Capitol in the location desired by the
DIA entailed purchase of additional downtown property, 
demolition of the old Armory, and relocation of lolani Barracks, 
in addition to erection of the new building. The project 
succeeded in raising property values (and tax collections) in 
nearby areas, and encouraged private 
development/redevelopment on its Ewa edge. Private projects 
include;
1. Alii Place
2. renovation of the old Armed Forces YMCA into the 
One Capitol Plaza.
3. the 1100 Alakea Building
4. Central Pacific Plaza
5. Pacific Trade Center (first phase of Bishop Square)
6. Pauahi Tower (second phase of Bishop Square)
Regulatory policies 
that set the character 
of an area or lessen 
private investment risk
Character of the Area
A height limitation and the “Great Park” concept later 
developed for the Capitol District created an “oasis of open 
space” within the central city.
Lessen Private Investment Risk
Properties with potential views of the newly created open space 
became highly desirable development sites (i.e.. Alii Place and 
No. 1 Capitol District). Financial institutions are generally more 
willing to lend to projects near centers of activity than peripheral 
ones.
Incentives for desired 
private development
This being a public project, no formal incentives were offered. 
However, potentially large numbers of government workers 
utilizing space and services in adjacent properties (positive 
externality) encouraged landowners to further develop their 
holdings.
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TABLE 4.3. GARVIN’S INGREDIENTS OF PROJECT SUCCESS
Ingredient for 
Success
Evaluation
Market The market for the project was the State government, the general
public, and tourists. The new State of Hawai’i had visibly outgrown 
lolani Palace, and a larger facility was needed to facilitate public 
access to government. Thus there was popular consensus that a 
“statement” building accommodating larger numbers of people was 
needed to represent the entity created by Statehood. The booming 
“Statehood” economy created confidence in the government and 
public that the project was possible and affordable.
Location Inherent Site Characteristics
The chosen site had the disadvantage of limited space compared to 
alternatives at Fort Armstrong and Kane’ohe, and required the 
deliberate construction of vistas (i.e., the still incomplete mauka mall) 
and setbacks (redirection of Beretania Street) to make it appear 
more dignified.
Proximity
The DIA succeeded in framing the discussion of a new Capitol 
placement, convincing both the public and government sector of the 
practicality of locating at the civic center site near both existing 
Downtown services and government offices.
Design The Capitol’s architecture invokes interest for several reasons:
1. The building is a radical departure from traditional state 
capital designs.
2. The structure has developed a popular mystique highly 
symbolic of Hawai’i’s origins: a volcanic island rising out of the sea, 
with a large “caldera” and surrounded by “palm trees.”
3. The project offers an open style, “inviting” the public to 
participate in decision making.
4. Also symbolic is the idea that the legislature can be 
viewed from the central open space — the legislature is below, 
meaning that the government works for the people.
It should be noted that the building opens out directly onto
Hotel Street, a major entry point to Downtown and a candidate for a 
rapid transit station that could further connect the Capitol to all parts 
of the island.
Financing The new State of Hawai’i covered the costs of construction and
maintenance through taxes.
Entrepreneurship DIA representative Midkiff, and Legislative member Koga, provided
this function. They were instrumental in choosing the location, 
architect and design for the structure, monitoring even the 
construction work until the project was complete. DIA was thus 
influential in all phases of the project.
Table 4.3 is continued on the next page.
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TABLE 4.3. (CONTINUED): GARVIN’S INGREDIENTS FOR PROJECT SUCCESS
Ingredient for 
Success
Evaluation
Time Immediate
The Hawai’i State Capitol, located upon a slight rise on Beretania 
Street, was designed to impress upon approach. What is interesting 
is how it also is designed to invite the pedestrian to enter. Bridge­
like structures cross reflecting pools, bringing pedestrians into a 
huge, open, central area. While the height of the building internally 
reflects the power of government, the open central area provides 
unity among the various levels. From the open central area one can 
monitor legislative activity. Continuous patios on all upper levels 
provide sheltered areas to communicate business, and to even 
communicate with individuals below.
The 24 Hour Day
Because of its special nature, activity can occur at any hour of day or 
night during sessions of the Legislature. When not in legislative 
session or under some other deadline, the facility adheres to a 
Monday through Friday 8:00AM-4:30PM schedule.
Decades
Although recently extensively renovated, the architectural 
distinctiveness of the Hawai’i State Capitol has been maintained. 
Recently the building had a number of improvements done, including 
removal of asbestos. The structure, made mostly of concrete, 
provides concerns about leaks into the lowest level from the 
reflecting pools above. Considering the nature of the building as the 
State Capitol, and its central location among many government 
offices and the Governor’s Residence (Washington Place), it is 
highly likely that proper maintenance funding will be provided.
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4.5.2 THE “PLANNING” AND “BUILT” LEGACIES
TABLE 4.4. THE “PLANNING” AND “BUILT” LEGACIES
Legacy Evaluation
Planning Legacy The Hawai’i State Capitol project placement process 
“popularized” planning more than any project had done so 
before.
1. The use of scale models in the Capitol project would 
be soon copied by other developments. For example, the 
Financial Plaza of the Pacific used a scale model fitted into 
aerial photographs (Hawai’i Business and Industry March
1966a).
2. Distance-time studies, drawings, and other vehicles 
to entice public participation were also copied. A good example 
was the O’ahu Urban Design Project (UDP), written by the
O’ahu Development Conference in 1968, and encompassing 
the leeward O’ahu shoreline from Honolulu Airport to Diamond 
Head. UDP incorporated three-dimensional “drawings which 
incorporate the various schemes, (so that) people can see what 
these ideas will do to an area and how they will affect the 
adjoining areas” (Hawai’i Business and Industry March 1968b).
3. The DIA’s successful effort in obtaining a downtown 
Capitol site became a role model of community group 
organizing, visioning, and use of a large scale plan. The DIA 
and ODC would use this method again (i.e., the UDP study, 
etc.) to further participation in the planning process.
The decision making process utilized in the 
development of the Hawai’i State Capitol provided the catalyst 
necessary to develop the Capitol District Master Plan 
developed by John Carl Warnecke and Associates.
Built Legacy The DIA has ensured that for the foreseeable future, state 
government will have a significant economic impact on 
downtown Honolulu. It can be argued that within Downtown, 
the location of the State Capitol has had the effect of directing 
newer development from the Financial District toward it, at the 
expense of the Fort Street and Chinatown areas. Furthermore, 
by locating State government so close to Downtown, State 
agencies directly compete with the private sector for parking, 
office space, etc. This would increase the value and density of 
nearby Downtown properties.
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4.6 LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE
TABLE 4.5. HAWAI’I STATE CAPITOL PLACEMENT: LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE
Lesson for the Future Application in the Project Possible Future Use
The ability of community 
organizations to aid in 
consensus building
It was the DIA’s vision that 
organized public support 
for the downtown Capitol 
site and opposition to 
development of a high-rise 
there.
When projects such as the 
recently completed Kahekili 
Highway widening provoked 
community displeasure over 
its design, it is apparent that 
government-community 
communication needs work. 
By “networking” within 
neighborhoods, community 
organizations can aid 
government planners by 
explaining design choices 
and developing consensus 
before plans are finalized.
The importance of sufficient 
resources to the 
development and 
effectiveness of community 
organizations
Business groups such as 
the DIA often have access 
to more resources than 
most other community 
groups. Business and 
other community groups 
accomplished the goal of a 
downtown Capitol by 
combining their resources.
Broader use of methods 
used by organizations such 
as the Nature Conservancy, 
which actively seeks broad 
sources of financial and 
manpower support for 
creation and maintenance 
of nature preserves.
Public-private financial and 
operational cooperation
The DIA financed the
Capitol model and helped 
organize public support for 
the Civic Center site. The 
State provided funding for 
land purchase. George 
“Scotty” Koga of the State 
Legislature and Robert 
Midkiff of the DIA 
cooperated throughout the 
Capitol design phase, 
resulting in a unique and 
dynamic structure.
In this time of heavy fiscal 
demands and limited 
resources, public-private 
support of public services 
should be encouraged. A 
current example of this 
concept is the Makiki
Library, where private 
funding sources help keep 
that facility in operation.
Along the same line, 
expansion of the State’s 
Adopt-a-Highway and the 
City’s Adapt-a-Park 
program should be 
undertaken.
Table 4.5 is continued on the next page.
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TABLE 4.5. (CONTINUED): HAWAI’I STATE CAPITOL PLACEMENT: LESSONS FOR 
THE FUTURE
Lesson for the Future Application in the Project Possible Future Use
Positive economic impact of 
government location close 
to the business center
Honolulu is unique among 
American cities in locating 
the business and political 
communities within walking 
distance of one another.
The DIA was correct in 
determining that a 
downtown Capitol location 
would have a positive 
effect on Downtown, as 
State offices there have 
contributed to retail sales, 
rents and land values.
Outer island communities 
such as Hilo and Lihue 
should explore returning 
government into depressed 
downtowns as a 
revitalization method, rather 
than moving such activities 
into peripheral shopping 
centers.
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CHAPTER 5. THE FINANCIAL PLAZA OF THE PACIFIC (1968)
5.1 GOAL: ANCHOR THE BUSINESS DECISION-MAKING CENTER
DOWNTOWN
Anchor the business decision-making center of the 50"’ state downtown 
by building a sort of ‘Rockefeller Center’ to serve as a business magnet 
and catalyst.
(Midkiff 1980)
5.2 DESCRIPTION OF THE PROJECT
The project was the world’s largest commercial condominium when built. It occupies the 
total block bounded by Fort-Merchant-Bishop and King Streets, and contains three 
buildings: the twenty-one story Pacific Century Tower (originally the Castle and Cooke 
Building and later known as the Bancorp Tower), the twelve story American Savings and 
Loan Building, and the six story Bank of Hawai’i Building.
Architects: Victor Gruen Associatess and Leo Wou. Contractor: Hawaiian 
Dredging & Construction Company. Cost: $20,200,000. Constructed: 1965-68 
(Dovyntown Improvement Association March 1967b).
5.3 BACKGROUND OF THE PROJECT
In the early 1960s, Al Boeke, Vice President of Castle and Cooke subsidiary Oceanic 
Properties, was assigned to study replacing the parent firm’s aging C. W. Dickey edifice 
on the comer of Merchant and Bishop Streets. Boeke contacted a personal friend of his, 
architect Victor Gruen, for design help (Haight 1998).
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As potential plans were considered, other property owners in the block 
expressed interest in redevelopment proposals. In 1963, Scott Pratt, President of 
Hawaiian Trust Company, arranged an initial meeting. The landowners were:
1. Castle and Cooke
2. Bishop National Bank
3. American Savings and Loan Association
4. Territorial Savings and Loan Association
5. Wilcox Development Company
6. Austin Trust (R. Midkiff 1998).
Encouraged by the expression of interest, Gruen envisioned a block wide project 
patterned after Manhattan’s Rockefeller Center -- a high quality project combining the 
economic advantages of high-rise construction with open space for people-related 
activities at ground level.
Local architect Leo Wou was called in to help develop designs for the proposed 
complex due to his expertise with pre-stressed, post tension concrete. The project 
would feature new construction techniques because all forms were molded elsewhere 
and assembled on-site (Haight 1998).
As the scale of the project broadened, the corresponding workload expanded. 
Oceanic Properties President Warren Haight and Planner Al Boeke conducted the real 
estate paperwork, and local attorney Martin Anderson handled legal matters (Haight 
1998).
The major hurdles facing the project were:
1. assembling the land.
2. getting necessary zoning.
3. setting up an organization for ownership of the new complex (Haight 1998).
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5.4 DIA INVOLVEMENT AND PROJECT EVOLUTION
The Downtown Improvement Association saw the proposed project as a potential 
catalyst in rebuilding Downtown and maintaining it as the home of Hawaii’s major 
corporations. DIA members Robert Midkiff and Moses L. Randolph were intimately 
involved with the development of what became the Financial Plaza of the Pacific.
Robert Midkiff facilitated consensus between the landowners and between the 
landowners and government.
Midkiff, who personaiiy knew representatives of all six property owners, 
suggested using a commercial condominium ownership arrangement for the new 
project. The Hawaiian Trust Company had successfully pooled private property in a 
Kalihi redevelopment project, and he felt confident the same could be done Downtown. 
Nothing, however, had ever been done with commercial condominiums on this scale.
The 1963 State of Hawaii Act 170-A Horizontal Property Law, and several 
modifications approved in 1964, allowed real property to be divided into “condominium 
units” and common elements. The law allowed such property to be bought, sold, 
exchanged, mortgaged or willed to others. Original land owners exchanged their land 
and buildings for the land under the new condominium project on a tax-free basis using 
Sections 1031 (a) and (b) of the internal Revenue Code. Each of the six owners 
received his proportionate share in the new condominium project based on an 
independent fair market appraisal of his previous land and buildings (Midkiff 1965, 1980, 
1998; Haight 1998).
Units not occupied by owners were held in common and managed by an 
independent rental agent, thus providing a uniform set of rentais based on value of the 
space. Each owner was then taxed on their share of the rentals collected by the 
common agent.
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One of the six entities involved was a family tmst legally restricted from the long 
term borrowing necessary for redevelopment. MIdkiff, in 1965, explained that:
In exchange for increased rental income for the next 33 years, with step- 
ups for inflation, the trust leased its units to the condominium. The long­
term loan which will 100 per cent finance the construction will be paid off 
in 28 years, and some years thereafter the trust will receive back its 
condominium units, free and clear of loan.
(Midkiff 1965)
Midkiff also brokered a complex property swap between the six principals and the 
Bank of Hawai’i. Bishop Trust Company, an occupant of the original block, had 
determined that it wanted to maintain a clearly defined business address in fee simple.
At the same time, the Bank of Hawai’i, located across King Street from the Financial 
Plaza site, needed additional office space that its existing facility could not 
accommodate. An agreement was reached wherein Bank of Hawai’i became a 
participant in the Financial Plaza, with its own building. Bishop Trust Company 
temporarily remained on the Financial Plaza site during construction of the Plaza’s 
buildings. Once the Bank of Hawai’i’s new Financial Plaza building was complete, the 
Bank would move into the Financial Plaza and Bishop Trust Company would move into 
the Bank’s annex building on King Street. The original Bank of Hawai’i building would 
then be demolished to make way for a new Bishop Trust Company building (Midkiff 
1965, 1988; Ames 1996).
Governance of the project took two forms. Initially all proposals had to be 
unanimous. Once the project was underway, however, time became critical. Under 
terms of a master agreement, each property owner agreed to turn title of his project over 
to a trust to be operated by a management committee representing all property owners.
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Figure 5.1. The Financial Plaza of the Pacific looking Ewa-makai in 1998. The high-rise 
on the left originally contained Castle and Cooke. Ltd., and Territorial Savings and Loan 
Association, and in 1998 is occupied by the Bank of Hawaii The main Bank of Hawai’i 
Building is on the right. American Savings is barely visible behind in the center. Source: 
Author.
Figure 5.2. The Financial Plaza of the Pacific looking Diamond Head-makai in 1998. 
The prominent building in the center is occupied by the Bank of Hawai’i, and the Fort 
Street Mall is in the right foreground. Source; Author.
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The management committee had authority to make decisions with the approval of 
committee members representing eighty per cent of the condominium.
Midkiff also acted as facilitator between government officials and the landowners’ 
architects. The City was in the midst of redoing its zoning program, exploring the idea of 
developer incentives that allowed more structural height if more open space was 
provided at ground level. The Financial Plaza of the Pacific became a model of such 
incentive zoning later formalized under the new Comprehensive Zoning Code (Haight 
1998; Grant 1998).
DIA representative and Campbell Estate Trustee M. L. Randolph was 
instrumental in gaining the cooperation of the Estate for development of a new building 
in the makai-Ewa comer of Merchant and Fort Streets. The new Campbell Building, 
although just off the main block, was an instrumental component of the Financial Plaza. 
Water table concerns and the need for underground vaults at the Bank of Hawai’i 
precluded large parking facilities within the main block. Instead, arrangements were 
made so that the necessary parking for the Financial Plaza was built into the Campbell 
Building (Haight 1998).
The development of the Financial Plaza of the Pacific meant the loss of two 
Honolulu landmarks: the Lewers and Cooke and Bank of Hawai’i buildings. The Bank of 
Hawai’i Building was especially memorable because of its pioneering role providing 
greenery and open space in a downtown setting (Ames 1996).
The Financial Plaza of the Pacific was the first new “Class A” building complex in 
downtown Honolulu, meaning that it was of recent construction, in a prime location, 
enjoyed high occupancy, and had highly competitive rental rates (Hawai’i Business, 
1986). This implies a prestigious address. Most Downtown structures at the time had 
been developed during the 1920s and were dated, inefficient, and insufficient in size to
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Bmeet current business demands. The Financial Plaza of the Pacific set the stage for 
numerous other full block “Class A” projects by T.H. Davies, Amfac, First Hawaiian 
Bank, etc. (Clark 1998; Haight 1998).
5.5 ANALYSIS OF THE PROJECT
5.5.1 ALEXANDER GARVIN ANALYSIS
TABLE 5.1. GARVIN’S BACKGROUND REQUIREMENTS FOR SUCCESSFUL 
PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS
Requirement Evaluation
Effective input from all 
stakeholders
The condominium arrangement, although new for the 
time in a commercial development, provided that each 
landowner would have a stake in the new project. The 
key decisions, facilitated by DIA representative R.
Midkiff, were acceptance of the condominium concept 
and that the underlying appraisal was fair.
Understanding what planning 
can and cannot accomplish
The developers and DIA were trying to create a quality 
focal point for business in the city. They realized that 
there was risk inherent in doing so large a project in an 
area that had been mostly characterized by smaller or 
less architecturally unique developments.
Understanding how physical 
changes to the urban 
environment can improve the 
economy, quality of life, and 
city function
Development of the Financial Plaza of the Pacific was 
meant as a physical statement, both to the public and to 
government, that business intended to remain
Downtown. The project was meant as a catalyst for 
further private and public development (Midkiff 1980).
Creating positive change and 
preventing negative change
Create Positive Change
The Financial Plaza of the Pacific was meant to incite 
rebuilding in Downtown. The Financial Plaza of the 
Pacific built on the landscaping traditions of the original 
Bank of Hawai’i and Alexander and Baldwin Buildings, 
adding to that tradition by including large amounts of 
open space. It was a successful catalyst because T.H. 
Davies, Amfac, and the Hawaiian Telephone Company 
subsequently redeveloped their large lots with large 
office buildings complimented by generous open space. 
Prevent Negative Change
The Financial Plaza of the Pacific and Campbell 
buildings were erected to maintain Downtown as the 
center of business decision-making in Hawai’i, 
encourage rebuilding to prevent further deterioration of 
the area, and to increase the population of office 
workers available as customers for suffering retail 
businesses along Fort Street.
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TABLE 5.2. GARVIN’S FRAMEWORK OF GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS TO 
ENCOURAGE PRIVATE INVESTMENT
Government Programs Evaluation
Strategic investment in 
infrastructure, rather 
than routine capital 
spending
As the physical and economic conditions of downtown Honolulu 
declined in the early and mid 1960s, concerns mounted in both 
City government and business circles as to what could be 
done. The result was increasing cooperation between the 
Blaisdell Administration and the business community. Most 
significant was the agreement by the City to hire Victor Gruen 
Associatess for a master plan for the CBD, which was 
scheduled for completion in 1968. The plan contained such 
features as $100 million in new public parking garages, the Fort 
Street Mall, beautification of Bishop Street, a rapid transit line, 
etc. The DIA worked with Gruen and City Planning Director 
Frank Skrivanek on the plan while the DIA also worked with the 
Financial Plaza principals on that project. Thus the DIA knew 
that the City and County of Honolulu would back the Financial 
Plaza of the Pacific project with an integrated program of 
strategic government investment in the area. It is significant 
that Mayor Blaisdell in March of 1968 announced government 
initiatives based on the Gruen recommendations at a DIA 
annual meeting before the Gruen Plan had been formally 
presented to or adopted by the City (Downtown Improvement 
Association March 1968).
Regulatory policies 
that set the character 
of an area or lessen 
private investment risk
Character of the Area
The State had committed to the DIA’s Civic Center site for the 
new Capitol, and the City was serious about providing 
additional parking, the Mall, and rapid transit. All these 
programs helped define Downtown as a central, active, 
decision and commerce center.
Lessen Private Investment Risk
The City’s Improvement District 80 limited the amount of 
parking legally necessary within the Downtown area, lowering 
development costs and investment risk. The developers of the 
Financial Plaza of the Pacific, hampered by a high water table 
and the desire to create as much ground level open space as 
possible, thus limited the amount of parking to be built within 
the block. In fact, only one level of parking exists underground. 
To provide for perceived additional parking needs for 
themselves and their tenants, the developers contracted with 
the Campbell Estate to develop parking nearby in the makai- 
Ewa corner of Merchant and Fort Street.
Incentives for desired 
private development
The Financial Plaza of the Pacific served as a “test case’’ for 
the City’s proposed new Comprehensive Zoning Code (CZC). 
The CZC offered developers additional height in return for 
ground level open space. The result was creation of the largest 
privately developed open area in downtown Honolulu at that 
time, at the Bishop-King Street intersection.
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TABLE 5.3. GARVIN’S INGREDIENTS OF PROJECT SUCCESS
Ingredient of 
Success
Evaluation
Market Real estate surveys done by the DIA through 1962 had predicted a
annual need for only 100,000 additional square feet of office space 
per annum for Honolulu (Hawai’i Business and Industry 1966). Yet 
“Neither the banks, the State, nor private planners have ever agreed 
on a formula or come up with standardized statistics... About the only 
thing certain is that the estimate will be well under what will actually 
be needed, planners being conservative” (Hawai’i Business and 
Industry March 1968a). The backers of the Financial Plaza of the 
Pacific, however, had two distinct advantages in their project;
1. The project would enjoy high immediate occupancy rates 
because the developers themselves would take most of the space.
The six owners were: Castle and Cooke, Bank of Hawai’i, Territorial 
Savings and Loan, American Savings and Loan, Austin Trust, and 
Wilcox Development Company.
2. The Financial Plaza enjoyed a number of features making 
it a desirable business address. Located in the heart of the Financial 
District and occupied by major Hawai’i corporations, it was the first 
“Class A” building built in Downtown in years and boasted the only 
open space in the area.
Location Inherent Site Characteristics
The project block was originally determined by the operation of
Castle and Cooke. The block was also the original site for the Bank 
of Hawai’i, a fact that that firm promoted extensively.
The site offered the potential for complete block 
redevelopment because it contained no relatively new buildings and 
had a limited number of owners.
Proximity
The site was attractive for office redevelopment because it was;
1. located halfway down Bishop Street. The block was near 
the center of the premiere finance business street for the city.
Nearby were major corporations such as Alexander and Baldwin,
T.H Davies, First National Bank, and the Alexander Young Building.
2. faced heavily traveled King Street, and due to the 
curvature of King, was prominently displayed throughout Chinatown 
from the Ewa direction.
3. placed the Financial Plaza between the Bishop Street 
financial institutions and Fort Street retail activities.
4. bordered Fort Street, which offered retail amenities to 
Financial Plaza customers and employees, and was to be 
redeveloped by the City. The new Mall would unite the Financial 
Plaza with the Campbell Building parking facility, and could 
encourage development from the Plaza in the Ewa direction.
5. situated on Merchant Street, the original mercantile 
location in the city, and still the locus of many professional offices.
Table 5.3 is continued on the next page.
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TABLE 5.3. (CONTINUED): GARVIN’S INGREDIENTS OF PROJECT SUCCESS
Ingredient of 
Success
Evaluation
Design Architect Leo Wou had to define a complex that offered a unity of 
design while providing its occupants with separate identities. He 
organized the three major occupants into three structures:
1. The Bank of Hawai’i Building’s height was set as the 
same as that of the end pavilions of the Alexander Young Building. 
The structure’s frame consists of four cast-in-place girders that form 
the outside wall of the building between the fourth and sixth floors, 
supported by central columns, creating an open effect at ground 
level both in and out of the building.
2. The Castle and Cooke Building (later Bancorp Tower and 
1998’s Pacific Century Tower) has the distinctions of a tapered base 
and the top three floors hanging eight feet out over the rest of the 
building.
3. The third building, American Savings and Loan, reaches a 
height between the other two complexes. Its small footprint, 
however, limits its flexibility to use by only a few tenants.
Architect Leo Wou’s original design had included arches to 
complement the old Davies Building across Bishop Street, but the 
developers wanted something more distinctive for the new complex. 
The style that was chosen was referred to as “Brutalism” in the
1960s. This architectural form used overscaled features and rough 
concrete surfaces (Ames1996). The rough surfaces give the 
buildings a more timeless, natural look.
The Financial Plaza followed the lead of the old Bank of 
Hawai’i main office across Bishop Street in the use of artwork and 
plantings. Four major pieces of sculpture and the landscape work of 
architect Lawrence Halprin were used to soften and humanize an 
otherwise overassertive architectural environment.
The project was unique because most of the components 
were built elsewhere and assembled on site, an innovation for that 
time (Haight 1998).
The project was a “test case” of guidelines that became the 
Comprehensive Zoning Code (Grant 1998). The idea was to 
encourage ground level pedestrian open space by offering additional 
building height as an incentive:
1. The open space on the Bishop Street side of the complex, 
coupled with a “walk up” fountain, is Downtown’s original plaza. It 
provides welcome relief for bus riders and individuals savoring the 
outdoors.
2. The Financial Plaza also has a large covered open space 
between the three structures, which has been criticized as dark, but 
which provides a useful refuge from wind and rain.
Table 5.3 is continued on the next page.
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TABLE 5.3. (CONTINUED): GARVIN’S INGREDIENTS OF PROJECT SUCCESS
Ingredient of 
Success
Evaluation
Financing Individual private mortgages were originally to be financed with an 
issue done through the Solomon Brothers brokerage, but that fell 
through. Kidder, Peabody then agreed to do the permanent 
financing (Haight 1998).
The long term loan was negotiated with an effective overall 
interest rate of 4.78 per cent. Different owners of the condominium 
each negotiated their own individual rates with the lender, ranging 
from 4.6 to 5.25 per cent. The total loan was for $13,000,000 
(Midkiff 1965).
Entrepreneurship There were two key individuals:
1. Oceanic President Warren Haight, who did much of the 
background real estate work and project development.
2. DIA representative Robert Midkiff, who suggested the 
condominium concept and who acted as facilitator with the owners to 
get agreement on the kind of project to develop, and with 
government zoning officials over open space and height proposals 
(Clark 1998).
Time Immediate
Approaching the Financial Plaza of the Pacific from either the Bishop 
or Fort Street sides is a pleasurable experience because of the open 
space, flowers and works of art. The plumeria plants remind one of 
Hawaiian gardens, and the weathered look of the concrete is 
reminiscent of natural lava rock.
The 24 hour Day
The complex was designed for office use, and although operations 
do occur there after regular business hours, those operations are 
hidden away. The area is vacant at night, except for people awaiting 
buses or using the automatic teller machines outside. Fortunately, 
the automatic teller machines are in a well lit area facing the street. 
Decades
The natural look of the Financial Plaza of the Pacific has prevented it 
from aging architecturally.
Castle and Cooke, Ltd. has sold its space to the Bank of 
Hawai’i. The complex continues as a prestigious business address.
The addition of the Fort Street Mall in 1969 and the 
development of Pioneer Plaza and its extensive plantings in 1977 
have created the impression of one continuous courtyard between 
the Merchant-Fort area and Bishop Street.
The greatest change in the operation of the Financial Plaza 
has been the addition of parking using the Watkins (old King
Theater) property Ewa on King Street. The continuing limited 
amount of available public parking has made this necessary.
The feeling of openness on the Bishop Street side has been 
expanded by new open space at Tamarind Park and the First 
Hawaiian Bank Building.
I.
5.5.2 THE “PLANNING” AND “BUILT” LEGACIES
TABLE 5.4. THE “PLANNING” AND “BUILT” LEGACIES
Legacy Evaluation
Planning Legacy 1. The Financial Plaza is a good example of Garvin’s 
idea of successful planning as a “public action that will produce 
a sustained and widespread private market reaction.” The 
Blaisdell Administration, increasingly concerned about 
Downtown’s future, worked with the DIA to develop a
Downtown master plan while the DIA simultaneously worked 
with the Financial Plaza’s developers. This allowed creative 
synergy; the projected Mall made it possible for the Financial 
Plaza plan to work (Haight 1998), and the city was willing to 
invest in the Mall in order to get that private investment.
2. Although it was a private project, the Financial
Plaza is a fine example of strategic investment. The project 
developers wanted to make a statement that business would 
remain centered in Downtown. Project developers and the
DIA made every effort to give this initiative maximum publicity, 
even referring to it as a “Mini-Rockefeller Center” (R. Midkiff 
1980). This deliberately high quality and costly project, backed 
by prominent members of the business community, had the 
desired results of increasing the value and potential of 
properties around it. It sparked other successful real estate 
investment activities in the immediate vicinity.
3. Downtown as the premiere office center of the state 
was confirmed, so that Downtown could expect to become a 
high density, high-rise area. The March, 1969 issue of Hawaii 
Business noted that, “Surprisingly, the high price tags attached 
to such attractive packages as the Financial Plaza and other 
Class A office space has proved no deterrent to renters. 
Apparently the commercial value of prosperous surroundings 
and a prestigious address offsets the steep fare” (Hawai’i 
Business March 1969). City planners could expect that 
pressure would be strong on Downtown property owners to 
redevelop because:
“The incentives to develop are there. Downtown 
landowners are aware that if they do not build, someone else 
outside of the downtown core area will provide office space” 
(Hawai’i Business and Industry March 1968a). It was in the 
interests of Downtown property owners to maintain the 
development momentum.
Owners of less high quality space (Class B and C) 
would not have as vigorous a market and felt increasing 
pressure to upgrade their properties. The Alexander Young 
Hotel property was one such prospect mentioned (Hawai’i 
Business March 1969). The Hotel was razed in 1981.
Table 5.4 is continued on the next page.
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TABLE 5.4. (CONTINUED): THE “PLANNING” AND “BUILT” LEGACIES
Legacy Evaluation
Planning Legacy 
(continued)
4. The project served as a “test case” for the City’s 
new Comprehensive Zoning Code. Open space requirements 
provided height incentives under the CZC. The Financial
Plaza, and subsequent construction under the CZC , such as 
the Davies Pacific Center (1972), 1164 Bishop (1975) and the 
Grosvenor Center (1979/81), would transform Downtown from 
an area limiting pedestrians to narrow sidewalks to an area 
featuring open space, plantings and fountains.
Although not required under Improvement District 80, the 
developers of the Financial Plaza of the Pacific would provide 
additional parking beyond the legal minimum. This would set a 
standard that other projects (i.e., Amfac Center with 930 stalls) 
would follow (Downtown Improvement Association July 1993). 
Additional parking proved a wise decision when the City’s rapid 
transit system was twice cancelled. Projects such as the
Bishop Trust Building, which did not provide such additional 
parking, would be at a disadvantage when seeking tenants 
(Haight 1998).
Built Legacy 1. The developers and the DIA were correct in their 
prediction that there existed great latent demand for Class A 
space within downtown Honolulu. The project remains a Class
A business address, and has incited a list of other projects 
seeking to use the same formula. Projects erected after the 
Financial Plaza/Campbell Buildings along Bishop Street 
included the Amfac Center (1969,72), the Bishop Trust
Company (1970), the Davies Pacific Center (1972), the Bishop 
Square/Pauahi Tower (1983), and First Hawaiian Center 
(1996) (Dougherty 1988; Ames 1996).
2. The Bishop Street open space of the Financial
Plaza served as a catalyst in creating a “people place” at the 
corner of Bishop and King Streets. Nearby developers 
centered their open space there, including Tamarind Park, 
located in the mauka/Diamond Head corner of the intersection, 
which added one acre of open space in 1983.
3. The project also transformed the character of Fort 
Street makai of King Street, but not in the manner expected.
The area redeveloped almost totally into an office 
complex, with minimal retail operations catering to lunchtime or 
office supply needs.
The open character of both the Financial Plaza and 
Pioneer Plaza no longer provides demarcation for the Mall, so 
that the Mall almost “disappears” into the adjacent complexes.
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5.6 LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE
TABLE 5.5. FINANCIAL PLAZA OF THE PACIFIC: LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE
Lesson for the Future Application in the Project Possible Future Use
Importance of a 
comprehensive plan to 
improve investment 
effectiveness
The DIA’s comprehensive 
plan for Downtown 
revitalization required 
access to government 
decision makers, a first 
class office facility, and a 
lively and interesting retail 
sector. DIA consultant 
Downs felt that a series of 
coordinated projects offered 
greater potential success 
than any single project 
could.
Neighborhoods such as 
Waipahu, suffering from the 
decline of their core 
environments, should study 
the DIA’s development of a 
comprehensive plan to 
reinvigorate area 
businesses. Similar ideas 
could include placing 
government offices, social 
service agencies, rapid 
transit stops, etc., in these 
locations to develop “critical 
mass.” Specialized small 
business could 
subsequently rebuild by 
servicing government and 
transit patrons.
Business ventures entail 
taking risks and rely on 
communication and 
personal trust between 
principals. Thus close 
proximity among firms is an 
advantage that downtowns 
can offer businesses.
One of the main reasons for 
businesses remaining 
Downtown, according to the 
DIA, was the need for 
personal contact. “The 
specialized functions of 
Downtown Honolulu require 
an intensively developed 
area arranged to enable 
easy, convenient and direct 
contact between inter­
related economic, business, 
cultural, professional, and 
governmental activities “ 
(Downtown Improvement 
Association 1967). It was 
through personal 
relationships that DIA 
representative R. Midkiff 
was able to facilitate 
acceptance of the 
condominium concept and 
aid in zoning negotiations 
with the City (Haight 1998).
Downtown Honolulu again 
needs the kind of mutual 
commitment that personal 
contacts provide. The Fort 
Street area is again in 
decline, with F.W. 
Woolworth’s departure 
leaving a whole block of 
empty storefronts that 
undoubtedly is affecting 
nearby merchants such as 
Liberty House and Leeds 
Shoes. A group of 
business oriented people 
needs to organize and find 
a tenant large enough to 
use that space before the 
vacancy further negatively 
impacts nearby businesses.
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CHAPTER 6. THE FORT STREET MALL (PHASE I, 1969)
6.1 GOAL: REVITALIZE DOWNTOWN RETAILING
The purpose of the Fort Street Mall was to revitalize the retail business of 
downtown Honolulu.
(Midkiff 1998)
Fort Street was the historic premiere shopping location for the city.
6.2 DESCRIPTION OF THE PROJECT
The Fort Street Mall is a pedestrian right of way in downtown Honolulu, extending from 
Nimitz Highway to Beretania Street. The Mall follows the original Fort Street, which 
extended from the gate of Honolulu Fort inland, and marked the trade route for imported 
goods into the hinterland and island produced goods to the harbor ships. The Fort 
Street Mall as first constructed actually extended from Queen to Beretania Streets. It 
included such features as an underpass at King Street, plazas at King and at Beretania, 
fountains, overhanging trellises, and a children’s sandbox.
Architects: Victor Gruen Associates. Contractor: Hawaiian Dredging and 
Construction Company. Cost: $2,766,484.50. Constructed: 1968-69 (Downtown 
Improvement Association February 1969).
6.3 BACKGROUND OF THE PROJECT
By the early 1940s, the ability of automobiles to transport anyone anywhere had 
seriously eroded the popularity of Honolulu’s electric street car system. The street car 
system’s demise meant that Fort Street was no longer a necessary center of the
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The 1939-44 City of Honolulu Master Plan stated that, “Lack of adequate off- 
street parking is probably the greatest single problem confronting city officials.” People 
simply could not find parking easily in the Downtown area and were going elsewhere to 
shop. The City Planning Commission issued Honolulu’s Master Plan, A Progress Report 
in January 1941 and expressed concern about the potential loss of Downtown taxation 
revenues to the City government caused by decentralization of popular retailing habits.
Merchants and property owners tried to find ways to entice people to enter 
Downtown to shop. The Honolulu Advertiser, on February 14, 1949, noted discussions 
between the Chamber of Commerce and the City Planning Commission to experiment 
with a “pedestrian plaza” on Fort Street between Merchant and Pauahi Streets, for a 90 
day trial period (Honolulu Advertiser 2/14/1949).
On October 28, 1949 the Honolulu Star Bulletin reported that a preliminary public 
hearing was to be scheduled before the City Planning Commission for a shopping 
complex on Dillingham Corporation property along Ala Moana Boulevard (Honolulu Star 
Bulletin 10/28/1949).
Forty one mauka end retailers banded together as an “Upper Fort Street 
Shopping Center” in 1957. The retailers placed advertisements in the local papers 
together declaring “Upper Fort Street Shopping Center: Open Every Night.” Samuel 
Kramer, owner of Kramer’s Men’s Store on Fort declared, “The idea is to encourage 
people to show in this area. New shopping areas are springing up and we want people 
to continue their downtown shopping habits. But you can’t do that by just sitting back.
So we formed this Center” (Honolulu Advertiser, 11/28/1957).
transportation network, and as a result, Downtown retail sales and property values
began to stagnate while new retail centers developed in Kalihi, Wahiawa, and Kaimuki.
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Alarmed property owners and retail operators formed the DIA in 1958, “in an 
effort to keep shopping centers from digging too deeply into downtown business 
pockets” (Honolulu Star Bulletin, 3/24/1958).
Ala Moana Shopping Center opened October 29, 1959 (Honolulu Star Bulletin 
10/28/1959).
Retail sales declined Downtown from $64 million in 1958 to $55 million in 1963 
(Gruen 1968).
6.4 DIA INVOLVEMENT AND PROJECT EVOLUTION
The leadership of the DIA believed that healthy retail operations would only be possible 
in the traditional premiere Fort Street location if a series of supporting activities were 
happening off of Fort Street. Inclusion of a mall Downtown would not be enough to stem 
the decline in retail activities. Thus issues of parking, access, etc. had to be addressed 
as part of a large scale plan. Shortly after receiving its charter in 1958, the DIA 
undertook a series of studies of the Downtown area, centering on economics, land 
values and overall planning concerns.
Economic Analysis of Downtown Honolulu (1959) by the Western Real Estate 
Research Corporation. This study made several observations and recommendations.
1. Downtown Honolulu was unable to compete with Waikiki for hotel rooms, and 
was weak in cultural and entertainment activities.
2. Parking, access and planning needs had direct impacts on potential futures 
for the CBD.
3. “Oriental” activities in Chinatown could be organized and rebuilt to create “a 
foreign and exotic atmosphere...similar to the Vieux Carre (the old French Quarter) just 
off Canal Street in New Orleans” that could become a tourist mecca.
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4. The Honolulu CBD could profit from its “virtually unique” proximity to both 
federal, State and City government decision makers.
5. The Honolulu CBD could provide offices for administrative, technical and 
engineering firms seeking a base for Pacific operations.
6. There would be a growing need for office space in Honolulu for the 
foreseeable future, and most of that office space should be located in the CBD.
Central Business District of Honolulu (1959) by Central Business District 
Consultants. The City Planning Commission, in conjunction with the Honolulu 
Redevelopment Agency and the DIA, hired four planners in 1961 to develop a master 
plan for Honolulu. They were Walter Collins from Belt, Collins, and Associates; Donald 
Wolbrink of Harland Bartholomew and Associates; George Houghtailing for Community 
Planning Incorporated; and Charles Bennett for Charles Bennett and Associates. Their 
report graphically displayed the disparity of locations with the highest tax assessment 
(retail along Fort Street) and those areas receiving recent private investment. This 
strongly indicated retail decline. The study then called for development of a “retail core” 
along Fort Street and the areas immediately Ewa near King and Hotel Streets.
Unfortunately, no consensus about area access was reached among the 
planning group. Two planners (Walter Collins and Donald Wolbrink) suggested creation 
of a “Circumferential Circulation Plan”. Makai and mauka freeways would keep through 
traffic out of the CBD. Large peripheral streets would carry traffic to parking garages 
located around expanded city blocks created by closure of smaller interior streets. Fort 
Street would become a mall from Hotel to Merchant, with connecting malls on Hotel and 
King. Included were recommendations to institute floor area ratio legislation that would 
allow developers to trade ground level open space for building height, and creation of a
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The two other planners, George Houghtailing and Charles Bennett, wanted to 
develop a “Linear Circulation Plan” that would speed traffic flow through, rather than 
around. Downtown. Parking would remain along the perimeter. Hotel Street and 
Richards Street near lolani Palace would be widened into divided roadways, while Fort 
Street would not become a mall. Pedestrian space would be created along Pauahi and 
Smith Streets.
This lack of consensus by planning experts further confused Downtown 
merchants, property owners, and the DIA as to what action they should take (Alf Pratte 
2/21/1969).
Honolulu: A Master Plan for the Central Business District (1962), by architect 
Leo S. Wou and planning consultant David Y. C. Tom. The DIA, in another attempt to 
develop consensus on a master plan, hired Wou and Tom and published the results.
The Wou Plan made even more extensive use of malls than did either of the Central 
Business District of Honolulu plans. Features included:
1. development of extensive pedestrian malls by closure or partial closure of 
River, Kekaulike, Smith, Bethel, Fort, Alakea, Hotel, Merchant Streets, and Nuuanu 
Avenue. Only King and Maunakea Streets would remain as through roadways within the 
CBD.
2. removal of most structures and parts of existing streets, similar to prevailing 
urban renewal practice, thus providing space for development of extensive new 
buildings.
3. parking along the periphery.
4. an international center to be constructed next to Nuuanu Stream.
Downtown Development Corporation to begin urban renewal Ewa of Nuuanu Avenue in
Chinatown.
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5. a retail shopping complex extending Ewa from Fort Street along the existing 
Hotel Street right of way.
Economic Trends and Planning for the Central Business District of Honolulu, 
Hawaii (1963), by UCLA Graduate School of Business Assistant Dean Dr. James 
Gillies, and Research Analyst C.E. Elias. The Gillies report called the 1962 Wou Plan,
“a starting point for such master planning; the plan is imaginative and provides for 
effective development.” Gillies went on to recommend:
1. a more detailed determination of desired land use and occupation densities 
be made as part of a comprehensive zoning plan.
2. support for an “Oriental Center” to serve as a cultural focus, provide shopping 
for local residents interested in Asian products, encourage tourism into the area, and by 
proximity, help existing businesses.
3. development of a major office complex of approximately 250,000-350,000 
square feet. “What is needed to unequivocally dramatize the significance of the Central 
Business District as the business and financial center of the State is the construction of a 
major office complex - a miniature Rockefeller Center for Honolulu” (Gillies 1962).
At about this time other entities besides the DIA were also conducting planning 
Downtown, concerned about the declining vitality of the CBD:
The Planning Department of the City and County of Honolulu (1962), engaged in 
planning studies of Downtown, also recommended a pedestrian mall on Fort Street 
(Gruen 1968).
Landowner Oceanic Properties hired Victor Gruen Associates (1962) to study a 
four block area centered at King and Fort Streets. The study recommended a 
pedestrian mall along Fort Street.
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The continuing decline in the retail health of the Fort Street area was illustrated 
by 1966, when Liberty House moved its “Flagship Store” designation to the second 
phase of the Ala Moana Shopping Center.
DIA President Clarence Ching and Wade McVay of Downtown landowner 
Campbell Estate (the largest single property owner in the Fort Street area) decided that 
something had to be done about revitalizing retail activity along Fort Street. Both men 
contacted Ben Kaito, Chairman of the Honolulu City Council’s Public Works Committee 
for assistance. The three men then convinced the City Planning Commission to pay for 
a Fort Street study by Victor Gruen Associates, the firm which had already begun a 
limited Downtown study for Oceanic Properties, and which had designed the first 
permanent pedestrian downtown mall at Kalamazoo, Michigan. Victor Gruen Associates 
recommended that the whole of the CBD undergo study for a comprehensive long-range 
masterplan and revitalization program, of which the proposed Fort Street Mall would be 
one element.
The Report of the Studies and Recommendations for a Program of Revitalization 
of the Central Business District of Downtown Honolulu (the ’’Gruen Plan”), 1968, by 
Victor Gruen Associates, Inc., recommended:
1. creation of pedestrian “superblocks,” including Nuuanu Avenue-King-Alakea 
and Beretania Streets.
2. redevelopment of Chinatown also using superblocks, and including 
apartments.
3. widening of Alakea and Nuuanu Streets to place traffic on the periphery.
4. a rapid transit corridor under Hotel Street.
Specifically for Fort Street, the Gruen Plan recommended:
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1. three new parking garages. The first would include the block bounded by 
Nuuanu Avenue-Beretania-Queen Emma and Kukui Streets; a second on both sides of 
Maunakea Street between King Street and Nimitz Highway; and the third on the 
Diamond Head side of Nuuanu Avenue from Pauahi Street to King Street. Existing 
facilities were to be expanded at Alakea-Richards-Hotel Streets and Kaahumanu Street. 
The Kaahumanu Street garage expansion would entail removal of portions of Bethel 
Street, the original Bishop Bank building, and Melcher and Honolulu Police Station 
structures on Merchant Street.
2. a harborside complex, including a hotel, “ship museum” and restaurants to be 
created makai of Fort Street, centered on Aloha Tower.
3. pedestrian malls be built along Hotel and Fort Streets. A pedestrian bridge 
would cross Nimitz Highway from Fort Street to Aloha Tower to facilitate access to the 
harbor.
4. a major rapid transit station be constructed on Hotel Street between Union 
Street and Nuuanu Avenue.
5. space for an additional department store be provided on the Ewa side of Fort 
Street at Beretania Street. (The distance between this new department store site and 
the existing Liberty House store is appropriately enough, roughly the distance within the 
Ala Moana Shopping Center, between Sears and Liberty House (Grant 1998).
6. a major office-hotel complex with ground level retail activities on the blocks 
bounded by Bethel-King-Bishop and Hotel Streets (Gruen 1968).
The DIA formed two committees to deal with immediate issues relating to the 
proposed mall:
1. A Fort Street Mall Committee consisted of representatives from Castle and 
Cooke, Oceanic Properties, Hawaiian Trust Company, Sato Clothiers, the O’ahu
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Development Conference, Our Lady of Peace Cathedral, the City and County of 
Honolulu Department of Public Works, the Honolulu Academy of Arts, and the Council of 
Downtown Honolulu Merchants. Its Chairman was Richard Wheeler from the Andrade 
Store mauka of King Street.
2. A Parking Committee had representatives from Bank of Hawai’i, Campbell 
Estate, City Bank, and Manoa Finance. The Chairman, David Black, was from the F.W. 
Woolworth store on the corner of Hotel and Fort Streets.
The DIA committees worked directly with Councilman Ben Kaito of the City 
Council Public Works Committee; Traffic Engineer William Hong; Planning Director 
Frank Shrivanek; and members of the Gruen design team (Downtown Improvement 
Association February 1969).
The developing close working relationship between DIA President Moses L. 
Randolph and Honolulu Mayor Neal Blaisdell over issues of Downtown revitalization is 
well illustrated by a speech given by the Mayor at a DIA luncheon on March 4, 1968. 
Although the City had not formally adopted the Gruen Plan, the Mayor used the DIA 
meeting to outline City Administration proposals that followed much of the Gruen Plan. 
Included were the Fort Street Mall, four multi-deck parking garages, a rapid transit 
terminal along Hotel Street near Fort, creation of a superblock bounded by Alakea, 
Nuuanu, Beretania, and King and downtown apartments (Downtown Improvement 
Association March 1968).
Hawaiian Dredging and Construction Company broke ground for the Fort Street 
Mall on June 1, 1968, and completed work February 17, 1969. The Mall was dedicated 
on February 22, 1969 months behind its hoped for Thanksgiving opening date due to 
unforeseen problems with poorly mapped underground utility lines. The City of Honolulu 
paid $1,532,841.06 toward the cost of construction, the Board of Water Supply
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$25,442.00, and Fort Street property owners $1,208,201.44 (Downtown Improvement 
Association February 1969).
On April 3, 1969 newly elected Honolulu Mayor Frank Fasi, who previously had 
“voted reluctantly” as a City Councilman in favor of the Fort Street Mall, declared that the 
City would not be able to finance the Gruen Plan’s ambitious parking program. Fasi said 
he had decided not to award a contract for design work on the next planned City owned 
parking structure. He explained instead that he wanted to do studies on the proposed 
rapid transit system before resuming construction of any more parking Downtown 
(Downtown Improvement Association May 1969c).
DIA President Randolph tried to salvage the plan by suggesting a $27 million 
bond issue for the parking program. Randolph noted that this would cost only $1 million 
a year from an area projected to increase its tax valuation by the same amount annually 
(Downtown Improvement Association May 1969a).
Fasi countered by suggesting that any further parking be developed through 
public-private participation in mixed use projects in the Kukui area (Downtown 
Improvement Association May 1969a). Ultimately, both Kukui Plaza and the Chinatown 
Gateway Plaza would provide public parking within their complexes, but not within the 
five year time frame hoped for by the DIA.
Meanwhile, operation of the Mall itself became an issue.
The first problem was the use of public property in the same manner as a private 
shopping mall. As the Mall is public property, regulations governing permissible public 
behavior are much more loosely defined than those acceptable at private shopping 
complexes. Examples of this were “street people,” whose presence some members of 
the public found objectionable, and who could legally be removed from private, but not 
public, property.
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Figure 6.1. Opening of the Fort Street Mall in 1969. Source: Camera Hawaii, Inc.
Figure 6.2. Local high school band plays at the opening of the Fort Street Mall in 1969. 
Source: Camera Hawaii, Inc.
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Figure 6.3. The Fort Street Mall in 1969, looking Ewa-makai from Beretania Street. Our 
Lady of Peace Cathedral is on the left. Source: Camera Hawaii, Inc.
Figure 6.4. The Fort Street Mall in 1969, looking makai near Chaplain Lane. The Ritz 
Department Store is on the left and the Blaisdell Hotel on the right. Source: Camera 
Hawaii, Inc.
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Figure 6.5. The Fort Street Mall in 1969, looking mauka toward Hotel Street. Hartfield’s 
is on the left, and F.W. Woolworth’s on the right. Source: Camera Hawai’i, Inc.
Figure 6.6. The Fort Street Mall in 1969, looking Ewa-mauka toward its intersection with 
King Street from a courtyard of the Financial Plaza of the Pacific. Liberty House is the 
only retail activity that would remain in this area. Source: Camera Hawai’i, Inc.
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How, then, could security be improved, so that patrons felt safe? The practice of 
the Honolulu Police Department to patrol the city in automobiles meant that most of the 
Mall was difficult to access for the police. Driving police automobiles down the Mall was 
a hazard for pedestrians. Input from the DIA and businessmen in the area led to the use 
of foot patrols (Downtown Improvement Association March 1990a). Private 
organizations such as Hawaii Pacific University, for example, eventually hired their own 
private security force to walk the Mall fronting school buildings at night, in effect 
providing backup for the Honolulu Police Department.
The second problem was the use of municipal government in the same manner 
as a private landlord.
The City and County of Honolulu was simply not organized to perform the 
specialized functions of private shopping complex owner/managers.
Although the Union Mali predated the Fort Street Mall, the City did not have a 
well-organized set of rules for mall operations when the Fort Street Mall opened. 
Declaring that, “Downtown Malls must be managed like shopping centers, or we’re going 
to lose out,” DIA representative Richard Wheeler in 1969 suggested that merchants 
could assist the City in operating the Mall. Wheeler suggested an ordinance to set up a 
Downtown Malls Commission to consist of two City and County members, two 
landowners, two land users, and one at-large representative. The proposed commission 
would have had the power to issue permits for mall use, review and make 
recommendations for structural changes to frontage buildings, review and make 
recommendations about signs, establish timetables for repair of public utilities, assist 
with art acquisition, recommend Mall maintenance policies, and suggest improvements 
to the appearance of both public and private properties facing the Mall (Downtown 
Improvement Association May 1969b). The Mayor eventually did appoint a malls
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advisory committee, but disbanded it after disagreeing with its recommendations (Loftus 
1997).
Unlike Ala Moana Shopping Center, there was no landlord coordinating 
promotion along the Mall. Mr. Rudy Loftus, last manager of the F.W. Woolworth store, 
remarked that the decline of Fort Street’s retail operations led to the demise of the local 
merchant association, a volunteer organization of approximately 40 members which had 
once tried to perform this function (Loftus 1997). The DIA did eventually reach 
agreement with the City to limit sidewalk sales to four a year, to be held only by 
businesses fronting the Mall after applying for a permit (Downtown Improvement 
Association March 1990a).
The condition of landscaping, frequency of trash pick up, etc. were a continuing 
headache, as level of maintenance was unfavorable to that of private shopping centers. 
Maintenance functions were split between City departments, with Parks and Recreation 
responsible for trash pickup, the Transportation Services for lights and electrical work, 
and Public Works for surface replacement (Reid 1998). Merchants often complained 
that the frequency of work was insufficient, and cleaned the areas in front of their stores 
themselves (Medeiros 1997).
The Mall ultimately failed to retain the majority of the retailers operating there 
when it opened. It was the end of any hope for Downtown to retain any sizable portion 
of O’ahu’s regional retailing activity. Most of the merchants who had already opened 
branches within the Ala Moana Shopping Center, such as Kramer’s Mens Wear, the 
Ritz, Hartfield’s, and Sato Clothiers, proceeded to close their Fort Street stores. Others, 
such as Ming’s Jewelry, moved into ground level shops within the new office high-rises. 
Of the merchants operating along Fort Street in 1969, only four (Miyamoto Jewelers, 
Medeiros Optician, Kim Chow Shoes, and Liberty House) would still function on the
mauka end of the Mall between Hotel and Beretania Streets by 1998. Only office 
specialty stores would operate makai of King Street.
6.5 ANALYSIS OF THE PROJECT
6.5.1 ALEXANDER GARVIN ANALYSIS
TABLE 6.1. GARVIN’S BACKGROUND REQUIREMENTS FOR SUCCESSFUL 
PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS
Requirement Evaluation
Effective input from all 
stakeholders
Despite DIA President Randolph’s happiness that “we 
were able to lay before the City Council letters of 
consent for this great project signed by three out of four 
of the Fort Street property owners’’ (Downtown 
Improvement Association March 1968), the DIA had not 
reached consensus with all stakeholders.
1. Not all landowners and retail establishments 
welcomed the proposed mall.
The Roman Catholic Church objected to a $132, 
334.30 assessment, forced sale of land immediately 
mauka of the Our Lady of Peace Cathedral for creation 
of a pedestrian plaza, and loss of vehicle rights for 
social functions at the Cathedral front (Hawai’i Business 
and Industry May 1968).
The owner of the Blaisdell Hotel, Attorney Arthur 
Spitzer, complained that the Mall blocked access to his 
property, sued the City over his $47,415.95 
assessment, and won (Honolulu Advertiser
11/27/1969).
Several small business owners such as the 
Medeiros Optician owners fought the project, feeling 
that Mall development would make them less visible to 
potential customers, make access even more difficult 
due to removal of parking, and represented additional 
expense, i.e., the assessments passed through to them 
by the landowners (Medeiros 1997).
2. The DIA had not reached accommodation 
with Fasi, a likely strong candidate for the position of 
Mayor. Before and during the election, the DIA was 
heavily promoting its agenda. When Fasi became
Mayor, his first speech to the DIA contained the theme 
“Don’t ever try to pressure the Office of Mayor of the
City and County of Honolulu” (Downtown Improvement 
Association May 1969c).
Table 6.1 is continued on the next page.
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TABLE 6.1. (CONTINUED): GARVIN’S BACKGROUND REQUIREMENTS FOR
SUCCESSFUL PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS
Requirement Evaluation
Understanding what planning 
can and cannot accomplish
The major exit of established shops from Fort Street did 
not occur until after the Mall was completed. Many 
retailers had remained after Ala Moana’s retail 
competition with Downtown began, hedging their bets by 
opening branches at Ala Moana, and hoping that 
business would pick up Downtown once the Mall was in 
operation. The constant comparison in the press 
between the design of the Mall and that of the Ala
Moana Shopping Center created unreasonable 
expectations of what was becoming a much more 
localized (and specialized) retail operation.
Understanding how physical 
changes to the urban 
environment can improve the 
economy, quality of life, and 
city function
The creation of the Fort Street Mall did not create a 
sustainable, revitalized retail sector as hoped by the DIA. 
The Mall instead provided:
1. a pedestrian entrance and corridor into 
Downtown, utilized daily by thousands of workers on 
their way to and from surface parking facilities in the
Kukui area and Downtown.
2. a Downtown pedestrian oasis. The length of 
the Mall allowed different sections to develop their own 
individual character, complementing surrounding 
activities and architecture. The open spaces between 
office buildings on the makai side of the Mall were 
successful enough to be copied by other developments, 
including extension of the Mall itself to Nimitz Highway.
Creating positive change and 
preventing negative change
Create Positive Change
The Mall succeeded in creating positive change in ways 
not imagined by its original proponents.
Along Beretania Street, subsequent federal 
rehabilitation tax policies have restored buildings that, 
combined with the open space of the Mall, have created 
a pleasant urban campus for a new kind of business -- 
Hawai’i Pacific University.
Makai of King Street, the new Campbell and 
Pioneer Plaza complexes held little retail space.
Only between Hotel and King Street did general 
retailing spark sizable new construction (Liberty House 
and F.W. Woolworth).
Prevent Negative Change
The Mall prevented negative change by creating a focal 
point for HPU development in the area hardest hit by 
declining retail activity (near Beretania). While this was 
not the high end retail hoped for, the growth of HPU 
prevented empty storefronts and assured structure 
maintenance.
107
TABLE 6.2. GARVIN’S FRAMEWORK OF GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS TO 
ENCOURAGE PRIVATE INVESTMENT
Ingredient of Success Evaluation
Strategic investment in 
infrastructure, rather 
than routine capital 
spending
Positive effects of Investment
Strategic investment by the City and County of Honolulu had 
positive effects.
1. In 1952 the City had created Improvement District
80 which assessed property owners for funds to create off 
street parking lots (Reid 1998). These public lots, although 
never enough, contributed to accessibility for Fort Street retail 
customers at a time when parking was increasingly difficult.
2. In 1961 a study, eighty per cent financed by the
DIA, confirmed the need for additional public off street parking 
Downtown. The City responded with development of three 
parking structures at Richards-Alakea, Kaahumanu-Nimitz, and 
Smith-Maunakea. The November, 1961 Dafa happily remarked 
that the three lots represented “a 125% increase in City garage 
facilities in an 18 month period” (Downtown Improvement 
Association November 1961).
3. Honolulu’s Mayor Blaisdell’s pledge in March 1968 
for a $60 million series of public parking structures Downtown, 
projected with the development of the Fort Street Mall, was 
enthusiastically welcomed by Downtown landowners and 
merchants. Randolph remarked that month in the DIA 
newsletter that such government support was important:
The real test of the efficacy of our partnership 
with our city government is the tremendous 
confidence physically expressed by private 
enterprise on the construction of the Financial
Plaza of the Pacific, the start of construction of 
the new Hawaiian Telephone Company Building, 
the announcement of a huge building project by
Amfac, Inc. (Amfac Center) at the foot of the
Fort Street Mall, and the completion of the
Campbell building.”
(Downtown Improvement Association
March 1968)
4. Projected development of the Fort Street Mall “made 
the Financial Plaza work” (Haight 1998). Parking necessary to 
the successful development of the Financial Plaza was located 
in the Campbell Building across the Mall. The Mall helped unify 
the projects both architecturally and functionally.
Table 6.2 is continued on the next page.
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TABLE 6.2. (CONTINUED); GARVIN’S FRAMEWORK OF GOVERNMENT
PROGRAMS TO ENCOURAGE PRIVATE INVESTMENT
Ingredient of Success Evaluation
Strategic investment in 
infrastructure, rather 
than routine capital 
spending (continued)
Negative Effects Caused by a Lack of Strategic investment:
Just as strategic investment brought about positive change 
within the Fort Street area, conversely a lack of strategic 
investment had a number of negative impacts:
1. The slowdown in the City parking program by Mayor 
Fasi and the cancellation of the Honolulu Area Rapid Transit 
(HART) by the following Mayor, Eileen Anderson, meant that 
two of the three elements designed by the Gruen Plan to 
support Downtown retailing would not exist. The number of 
potential retail customers patronizing Downtown merchants 
would be dependent upon the bus and the limited number of 
existing parking stalls. This had major effects on Fort Street 
retail activities.
First, the movement from general into specialty retailing 
was accelerated.
Office workers shopping on their lunch hour 
represented the largest single source of customers. Mr. Rudy 
Loftus, last Manager of the downtown F.W. Woolworth store in 
1987 estimated that sixty-seven per cent of his store’s business 
occurred between 11:00 a.m. and 1:30 p.m. (Loftus 1997).
Bus patrons, shopping on their way home, would NOT 
be looking for large or bulky items.
HPU students, who catered mostly to ethnic restaurants 
on the mauka side of the Mall.
Local area residents doing convenience shopping.
Second, the movement of the remaining high end retail 
operators off Fort Street and into ground level space in the new 
office towers rapidly increased. The 1960 Central Business 
District of Honolulu report had shown the growing physical 
separation of the original retail core from new office 
development within Downtown. Stores such as Ming’s Jewelry 
simply followed their customers. The single major exception. 
Liberty House, was sufficiently close to the financial institutions 
and between the two major bus stops in the Downtown area to 
warrant reconstruction (Gray 1997).
Third, the lack of additional public parking led to an 
increasing dependence upon private development for parking 
Downtown. By September, 1996, eighty-five per cent of all 
parking would be privately owned (Downtown Improvement 
Association September 1996). Many developers, such as that 
of the Amfac Center, would deliberately build more parking 
than the Comprehensive Zoning Code and Improvement
District 80 required. Additional parking helped make properties 
prestige addresses, and allowed developers to charge lessees
Table 6.2 is continued on the next page.
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TABLE 6.2. (CONTINUED): GARVIN’S FRAMEWORK OF GOVERNMENT 
PROGRAMS TO ENCOURAGE PRIVATE INVESTMENT
Ingredient of Success Evaluation
Strategic investment in 
infrastructure, rather 
than routine capital 
spending (continued)
higher rents. Unfortunately, such parking stock was usually in 
the office areas and not near the Mall, further disadvantaging 
Mall retail activities.
No restrooms were built on the Mall, as plans were to 
include them within nearby City parking garages. However, no 
such facilities were actually ever built. This put the Mall at a 
supreme disadvantage compared to privately owned retail 
complexes. The children’s sandbox became an impromptu 
toilet by night.
Regulatory policies 
that set the character 
of an area or lessen 
private investment 
risk.
Character of the Area
The Mall transformed Fort Street into a safe haven for 
pedestrians. The pace of movement slowed down as 
pedestrians no longer had to dodge cars while crossing the 
street.
Lessen Private Investment Risk
The Mall was constructed to help the Downtown merchants 
compete favorably with those located at private shopping 
complexes. Unfortunately, two challenges were uncovered 
with the completion of the Mall:
1. The attempted use of public property (Fort Street) in 
the same manner as a private shopping mall was not 
successful. Unlike projects such as the Aloha Tower 
Marketplace, which lease the entire project property from the 
government, the Fort Street Mall proprietors did not control 
their project frontage. Thus they did not control the shopping 
environment.
2. The attempted use of municipal government in the 
same manner as a private landlord. As mentioned earlier, the 
City and County of Honolulu was not organized to perform the 
specialized functions of private shopping complex 
owner/managers, and thus could not respond in like time to 
perform those functions.
These two disadvantages, along with access problems, 
discouraged commuters from utilizing Fort Street as a regional 
shopping complex.
Incentives for desired 
private development
Several incentives were offered to commercial establishments 
operating along the Fort Street Mall:
1. As mentioned earlier, the City Improvement District 
80, adopted in 1952, exempted the Fort Street area (and much 
of Downtown) from regular parking requirements.
2. The City’s financial contributions toward 
development and maintenance of the Fort Street Mall was 
meant to attract shoppers to retail operations in the area.
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TABLE 6.3. GARVIN’S INGREDIENTS OF PROJECT SUCCESS
Ingredient of 
Success
Evaluation
Market Two markets were the target of the 1969 Mall development:
1. Office workers from the new high-rises proliferating 
Downtown.
2. As many of the old island wide customer groups as could 
be accommodated by access constraints.
Location Inherent Site Characteristics
Upon the opening of the Mall in 1969, Fort Street could boast an 
excellent collection of retail stores such as Long’s Drugs, F.W. 
Woolworth, Liberty House, etc. within walking distance of each other. 
Proximity
Fort Street merchants operating in 1969 faced a number of distinct 
disadvantages;
1. While Fort Street still could boast excellent bus 
connections throughout the island, the lack of parking and the 
limiting nature of nearby roadways made access a major problem.
2. The center of activity Downtown was also shifting away 
from Fort Street toward the State Capitol and major high-rise 
corporations along Bishop Street. The high-rise buildings also 
offered retail activities on their ground floors, with parking usually 
provided.
3. Fort Street, located within Downtown, increasingly 
suffered from a popular conception as an area of decaying buildings, 
street people, etc.
Design The 1969 Mall design:
1. made extensive use of light tan concrete. Thirty seven 
overhead light posts and four trellises were also made of the same 
material.
2. contained a series of features that proved hard to 
maintain, including a children’s sandbox and a low rise fountain near 
Pauahi Street.
3. used false olive trees to provide shade, but such plants 
also gave off material that was tracked into stores, forcing constant 
cleaning of floors.
4. contained two mini “plazas,” one at Beretania and one at 
King Street. (It is ironic that the King Street plaza was the site of the 
major Mclnerny’s Department Store, torn down for a mall designed to 
aid retailing).
5. had an underpass, complete with another fountain, which 
carried pedestrians under King Street traffic. Because pedestrians 
were eventually allowed to cross King Street at ground level, the 
underpass gradually became abandoned. A petroglyph mural by 
artist Ed Stasack was located in the underpass (Downtown 
Improvement Association February 1969; Reid 1997).
Table 6.3 is continued on the next page.
TABLE 6.3. (CONTINUED): GARVIN’S INGREDIENTS OF PROJECT SUCCESS
Ingredient of 
Success
Evaluation
Financing The 1969 Mall was financed by $1,208,201.44 in direct assessments 
to adjoining property owners, and $1,532,841.06 in taxes from the
City (Downtown Improvement Association February 1969).
Maintenance was to be provided through the regular City 
operating budget. Maintenance levels soon, however, came into 
question by merchants and landowners along the Mall.
Entrepreneurship Although earlier DIA President Clarence Ching, Wade McVay of the 
Campbell Estate and Ben Kaito of the City Council had major input 
into the project, it was DIA President M. L. Randolph (also of the 
Campbell Estate) who was most closely associated with the 1969 
project (Downtown Improvement Association February 1969).
Time Immediate
The Mall served two main purposes:
1. a pedestrian corridor between Downtown offices and
Hotel Street bus stops or parking in the Kukui area.
2. a specialized retail area for Downtown office workers, bus 
patrons, HPU students and a small but growing Downtown 
residential population.
In 1969, each Mall block created a different sense of place.
Between Beretania and Pauahi Streets, the Mall was graced 
by Our Lady of Peace Cathedral and small shops within the aging 
Model Progress Block.
Between Pauahi and Hotel Streets, the Ritz sold wedding 
dresses and other formal wear, Kress operated a “five and dime’’ 
store complete with soda fountain, and the Kramer and Hub stores 
carried men’s clothing. Children would play in a long low fountain 
and a sandbox while their parents and retirees watched nearby.
Between Hotel and King Streets, F.W. Woolworth was 
another “five and dime” store that also sold a variety of local foods, 
Andrade retailed clothing, Hartfield’s had its usual large displays of 
women’s attire, and Liberty House carried the highest fashion goods.
From King to Merchant Streets, the Bank of Hawai’i and 
American Savings occupied their high-rise buildings within the 
Financial Plaza, while travel agencies and other financial institutions 
operated out of a series of small structures on the Ewa side.
Along Fort from Merchant to Queen Street, the dignified old 
Judd and Brewer complexes contrasted with the new Campbell 
Building across the Mall. The Mall itself had become a quiet 
pedestrian path rarely used for anything but access to elsewhere.
The 24 Hour Day
Although the Mall opened with great fanfare, potential patrons 
increasingly shopped elsewhere. Store operating hours shortened 
and during weekends, evenings and nights the Mall was increasingly 
deserted.
Table 6.3 is continued on the next page.
112
TABLE 6.3. (CONTINUED): GARVIN’S INGREDIENTS OF PROJECT SUCCESS
Ingredient of 
Success
Evaluation
Time (continued) Decades
The Mall failed in its purpose of retaining a regional retail presence.
Meanwhile, over the years the Mall suffered from inadequate 
maintenance. Surface paving began to disintegrate under heavy 
pedestrian traffic, trees and shrubs were unkempt or died, the 
irrigation system failed, and lights became inoperable. The King
Street underpass became abandoned.
By the 1980s Downtown merchants, landowners and the DIA 
were actively pressing the City to renovate the Mall and hire a private 
maintenance contractor to improve the Mall’s appearance. The DIA 
and City negotiated about potential new assessments to provide the 
necessary funding, but the maintenance issue could not be resolved. 
The City Department of Housing and Community Development 
rebuilt the Mall in 1993 using solely City funds (Reid 1998).
6.5.2 THE ’’PLANNING” AND “BUILT” LEGACIES
TABLE 6.4. THE “PLANNING” AND THE “BUILT” LEGACIES
Legacy Evaluation
Planning Legacy The 1950s saw work begun on the first General Plan for the
City and County of Honolulu (Atwater 1995). The DIA was a 
strong advocate of such master planning, and the Fort Street
Mall was meant to be a major beneficiary of that planning.
The studies undertaken by the DIA were never officially 
adopted by the City, but would contribute to the Downtown that 
citizens of Honolulu know in 1998.
Economic Analysis of Downtown Honolulu (1959) by 
the Western Real Estate Corporation noted Downtown’s 
potential as an office center and Pacific area business 
headquarters. Downtown’s unique location near government 
decision makers and Chinatown also offered potential benefits.
Central Business District of Honolulu (1959) by Central 
Business Consultants did confuse its patrons with its conflicting 
“Circumferential Circulation” and “Linear Circulation” Plans.
Elements of the Circumferential Circulation Plan 
suggested a mauka freeway to keep through traffic out of 
Downtown, and malls and floor area ratio legislation that traded 
height for ground level open space to create a more pedestrian 
environment.
The Linear Circulation Plan also included pedestrian
malls.
Table 6.4 is continued on the next page.
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TABLE 6.4. (CONTINUED); THE “PLANNING” AND THE “BUILT” LEGACIES
Legacy Evaluation
Planning Legacy 
(continued)
Honolulu: A Master Plan for the Central Business
District (1962), by Leo Wou and David Tom suggested an 
international center along Nuuanu Stream, a Fort Street retail 
complex, and office development adjacent to the Civic Center.
Economic Trends and Planning for the Central
Business District {'\963) by Dr. James Gillies and C.E. Elias, 
recognized that Downtown’s retail supremacy was over, and 
recommended an Oriental Center in the Kukui area.
Report of the Studies and Recommendations for a 
Program of Revitalization of the Central Business District of 
Downtown Honolulu (1968) by Victor Gruen Associates was the 
plan most utilized by the City and DIA. The Gruen organization 
developed the plan utilizing ideas from previous DIA studies 
and experience gathered on the mainland while pioneering the 
conversion of other downtown streets into shopping malls 
(Grant 1998). The Gruen Plan features that impacted the Fort 
Street area included:
1. a commercial core superblock, bounded by Nuuanu 
Avenue, Nimitz Highway, Beretania and Richards Streets.
2. mixed use projects.
3. a rapid transit alignment through Downtown.
4. housing in both Chinatown and the Kukui area.
5. incentive zoning.
6. use of horizontal property acts (condominium law) 
for commercial and residential development.
7. extension of the Fort Street Mall to Nimitz Highway.
8. development of a tourist-oriented, water 
transportation oriented, information center at the Aloha Tower.
9. retention of vistas (Gruen 1968).
As of 1998 the prospect of a central rapid transit system 
station along Hotel between Union Street and Nuuanu Avenue 
continues to offer the most potential for future area growth.
Built Legacy The Fort Street Mall after 1969 was a pedestrian refuge in the 
city, made interesting and diverse by its length. The 1969 
design invoked an outdoor suburban shopping center with its 
squared concrete designs, fountains and children’s sandbox.
The area became increasingly bleak as access difficulties 
caused the number of shoppers to decline. Stores such as the 
Ritz, Sato Clothiers, Kress, Watamull’s, and Hartfield’s moved 
out, and discount and hamburger purveyors moved in. Litter 
problems increased. Physical maintenance declined as the 
Mali’s surface deteriorated; water fountains, music speakers 
and lighting units became inoperable and were not replaced; 
and unforeseen problems created in increasing numbers of 
“street people” created unsanitary conditions.
Table 6.4 is continued on the next page.
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TABLE 6.4. (CONTINUED): THE “PU\NNING” AND THE “BUILT” LEGACIES
Legacy Evaluation
Built Legacy 
(continued)
The Mall also developed separate characters, 
depending upon structures immediately adjacent to it. .
Between Beretania and Pauahi Streets during the first 
years of its existence the Mall increasingly served only as a 
transit corridor between parking lots in the Kukui and the 
Financial Districts. The small square at Beretania Street was 
mostly unutilized and the nearby Model Progress Block 
continued to deteriorate. Changes in federal tax rules 
encouraging building renovation and the growth of Hawaii
Pacific University slowly changed the area into an urban 
college campus where students socialized on the Mali’s 
benches.
Within the Pauahi to Hotel Street area, the small 
fountain near Thom McAn Shoes and the sandbox near Kress 
increasingly belonged to the homeless. The area became a 
public toilet, avoided by the patrons it was supposed to serve. 
Small service businesses remained along the Ewa side, while 
the bigger retailers such as Ritz, Kress, Kramers and the Hub 
moved out. The Ritz and Kress buildings were demolished for 
the Pan Pacific Plaza. The Hub location became a
McDonald’s.
Along Fort from Hotel to King Street, the location of bus 
stops on both Hotel and King and the popularity of the Liberty 
House and F.W. Woolworth stores kept the area much more 
active and clean. Groups of retirees continued to relate their 
stories to each other while sitting on benches near the F.W. 
Woolworth entrance.
The King Street underpass was eventually closed to the 
public. The underpass had never been handicap accessible, 
and thus the ground level crossing had been restored. The 
public simply ignored the underpass, preferring the speed and 
personal safety of a visible ground level crossing.
From King to Merchant Street, the open entrance of 
Pioneer Plaza, coupled with the similar space in the Financial 
Plaza of the Pacific, removed any effective visual demarcation 
lines between the Mall and adjacent private property. The Mall 
became an indistinguishable area between two private 
developments.
Fort from Merchant to Queen Street featured more 
trees than any other portion of the Mall and was farthest from 
the center of Mall activity. It became a quiet refuge for office 
workers seeking to get outside for a lunch spent sitting on any 
of the numerous benches available. This area would remain 
virtually unchanged, except for the renovation of the Judd 
Building, for the next twenty years.
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6.6 LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE
TABLE 6.5. THE FORT STREET MALL (PHASE I); LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE
Lesson for the Future | Application in the Project Possible Future Use
Often only the 
intensification of a problem 
forces involved parties to 
organize, develop 
consensus and create an 
action plan.
Downtown’s retail activities 
had slowly worsened since 
the 1930s. The impending 
opening of the Ala Moana 
Shopping Center was the 
catalyst that sparked first 
the formation of the Upper 
Fort Street Shopping
Center by merchants in
1957 and then the
Downtown Improvement 
Association by mostly 
landowners in 1958.
Honolulu’s worsening traffic 
situation may push the 
costs to all parties for lost 
time, gasoline, vehicle 
maintenance and air 
pollution so high that an 
alternative to automobile 
dependency could be 
demanded by the majority 
of the population.
Changes in political 
administrations can readily 
affect timetables and 
commitments. Citizen 
organizations must be 
prepared to invest 
considerable amounts of 
time in explaining the 
reasons for their positions 
in order to “win over” 
present and potential 
government officials.
Just as Mayor Fasi was 
unwilling to commit himself 
to the Blaisdell parking 
program, so too was Mayor 
Anderson unwilling to 
continue the Fasi HART 
project.
Critical local government 
projects such as rapid 
transit need to become 
more “bipartisan” and less 
identified with individual 
politicians.
Comprehensive planning, 
when not combined with 
adequate financing and 
administrative follow 
through, will fail to produce 
the results desired. Project 
developers must be “up 
front” in acknowledging this. 
Master planning thus is not 
simply “larger scale area 
planning,” but must include 
“long term commitment” to 
the plan itself.
The 1969 Mall, a Downtown 
retail center dependent 
upon outside customers, 
was bucking the popular 
trend toward suburban 
merchandising. Without 
additional parking and the 
rapid transit system the
Mall as a regional shopping 
complex was simply 
doomed.
Honolulu’s on-again, off- 
again rapid transit system is 
an example of difficulties 
encountered in initial 
development and long term 
commitment. It has been 
suggested that the program 
be split into phases in order 
to lower initial costs. It 
must be understood that 
construction of succeeding 
phases will be necessary 
for the project to provide 
the maximum potential 
ridership benefits.
Table 6.5 is continued on the next page.
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TABLE 6.5. (CONTINUED): THE FORT STREET MALL (Phase I): LESSONS FOR 
THE FUTURE
Lesson for the Future Application in the Project Possible Future Use
Today when government 
resources are limited and 
financing projects often 
requires joint government- 
private participation, 
questions of project 
operation and maintenance 
must be better addressed 
prior to project 
development. This should 
involve contractual 
obligations between all 
parties.
Many operational problems 
between the City and the 
owner/merchants were not 
resolved before the Mall 
was constructed. This 
included security, waste 
removal, maintenance of 
equipment, etc.
Any privatization of State 
small boat harbors should 
explicitly spell out the 
operational roles and 
obligations of the private 
entity contracted by the
State, the State itself, and 
the future of government 
workers currently working 
at those locations. It should 
be recognized that the 
private entity may wish 
greater operational latitude 
than possible in the past.
CHAPTER?. KUKUl GARDENS (1970)
7.1 GOAL: BRING HOUSING BACK DOWNTOWN
Some 10,000 people will be relocated from currently planned renewal 
areas. Present plans call for the entire area Waikiki of the River and 
makai of Vineyard to be zoned “commercial”. DIA contends that renewal 
areas should be substantially in multi-family housing for people.
(Downtown Improvement Association September 1961b)
7.2 DESCRIPTION OF THE PROJECT
The Kukui Gardens is an 822 unit low-rise rental project developed by the Clarence 
Ching Foundation, located on former Honolulu Redevelopment Agency lands bounded 
by Liliha, King, Beretania, A’ala, Kukui, and River Streets, and Vineyard Boulevard. The 
project was developed as “gap group” housing - meant to benefit renters who earned 
too much income to qualify for traditional public housing, but who were unable to afford 
market price residences. The project utilized funding from the Ford Foundation and loan 
guarantees from the federal Housing and Urban Development (HUD). HUD’s Section 
8185 D3 guaranteed the mortgage, allowing a lower interest rate that, in turn, lowered 
necessary rental levels for residents of Kukui Gardens.
Architects: Daniel, Mann, Johnson and Mendenhall (DMJM). Landscape 
Architects: Eckbo, Dean, Austin and Williams (Hostetler 1970). Contractor: Hawaiian 
Dredging and Construction Company, Ltd. Cost: $16,100,000. Constructed: 1968-70 
(Honolulu Advertiser 1/14/1970 and 5/29/1970a).
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7.3 BACKGROUND OF THE PROJECT
After World War II Honolulu mauka of Beretania Street could best be described as a high 
density, low-rise area of dilapidated buildings - a prime site for the “bulldozer” urban 
renewal projects that were increasingly popular among city governments across the 
United States.
The Honolulu Redevelopment Agency (HRA), organized in 1949 under the 
Territorial Urban Renewal Act, undertook this role of community redevelopment. The 
HRA would identify areas it felt were blighted beyond redemption, purchase (or 
condemn) the property, relocate occupants, and clear the land. The HRA then acted as 
a packager and coordinator for developers, typically selling the land at its own cost or at 
a loss, while retaining review and approval rights to the subsequent project for a stated 
number of years. The HRA ultimately cleared 73.8 acres in the Queen Emma Project, 75 
acres in Kukui, 30 acres in Kauluwela, and 4 acres in A’ala (Hawaii Industry April 
1962b), uprooting thousands of people from their neighborhoods and leveling hundreds 
of structures.
The Honolulu Redevelopment Agency was described by Hawaii Business 
Magazine as;
a product of the first generation of thinking about urban renewal - 
concerned more with the problems of clearing slums than with building 
new housing. HRA itself has lacked the necessary legal powers to 
develop housing, and has had to enlist private enterprise to build the 
approximately 5,000 housing units completed or in progress on 
redevelopment lands.
(Hawaii Business June 1973)
...families were moving out to the suburbs, where new housing and 
shopping centers were being built. When you started talking about urban 
renewal in those days, you really had problems. People were reluctant to 
build in the City core because they had little faith in renewal of the 
surrounding area.
(Hawai’i Business June 1973)
Melvin Shinn, former manager of the HRA, noted that had the HRA been 
successful in redeveloping its Kukui property in the early 1960s, there is little likelihood 
that the area would have gone into housing for displaced residents. Following prevailing 
practice, the HRA planned commercial zoning for most of the redevelopment areas, 
because commercial activity “was thought to be the key to rejuvenation of failing urban 
centers” (Hawai’i Business June 1973). The lack of market interest in the land was 
exemplified by large vacant lots and the erection of the low-rise development of funeral 
homes known as “mortuary row” along Kukui Street.
Honolulu’s chronic housing shortage encouraged redevelopment of the area as a 
series of high density residential complexes. Yet the public was “wary of high-rise, low 
income projects because of the difficulties with the Hawai’i Housing Authority’s high-rise 
public housing project, Kuhio Park Terrace” (Hostetler 1970).
The HRA’s first effort at high-rise residential development near Downtown began 
as a request for proposals in 1960. Meant as a demonstration project of what urban 
renewal could do, the effort became the showpiece 581 unit Queen Emma Apartments. 
Completed in 1964, the Queen Emma Apartments was a joint project of Oceanic 
Properties and E.E. Black, and designed by well-known architect Minoru Yamasaki (who
HRA manager Ray Fisher in 1973 described the problems faced by the HRA in
disposing of the consolidated properties:
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also did New York City’s World Trade Center). The $12.5 million dollar project was 
possible because of HRA land acquisition, consolidation, infrastructure and land sales 
policies, and offered studio, one and two bedroom units. It did not aim to rehouse the 
original area inhabitants, but was successful in attracting 1,500 people to live 
immediately adjacent to Downtown (Hawai’i Business and Industry June 1964).
The introduction of new Federal Housing Administration programs in 1961 
provided the HRA with additional housing options for its lands near Downtown. The 
National Housing Act Section 221 (d) (3) provided federal mortgage loan guarantees that 
allowed the borrower access to Below Market Interest Rates (BMIR) on the mortgage 
because the lender’s risk of a loan default was lower. This in turn lowered overall costs 
and allowed the borrower to charge lower rents. During the life of the mortgage, the 
FHA would then monitor project maintenance costs and rental income. The 221 (d) (3) 
program would be used by two organizations in Honolulu to develop extensive housing 
near Downtown — the Hawai’i Council for Housing Action (HCHA) in the Kauluwela 
Project, and the Clarence Ching Foundation in the Kukui District (Hawai’i Business June 
1970).
7.4 DIA INVOLVEMENT AND PROJECT EVOLUTION
The DIA’s desire for integrated land use planning had called for the return of housing to 
Downtown. As early as 1961 the Newsletter ha6 recommended the use of the Kukui 
area for high density residences.
Clarence Ching, DIA President in 1966, was an island born developer, known for 
residential and industrial projects in the Honolulu Airport, Salt Lake and Moanalua 
Gardens areas. Tight financial conditions in 1966 had encouraged him to look at 
Section 221 (d) (3) as a source of funds for apartment construction. Over a period of 22
121
months, Ching worked with the FHA on his 700 unit Moanalua Hillside development, the 
first large project in Hawai’i to use the program. Federal regulations limited his profit 
there to six per cent (Hawai’i Business and Industry 1968d and Hawai’i Business June 
1970).
Ching felt confident enough in his relationship with the FHA that he made an 
application in 1966 for a HRA project to be built mauka of Downtown which became 
Kukui Gardens. The Kukui Gardens project was organized to accommodate “gap group’’ 
renters earning ninety-five per cent of the median area family income (Gota 1998), using 
Section 221 (d) (3).
As part of his application for the Kukui Gardens project, Ching notified the HRA 
of his intention to create the Clarence T. C. Ching Foundation. This Foundation, as a tax 
exempt charitable trust, would act as developer. Ching would guarantee the Bank of 
Hawai’i $400,000 of his own funds to secure the Foundation a loan for a similar amount. 
Those funds would be used as start up capital for the project.
Another new entity, Kukui Gardens Corporation, would actually own the project. 
Kukui Gardens Corporation would be governed by a fifteen member board made up of 
five members from Chaminade College, five from St. Louis High School, and five from 
the Clarence T. C. Ching Foundation (Hong 1998). During the life of the project 
mortgage, rental income and expenses would be monitored by the FHA to ensure low 
rents to residents, maintain proper reserves, and provide cost containment. The forty 
year mortgage note allowed prepayment/payoff after twenty years. Once the mortgage 
ended, the three organizations would no longer be bound by FHA guidelines, and any 
income from the project would be utilized by the three governing entities (Gota 1998). It 
was estimated that Ching would lose $500,000 in potential profit because of the non­
profit arrangement (Cook 1967).
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Figure 7.1. A central pedestrian pathway within Kukui Gardens in 1998, looking makai. 
The stairs on either side provide private entrances to upper units. Source: Author.
Figure 7.2. Kukui Gardens from the distance, looking mauka, in 1998. In the immediate 
foreground are amenities of the adjacent Beretania Park. Source; Author.
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Both the Hawai’i Council for Housing Action and Ching submitted proposals to 
the HRA for the Kukui site. The project required a minimum of 800 units on the 21 acre 
site (40 units per acre) (Honolulu Advertiser 1/14/1970).
Ching’s architects devised a design for 822 housing units. The majority of the 
apartments would be in three story low-rise buildings. The remaining four structures 
would be six stories in height. Ching’s architects felt that low-rise buildings were 
desirable because of popular disillusionment with high-rise public housing projects in 
Kalihi. Low-rise buildings could also be built for less cost (Honolulu Advertiser 
1/14/1970). There were to be one, two, three and four bedroom units, with over fifty per 
cent of the units to consist of three and four bedrooms to accommodate families (Ching 
1966).
The Hawai’i Council for Housing Action’s proposal called for one ten story 
building and three eleven story buildings, with the remainder of the complex consisting of 
two and three story structures. The HCHA proposal offered a total of 779 units at a cost 
per unit $500 higher than Ching’s $17,800. Estimated rentals would have averaged $9 a 
month higher than Ching’s $77-$155 range (Honolulu Advertiser 1/14/1970).
Although the HRA favored the Hawai’i Council for Housing Action design, Ching’s 
proposal won because it had more units, could be built for less cost per unit, and was 
low-rise (Hostetler 1970).
7.5 ANALYSIS OF THE PROJECT
7.5.1 ALEXANDER GARVIN ANALYSIS
TABLE 7.1. GARVIN’S BACKGROUND REQUIREMENTS FOR SUCCESSFUL 
PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS
Requirement Evaluation
Effective input from all 
stakeholders
The Honolulu Redevelopment Agency was under great 
public pressure to utilize the vacant site left from HRA 
clearance activities, to provide housing for individuals 
and families displaced by redevelopment, and to 
provide “gap group” housing for those unable to qualify 
for previous government housing programs. Thus from 
inception the project underwent intense scrutiny from 
federal. State and City agencies.
Only former area residents displaced within the 
previous two years were promised a project unit, while 
earlier displacees were not.
The project also became a political issue 
between then State Governor John Bums who 
supported the project, and his rivals within the
Democratic Party, Honolulu Mayor Frank Fasi and State 
Lieutenant Governor Thomas Gill. The latter two 
individuals described the project when under 
construction as having the potential to be “another noisy 
and unpleasant slum” (Honolulu Advertiser 1/14/1970).
Criticisms of the project decreased when it was 
disclosed that 3,000 names had been placed on waiting 
lists for the 822 units (Honolulu Advertiser 1970d). 
Criticism of the project’s design also lessened later in 
1970 when the project won an American Institute of 
Architects award for its design (Honolulu Star Bulletin 
and Advertiser 11/15/1970).
Understanding what planning 
can and cannot accomplish
The project proponents knew that they could not solve 
Honolulu’s chronic affordable housing shortage, but 
they did address the needs of families and the “gap 
group.”
The project was designed to avoid what its 
promoters felt were many of the mistakes of the past. 
Although massive in scope (822 units), Kukui Gardens 
contains no buildings over six stories. Large units, 
individual addresses, distinctive architectural touches, 
community facilities and a broader mixture of income 
groups were all used to attract families, create 
community and avoid stereotyping residents. If demand 
is any indication, the project remains successful.
Table 7.1 is continued on the next page.
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TABLE 7.1. (CONTINUED): GARVIN’S BACKGROUND REQUIREMENTS FOR 
SUCCESSFUL PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS
Requirement Evaluation
Understanding what planning 
can and cannot accomplish 
(continued)
The developers also wanted to create housing near 
Downtown to provide economic support for area 
businesses. Kukui Gardens offered retailers 3,000 
potential new customers.
Understanding how physical 
changes to the urban 
environment can improve the 
economy, quality of life, and 
city function
Kukui Gardens replaced what was widely regarded as 
the city’s worse slum, and the wasteland left by HRA 
land clearance. While the HRA did attempt to house 
former area residents in the new facility, unfortunately 
records apparently were poor and only a small 
percentage of such individuals returned to the area.
The new facility offered residents fire proof 
structures, community facilities, a park, and large units 
to accommodate families.
Provision of housing near major bus routes and 
Downtown provided residents with employment 
opportunities.
Housing 3,000 individuals in the central city area 
potentially lessened their commute and removed a large 
number of vehicles from the city streets.
Examination of how the 
project or program in question 
has created positive change 
and prevented negative 
change
Positive Change
The project created positive change by removing a 
windswept wasteland and supplying badly needed 
housing.
Kukui Gardens, by only providing an upper limit 
on residential income, created a non-stigmatized public 
housing project.
Kukui Gardens, along with the higher income 
Queen Emma Gardens project, furnished Downtown 
retail merchants with a broader customer base.
Prevent Negative Change
Kukui Gardens, by filling a vacant wasteland, prevented 
the use of the area as a dump and isolated site for 
crime.
Occupation of the area helped to keep 
businesses along Liliha Street from further decline when 
the original area inhabitants were relocated.
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TABLE 7.2. GARVIN’S FRAMEWORK OF GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS TO 
ENCOURAGE PRIVATE INVESTMENT
Ingredient of Success Evaluation
Strategic investment in 
infrastructure, rather 
than routine capital 
spending
The HRA condemned and consolidated the 19.5 acre site, and 
then sold it to the developer. Provided were construction of the 
A’ala Street extension into the project area, and construction or 
upgrading of Vineyard Boulevard, Liliha, King and Beretania 
Streets along the project’s perimeter. Also included was 
development of Beretania Park along A’ala Street.
Regulatory policies 
that set the character 
of an area or lessen 
private investment risk
Character of an Area
Originally a collection of high density, low-rise, antiquated 
wooden structures, the initial HRA urban renewal action had 
turned the area into a windswept wasteland.
The new project emphasized internal neighborhoods by 
placing parking on the perimeter, and use of distinctive 
plantings and architectural features. The low-rise housing 
character of Kukui Gardens complements the same low-rise 
housing development immediately mauka of Vineyard
Boulevard. Much of the district continues as a collection of low- 
rise concrete structures.
Lessen Private Investment Risk
The HRA’s Queen Emma Project had demonstrated the 
demand for larger apartment units near Downtown (Hawai’i 
Business and Industry June 1964). This demand determined 
the greater number of large units to be built in the Kukui
Gardens project.
The use of Section 221 (d) (3) lowered investment costs 
to the developer.
The public support of the Governor of Hawai’i, John 
Burns, also expedited the project.
Incentives for desired 
private development
Section 221 (d) (3) offered developers two major incentives.
1. Government financing to build housing in times of 
restricted capital availability, as Ching had used in 1966 for his 
Moanalua Hillside project, helped developers avoid the “peaks 
and valleys” problem common to development.
2. Developers could utilize federal housing assistance 
to lower costs during the life of the mortgage, and eventually 
own the development “free and clear” once the mortgage had 
been paid off.
TABLE 7.3. GARVIN’S INGREDIENTS OF PROJECT SUCCESS
Ingredient Explanation
Market Honolulu’s chronic housing shortage had hit the “gap group” 
especially hard. This group earned too much to be eligible for 
traditional housing assistance, but could not afford market housing. 
Especially hard hit were families. The demand was well 
represented within the 3,000 families on the waiting list for the 822 
units available when the project opened (Honolulu Advertiser
5/29/1970b).
Location Inherent Site Characteristics
Kukui Gardens is located on a gently sloping 19.5 acre site.
Proximity
The project is within walking distance of Downtown, and on major 
bus routes.
A State developed high-rise apartment building for senior 
citizens is located nearby at Beretania and A’ala Streets, offering a 
mixture of lifestyles to the neighborhood.
Unfortunately, the development is also adjacent to Kukui 
Street, which has become a “drive by” route for crimes such as 
prostitution and drugs. The project has erected high fencing along 
College Walk and other nearby streets.
The U shape of the development, surrounding Beretania
Park on three sides, combined with the fencing along Vineyard,
Liliha, King and Beretania Streets, provides additional security to 
the Park.
Design The project consists of mostly three story structures, with four 
buildings built to six floors. Parking is on the periphery, so that unit 
access is by foot. Each unit has its own address, and cross 
ventilation. Nine neighborhood courts exist with distinctive 
architectural finishes, plantings and play equipment. A community 
meeting and day care center are adjacent to the public park 
(Honolulu Star Bulletin and Advertiser 11/15/1970).
The project consists of the following types of units;
1. 105 one bedroom/one bath
2. 302 two bedroom/one bath
3. 53 three bedroom/one bath
4. 226 three bedroom/one and a half bath
5. 136 four bedroom/two bath (Gota 1998).
Demand for units in the project has remained strong.
Financing Clarence Ching guaranteed a loan to the Bank of Hawai’i for 
$400,000 to get the project started (Honolulu Advertiser 1967).
On February 11, 1969 the project received its Section 221 
(d) (3) letter of mortgage guarantee from the federal government 
(Gota 1998).
The Ford Foundation issued a $16 million, 40 year mortgage 
for the project using the federal guarantee (Hawai’i Business June 
1970).
Table 7.3 is continued on the next page.
TABLE 7.3. (CONTINUED): GARVIN’S INGREDIENTS OF PROJECT SUCCESS
Ingredient Explanation
Entrepreneurship Clarence Ching was responsible for the development of Kukui 
Gardens. He applied for the project, organized the ownership, 
personally put up the money, requested and received the necessary 
federal financial support, and oversaw construction and completion 
of the project.
Time Immediate
Kukui Gardens is a pedestrian friendly environment that creates a 
sense of internal community and security by its design. The 
emphasis is on families.
The two most visually interesting components are the 
pathways between buildings and the stairs to the second floor units. 
This creates a sense of personal space for the children playing and 
their parents sitting nearby.
The 24 Hour Day
Residents of the project are active throughout the daylight and 
evening hours. The large number of children make the afternoons 
and early evenings within the complex especially busy. Security 
fences create demarcation lines at night, especially along the small 
project area along Kukui Street.
Decades
The project has weathered time quite well. The complex is properly 
maintained. New sloping roofs installed to prevent leaks in upper 
levels have had the added bonus of lessening the “box” look of the 
buildings. Fences were installed to deal with security concerns 
along the perimeter.
Judging from foot traffic, patronage from Kukui Gardens has 
helped area businesses such as Liliha Square and restaurants 
along Liliha Street and the Dillingham Boulevard-King-Liliha Street 
intersection. Downtown-Kukui Gardens interaction is harder to 
ascertain, as the distance usually entails a short bus ride.
The project is still in great demand (Luke 1998).
7.5.2 THE “PLANNING” AND “BUILT” LEGACIES
1
TABLE 7.4. THE “PLANNING” AND “BUILT” LEGACIES
Legacy Evaluation
Planning Legacy Kukui Gardens succeeded in returning residents (especially 
families) back to the Downtown area. This fit in well with the 
DIA’s desire to provide a mix of land uses in the area, and 
provide Downtown businesses with a potential base of 
customers.
Kukui Gardens is a fine example of several successful 
trends in public housing projects;
1. development of “gap group” housing, offering 
assistance to a group that had not been able to afford market 
housing.
2. housing a broader spectrum of people within the 
same project. By limiting occupancy to those who earned up to 
ninety-five per cent of the mean local family income, a broader 
group of renters was accommodated, and the project was not 
stigmatized as had earlier public housing developments such 
as Kuhio Park Terrace.
3. more attention to families. The Queen Emma
Project had overestimated the demand for studios, a fact that 
Ching kept in mind when determining the unit mix for Kukui 
Gardens.
4. increased emphasis on creating neighborhoods.
The Queen Emma Project had been developed as a high-rise 
apartment complex with extensive open space. Kukui Gardens 
was designed to create a sense of community.
5. use of architectural detail to create a unique sense 
of place in public projects. The designers of Kukui Gardens 
understood that such features create a sense of identity 
(“ownership”) of specific areas within the complex.
Built Legacy Kukui Gardens has a number of features that won it an 
architectural award. These include:
1. low-rise design
2. personal touches such as individual mail address 
and private stairs to upper floor apartments.
3. landscape architecture as an integral part of the 
plan. The plantings do much to lessen the feeling of density 
and to identify areas within the complex.
4. use of distinctive materials to provide character to 
areas of the development.
5. a high percentage of larger apartments for families.
6. other family and children oriented facilities.
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7.6 LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE
TABLE 7.5. KUKUl GARDENS: LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE
Lesson for the Future Application in the Project Possible Future Use
Public-private 
partnerships such as the 
Section 221 (d) (3) 
program have been 
successful in providing 
positive housing 
environments that 
neither the government 
nor market could 
provide individually.
Below Market Interest 
Rates (BMIR) as used 
by Kukui Gardens, were 
an additonal useful tool.
This federal mortgage 
guarantee program lowered 
the interest rate on the project 
loan, allowing the owners to 
lower project unit rents.
Reinstitute the BMIR.
Section 221 (d) (3) is 
historically most used 
during times of restricted 
capital. Hawai’i in 1998 is in 
a local recession coupled 
with the State’s historic 
housing crunch.
Development of housing 
would both help those 
needing shelter and the 
local construction industry. 
Underutilized properties 
makai of Kukui Gardens 
and A’ala Park are possible 
sites.
Development of housing 
for all income levels 
provides a broad 
customer base for 
nearby businesses.
Kukui Gardens has a mixture 
of income levels among its 
residents. Nearby projects 
such as Honolulu Tower offer 
market level housing.
Downtown benefits from 
having this mixture, because:
1. Downtown is not 
represented as inhabited by 
only one income group.
2. A broad income 
population can support diverse 
shopping opportunities, 
making Downtown a more 
interesting destination.
Government should 
encourage diverse housing 
opportunities Downtown. 
Block “J”, for example, the 
last undeveloped HRA site, 
and “Mortuary Row” along 
Kukui Street, offer 
opportunities because of 
their proximity to Downtown 
and their large lot size.
The demand for family 
housing has not been 
well addressed. Many 
couples with children 
cannot afford single 
family homes, but need 
additional bedrooms in 
their dwellings. 
Unfortunately, such 
units require larger initial 
investments.
Queen Emma Gardens 
overestimated the demand for 
studio units. Kukui Gardens 
contained over fifty per cent 
larger, family oriented units.
Government should provide 
incentives for production of 
units with larger numbers of 
bedrooms to accommodate 
families. Public housing 
developments should 
include high ratios of such 
units.
Table 7.5 is continued on the next page.
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TABLE 7.5. (CONTINUED): KUKUl GARDENS: LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE
Lesson for the Future Application in the Project Possible Future Use
Mixed income 
developments 
accommodate the most 
financially needy groups 
without stigmatizing 
these residents or the 
project.
Kukui Gardens’ income limit 
for residents was ninety-five 
per cent of the local median 
family income. This allowed 
housing for a mixture of 
income levels, where residents 
did not know the income level 
of their neighbors.
This policy should be 
continued in all subsequent 
public housing projects.
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CHAPTERS. THE CULTURAL PLAZA (1974)
8.1 GOALS: ENERGIZE REDEVELOPMENT AND REVITALIZE RETAILING
Energize redevelopment of Chinatown.
Revitalize the retail business of downtown Honolulu by enticing tourists 
away from Waikiki.
(Midkiff 1980)
8.2 DESCRIPTION OF THE PROJECT
The popular conception of the Cultural Plaza is that it contains four Chinese benevolent 
societies, the Chee Kung Tong, Kuo Ming Tang, Leong Doo, and Lung Doo, and two 
schools, the Sun Yat Sen School and Mun Lun School. All six were relocated to the 
block bounded by River, Beretania, Maunakea and Kukui Streets, from the Kukui 
Redevelopment Project, in hopes of developing an “Oriental Center” that would spark 
retail interest within the greater Chinatown area. Subsequent disputes between the six 
led to the spin off of the Mun Lun School.
1. The Mun Lun School is located at the comer of Maunakea and Kukui Streets. 
Architects: Au, Cutting, and Smith. Contractor; Francoll Construction Company.
Cost: $400,000. Constructed: 1970-71 (Chang 1998).
2. The Cultural Center (including the Sun Yat Sen School) occupies the 
remainder of the block .
Architects: Daniel, Mann, Johnson and Mendenhall designed the central 
common area and the Kuo Min Tang building; Peter Hsi and Associates the Chee Kung 
Tong and Leong Doo buildings; Park Associates the Lung Doo building, and Wong and 
Wong the Sun Yat Sen School building (Pang 1998). Contractor: Hawaiian Dredging
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and Construction, Inc. (Hawai’i Business March 1975). Cost: $6.4 million (Lock 1998). 
Constructed: 1971-74 (Hawai’i Business April 1979).
8.3 BACKGROUND OF THE PROJECT
Chinese cultural societies for generations had performed the functions of providing 
economic assistance to new arrivals, offering a familiar social environment, and handling 
tasks such as writing letters or sending money home. In order to do this, the societies 
historically purchased property for rental income, or engaged in commercial ventures.
Urban renewal in the Kukui district greatly impacted most of the 70 to 80 Chinese 
societies resident in Honolulu during the late 1950s and early 1960s. Displaced groups 
found themselves in possession of cash settlements from the Honolulu Redevelopment 
Agency and a promise for first choice of redevelopment lands once the properties were 
consolidated.
It was determined that special zoning would be required to allow Chinese cultural 
and benevolent organizations to revive their old lifestyle - a mix of institutional and 
commercial uses (Hawai’i Business and Industry March 1966b).
8.4 DIA INVOLVEMENT AND PROJECT EVOLUTION
The DIA, as part of its three tier plan to revitalize Downtown, wanted to reinvigorate 
Downtown retailing. The Western Real Estate Corporation, Wou and Gillies studies had 
suggested a center of cultural activity as being a potentially strong draw for tourism into 
Downtown, aiding Downtown retailing and Chinatown retailing in particular. It was 
hoped that such a center could transplant cultural activities from the decaying structures 
of the past into an attractive, modern facility.
Clarence T. C. Ching, President of the Joint Committee on Chinatown Renewal, 
the Sun Yat Sen School, past President of the United Chinese Society, and DIA
134
President, organized the Chinese Cultural Plaza, Inc., in 1965 (Hawai’i Business April 
1979).
As the Honolulu Redevelopment Agency did not lease land, a unified 
development corporation organized to purchase the land and immediately lease most of 
it back out seemed the best method to economically relocate displaced cultural groups 
back into the Kukui area. Federal regulations, unfortunately, did not allow 
“discriminatory” projects to qualify for federal funds. Yet it was the ethnic factor that was 
most likely to draw curious tourists from Waikiki into Downtown. Thus the “Chinese 
Cultural Plaza” became the “Cultural Plaza.” The project would contain apartments, 
offices, a library, and parking for 2,000 cars.
This new program was strongly endorsed by younger ethnic Chinese 
businessmen, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, the United Chinese Society, and the 
Downtown Improvement Association. The governing body of the “Cultural Plaza” was to 
consist of representatives of six large displaced Chinese cultural groups: the Chee Kung 
Tong, Kuo Ming Tang, Leong Doo, Lung Doo, the Sun Yat Sen School, and Mun Lun 
School. Each of the six groups would hold two seats, one occupied by the group’s 
elected president, and the second by a permanent group representative.
John Carl Wamecke and Associates, which had done the State Capitol and 
Capitol District plans, was brought in to design the complex. The Wamecke Plan 
covered two city blocks, constituting the area between River, Beretania, Nu’uanu and 
Kukui Streets. The Plan included multi-family housing to be financed by the Federal 
Housing Administration. The Small Business Administration also offered to assist 
individual merchants as tenants in the new center (Hawai’i Business and Industry March 
1966b).
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The Wamecke Plan exposed serious structural problems within the organization 
of the project:
1. The Board of Directors and the Chairman were all volunteers. As the 
personal time of Chairman Ching was limited, he was forced to have one or more of his 
employees represent him in the project.
2. As Chairman, Ching wielded little formal authority. Furthermore, culture 
apparently played a role in decision making, as many members of the Board were 
Ching’s seniors and the usually tough developer seemed reluctant to impose his will on 
them.
3. The six different groups had no tradition of working together. While some 
Board members were interested in a “new” Chinatown, others who represented the 
individual schools and societies were simply interested in rebuilding their individual 
school or society headquarters.
4. While the Board of Directors was indeed responsible for project decisions, 
each of the Directors was answerable to the society or school board that he or she 
represented, and many were unwilling to make decisions without prior approval by their 
own boards. As some group boards contained as many as 50 directors, or required 
debate by their full memberships, consensus and decision making became extremely 
difficult and time consuming.
5. Even the vision of how best to financially support the project was not shared 
by all members of the six groups. Although most members agreed that retail activity 
would be necessary to sustain the complex, few had any experience with actually 
operating a business. “Nevertheless, all insisted on participating in even the minutest 
decisions” (Hawai’i Business April 1979).
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The Wamecke Plan called for a high-rise hotel, apartments and an office tower. 
Inclusion of such facilities was meant to create a broad base of financial support for the 
project and provide it with potential customers. The Plan was scuttled because the 
groups could not agree on condominium ownership.
The project as built was far different from the Warnecke Plan. It was scaled 
down to the single River-Beretania-Maunakea-Kukui block. Four of the organizations 
immediately hired their own architects to design “their” own buildings. The Mun Lung 
school acquired separate financing and built its own freestanding complex eighteen 
months before the others. Construction of the main section of the Cultural Plaza began 
in 1972, with the opening occurring in December 1974 (Hawaii Business April 1979).
The project has never lived up to its projections.
1. Money intended for promotion purposes instead went to cover construction 
costs. Chairman Ching personally covered part of the construction costs.
2. Upon opening in 1974, only one third of the shops were occupied.
3. The lack of rental income left no money for promotion, which created a 
vicious cycle of no customers and no additional tenants.
4. The project lost its leasing agent, and such duties fell on the Project 
Coordinator.
5. Disagreements within the Board of Directors led to the hiring of a duplicate 
center manager.
6. A need for tenants to bring income into the Center led to lease agreements 
with inexperienced, first time retailers. Members of the societies, themselves unskilled in 
business methods, engaged in lease negotiations with potential tenants. The results 
were lapses of basic retailing principles.
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Figure 8.1. Exterior of the Cultural Plaza, 1998. View looking Diamond Head-Ewa. 
Note the lack of a main entrance or unified architecture. Source: Author.
Figure 8.2. Moongate Stage, located within the central courtyard of the Cultural Plaza, 
in 1998. One of the project’s major assets, the parking garage, lies to the left (Diamond 
Head direction). Source; Author.
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7. Language and cultural barriers created conflicts within the complex (Hawaii 
Business March 1975 and April 1979).
8. The lack of an overall plan, plus the use of six different architectural firms, 
resulted in no bus handling facility being built on site for tourist vehicles (Midkiff 1998).
8.5 ANALYSIS OF THE PROJECT
8.5.1 ALEXANDER GARVIN ANALYSIS
TABLE 8.1. GARVIN’S BACKGROUND REQUIREMENTS FOR SUCCESSFUL 
PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS
Requirement Evaluation
Effective input from all 
stakeholders
Effective input from a group of stakeholders must be 
based upon a realistic evaluation of the situation. This 
was not done.
Relocation was deemed difficult because of the 
mix of institutional and commercial land uses that such 
groups engaged in. Yet other such society structures 
exist in the Kukui area today on Fort Street and on
River Street. This option was not pursued for the six 
groups in favor of uniting the relocation project with a 
cultural center.
Those familiar with such cultural societies and 
schools should have understood the organizational 
difficulties of placing them in a developer context. 
Although the organizers had good motives, they did not 
address the problems of stakeholders as developers.
1. The societies and schools did not empower 
their representatives to make decisions for them, thus 
slowing down the decision making process.
2. Elders were unwilling to allow younger 
individuals, even if educated in a particular area, to 
make decisions. This was also reflected in the 
reluctance of Clarence Ching and others to be more 
assertive with the elder run societies and schools.
3. The competitive nature of the societies made 
cooperation among them difficult.
4. It was deemed necessary to have a highly 
respected individual within the Chinese community, 
such as Clarence Ching, working with the societies and 
schools on the project. However, Ching was often 
forced by time constraints to have others (frequently 
non-Chinese) represent him.
Table 8.1 is continued on the next page.
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TABLE 8.1. (CONTINUED): GARVIN’S BACKGROUND REQUIREMENTS FOR
SUCCESSFUL PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS
Requirement Evaluation
Effective input from all 
stakeholders (Continued)
A lack of input from potential tenants was also made
apparent when the project opened in 1974. The Project 
Manager “soon discovered that Chinatown’s remaining 
established merchants, many of whom were 
approaching retirement age, had no intention of 
reopening their shops in the Cultural Plaza or anywhere 
else, even if urban renewal were to move makai of 
Beretania Street and displace them’’ (Hawai’i Business 
April 1979.)
Understanding what planning 
can and cannot accomplish
The DIA and other backers of the Cultural Plaza were 
mistaken in thinking that they could change the modus 
operand! of the six groups. Much of the decision 
making processes were cultural, and had taken 
thousands of years to develop. Furthermore, the 
societies and schools had not been entrepreneurial in 
nature, but instead had relied on their tenants to 
produce their income. The lack of business experience 
could not be quickly overcome.
Understanding how physical 
changes to the urban 
environment can improve the 
economy, quality of life, and 
city function
The DIA and others hoped that the Cultural Plaza would
be another successful catalyst of economic activity 
much as the Financial Plaza of the Pacific had been. 
Unfortunately, the decision making process vetoed the 
Wamecke proposal, which contained features that could 
have reinforced the project, including a hotel, office 
complex and apartments. The final plan left a retail 
complex without any built-in customer base (Hawai i 
Business and Industry March 1966b; Hawai’i Business 
March 1975 and April 1979).
It is ironic that today (1998) an element of the 
Wamecke proposal, housing, has been built in the 
Diamond Head half of the original plan area. Many of 
the residents of those units do frequent area 
businesses, but most of the foot traffic seems to travel 
in the makai direction toward Chinatown itself.
Examination of how the 
project or program in question 
has created positive change 
and prevented negative 
change
------------------ ---------------------- -----
Positive Change
The Cultural Plaza replaced the substandard structures 
that had previously characterized the area, housed the 
six groups, and provided a large parking structure on 
the Ewa side of Downtown. It offered additional space 
for small Asian businesses, particularly restaurants and 
travel agencies, immediately adjacent to Chinatown. 
Prevent Negative Change
The project prevented further physical deterioration 
within the area, but has not been an effective engine for 
commercial success.
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TABLE 8.2. GARVIN’S FRAMEWORK OF GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS TO 
ENCOURAGE PRIVATE INVESTMENT
Government Program Evaluation
Strategic investment in 
infrastructure, rather 
than routine capital 
spending
The property on which the Cultural Plaza sits was condemned 
and assembled by the Honolulu Redevelopment Agency. That 
agency also developed the present road network around the 
complex. The land was then sold to the six groups for $1.5 
million (Hawai Business 1979). The City government also 
endorsed the Cultural Plaza plan, much like the DIA, to 
consolidate the six groups and use the result as a cultural/retail 
catalyst Downtown.
Regulatory policies 
that set the character 
of an area or lessen 
private investment risk
Character of the Area
The complex seems out of place within Chinatown because, 
unlike the traditional low-rise structures that face the street 
across Beretania, the Cultural Plaza looks inward, and has no 
readily defined entrances.
Lessen Private Investment Risk
The City encouraged consolidation of the six groups’ relocation 
efforts, offering them funds for their properties, and offered 
them land at a discount.
Incentives for desired 
private development
The societies and schools were given “first priority’’ at 
acquisition of urban renewal lands, especially if they 
consolidated their efforts. The Warnecke Plan would have 
enabled their tenants to apply for Small Business Loans, and 
provided Federal Housing Administration financing of the multi­
family housing above the complex. City support continued for 
the second plan, encouraging New Jersey’s Mutual Benefit Life 
Insurance Company, which had also been doing business with 
Clarence Ching’s Loyalty Enterprises for over ten years, to 
make the loan (Hawai’i Business April 1979).
TABLE 8.3. GARVIN’S INGREDIENTS OF PROJECT SUCCESS
Ingredient for 
Success
Evaluation
Market Planners viewed the potential market for the project as city-wide, 
especially the population of Asian descent, and tourists. The
Western Real Estate Research Corporation 1959 Economic
Analysis of Downtown Honolulu, the Central Business District of 
Honolulu 1960 study and the 1962 Master Plan for the Central 
Business District (Wou Plan) had all considered an “Oriental” or 
“International Center” within Chinatown. “If this general area could 
be organized and some of the noncompatible uses replaced, shops 
and restaurants here could become a tourist Mecca second only to 
the island atmosphere shops of Waikiki” (Western Real Estate 
Research Corporation 1959).
Table 8.3 is continued on the next page.
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TABLE 8.3. (CONTINUED): GARVIN’S INGREDIENTS OF PROJECT SUCCESS
Ingredient for 
Success
Evaluation
Location Inherent Site Characteristics
The project was moved from Chinatown near Nu’uanu Stream into 
the Kukui Redevelopment Area because that land was already 
available and cleared while Chinatown itself had not undergone 
urban renewal. The six Chinese societies and schools had, as 
displaced entities from the Kukui area, first rights to property there 
once consolidation by the HRA was complete.
Proximity
The chosen location was away from the center of both Downtown 
and the historical focus of Chinatown, making it difficult to operate 
as a retail and tourist center. The project has, however, has 
recently benefited from nearby high-rise residential developments. 
Many of the new area residents share cultural affiliations with 
businesses within the Cultural Plaza.
Design Two remarkable features of the existing complex are that there is no 
focal entrance to the project to provide presence and invite 
customers in from the street, and no bus bays/off loading areas 
designed for large tour buses. Such activities must be done directly 
on the street, a feature that greatly compromises a complex 
originally hoping to draw large numbers of tourists (Midkiff 1998).
The existing complex differed from the Warnecke Plan 
because it lies only within one block, bounded by River, Beretania, 
Maunakea and Kukui Streets; and does not include any hotel, office 
or apartment towers above it designed to provide mortgage or retail 
support for ground level shops.
The physical organization of the complex is governed by 
several factors.
1. Four of the organizations hired their own architects.
2. The Mun Lun School separated itself from the rest of the 
five by acquiring its own financing and commenced construction 
ahead of the rest of the facility.
3. Daniel, Mann, Johnson, and Mendenhall were hired to 
do the central common area and the Kuo Min Tang Building.
Although DMJM stated that there was “no problem’’ in integrating six 
different sets of architectural plans, the underlying disharmony of 
design is quite apparent simply in the lack of well defined entrances 
on both the Maunakea and Beretania sides of the complex (Hawai’i 
Business April 1979 and author 1998).
Within the Cultural Plaza block, each of the six societies and 
schools have their own buildings. The four located along Beretania 
are, moving in the Ewa direction the Chee Kung Tong, the Lung
Doo, Leong Doo and the Kuo Ming Tang. The Mun Lun School is 
situated at the Maunakea-Kukui Street intersection and the Sun Yat 
Sen School on Kukui Street.
Table 8.3 is continued on the next page.
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TABLE 8.3. (CONTINUED): GARVIN’S INGREDIENTS OF PROJECT SUCCESS
Ingredient for 
Success
Evaluation
Design
(continued)
The block is divided into four functional areas:
1. The largest, occupying two thirds of the block, is 
centered on an inner courtyard and stage, and is bounded by the 
four society buildings along Beretania, the parking garage on the 
Maunakea side, and shops along both the north and River Street 
faces. Structures are two or more stories. Restaurants 
predominate on the second floor and along Beretania, small retail 
concerns occupy the remaining space.
2. The Mun Lun School facing Maunakea and Kukui
Streets.
3. The Sun Yat Sen School facing Kukui Street.
4. A series of small take out food shops along River Street.
Financing Financial planning for the Cultural Plaza was inadequate, 
particularly predictions of required capital and potential profitability:
1. Interim financing was handled largely by New York 
based Irving Trust Company, with Clarence Ching’s Liberty Bank 
providing a smail part of the construction loan.
2. New Jersey’s Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Company 
provided the project with a $7.25 million loan for permanent 
financing based on its long association with successful developer 
Clarence Ching. No commitment fee was required, but Mutual
Benefit Life required immediate and reliable cash-flow for the project 
upon completion (Hawai’i Business April 1979).
3. Inflation, skyrocketing interest rates and construction 
strikes delayed opening of the project. Loyalty Enterprises 
personnel, monitoring progress, found the project fifteen to thirty 
per cent over budget, and had to ask the six groups for additional 
funds several times during construction. One group mortgaged its 
remaining property, $500,000 in promotion funds were used, and 
reportedly Clarence Ching made up $435,000 himself.
4. Lease (commercial occupancy) projections did not prove 
true upon opening, sending the cash-starved project into a tailspin. 
Lack of tenants meant less Income, limited income starved 
promotion, promotion deficiencies negatively impacted sales, and 
few sales meant fewer tenants. By early 1975 most of the original 
tenants had left.
5. The discovery that most of Chinatown’s merchants were 
not interested in opening in the Cultural Plaza led to a scramble for 
tenants. The Project Manager had, “relied heavily on members of 
the societies, friends, friends of friends, and word-of-mouth to attract 
tenants... Many of the renters who signed up proved to be less than 
ideal’’ (Hawai’i Business April 1979). Furthermore, language and 
intercultural misunderstandings became a common problem.
Table 8.3 is continued on the next page.
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TABLE 8.3. (CONTINUED): GARVIN’S INGREDIENTS OF PROJECT SUCCESS
Ingredient for 
Success
Evaluation
Financing
(continued)
6. Further management difficulties ensued when two 
individuals held the position of general manager simultaneously.
7. Efforts to entice tourists failed. Tour operators 
complained that the mix of tenants was not varied enough to spark 
visitor interest. Bus arrival schedules were poorly arranged to 
complement hours of operation. Time spent in the Center by 
visitors proved too short.
8. Mutual Benefit Life cooperated with the six groups by 
raising its mortgage commitment several times to cover rising costs, 
finally reaching $9 million. The Plaza’s interim lenders, however, 
pulled the plug after arrearage passed the $2 million dollar mark 
(Hawai’i Business April 1979).
9. In 1978 the project, minus the separately financed Mun 
Lun School, was offered for sale at a price of $13.5 million (Hawai’i 
Business 1979). The project was sold in 1979 to Longevity 
International Enterprises Corporation (Pang 1998).
Entrepreneurship Clarence Ching, President of the Cultural Center and President of 
the DIA, must be viewed as the person who kept the project going 
through to completion. Although his many commitments often 
meant that he delegated work to subordinates, he remained with the 
project, on occasion personally helping cover its debts.
Time Immediate
There is no intriguing architectural entrance anywhere to capture 
the shopper’s imagination.
The physical separation of the two schools and the 
domination of Beretania Street in the area focuses potential 
customers on the makai two thirds of the complex. The only 
unifying theme in the area is a series of red painted columns that 
eventually lead patrons into the central square. The design 
disorientation easily confuses patrons as to how to retrace their 
steps.
The 24 Hour Day
During the day, the most interesting part of the Cultural Plaza 
actually occurs on its perimeter. Along the mauka end of River 
Street, old local men play games and eat the ethnic foods available 
from Plaza shops nearby.
The Cultural Center is developing a reputation as a place to 
have an inexpensive lunch or to get a reasonably priced air fare to 
the Far East. Both of these activities occur within the central 
courtyard area.
In the evenings, parking attendants for the restaurants 
located along Beretania Street do a lively act double and triple 
parking cars on the sidewalk as their patrons make their way 
indoors.
Table 8.3 is continued on the next page.
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TABLE 8.3. (CONTINUED): GARVIN’S INGREDIENTS OF PROJECT SUCCESS
Ingredient for 
Success
Evaluation
Time (continued) Decades
The Cultural Plaza continues to languish economically. As 
mentioned earlier, the project had to be put up for sale. The present 
owners have not had much success adding life to the complex. In 
fact, the project seems forgotten - the DIA drawing “Downtown 
Honolulu 1958-1988: Key to Landmarks” does not show or list the 
Cultural Plaza (Downtown Improvement Association February
1988).
8.5.2 THE “PLANNING” AND “BUILT” LEGACIES
TABLE 8.4. THE “PLANNING” AND “BUILT” LEGACIES
Legacy Evaluation
Planning Legacy The inability of the Cultural Plaza to bring large numbers of 
tourists into Downtown and thus revitalize Chinatown helped 
refute the “federal bulldozer” approach to urban renewal in 
Honolulu. The “federal bulldozer” had completely removed 
whole neighborhoods and left the area vacant for long periods 
of time. Finally, when redevelopment did occur, the assistance 
promised conflicted with cultural norms, and the completed 
project became one of the “lackluster” commercial centers 
decried by Jane Jacobs in her book The Death and Life of 
American Cities. The result was that the project became an 
embarrassment, and was quietly forgotten. The “federal 
bulldozer” approach was discredited. Honolulu then followed 
the national trend (see Teaford) away from such wholesale 
district demolition and the problems it created. The pre- 
Cultural Plaza 1962 Wou Plan for Chinatown, for example, 
included large scale demolition of existing structures, while the 
later Gruen and Chinatown Plans continually increased the 
number of retained and rehabilitated buildings. By 1973, 
Chinatown itself would be placed on the National Register of 
Historic Places.
Built Legacy Functionally, the Cultural Plaza operates much like other low- 
rise structures in the area, occupied by mostly Asian-American 
or immigrant small retail stores or restaurants. Unfortunately, 
unlike the street-facing older facilities of Chinatown, the 
complex looks inward, discouraging the very retail activities that 
were meant to support it. Its most differentiating features are 
the modern (rather than traditional Chinese) architecture along 
Beretania Street and the parking garage along Maunakea. The 
complex, as constructed, is unlikely to have any great impact 
on the area around it.
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8.6 LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE
TABLE 8.5. THE CULTURAL PLAZA: LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE
Lesson for the Future Detailed Explanation Possible Future Use
A realistic understanding of 
clients and evaluation of 
their needs is essential.
Relocation of the six groups 
was consolidated rather 
than providing them with 
individual sites. A lack of 
understanding of their 
independence, decision 
making structures, limited 
commercial skills and 
unwillingness to defer to 
experience over seniority 
was illustrated by the 
rejection of the 
condominium concept 
within the Warnecke Plan.
Proponents should not be
afraid to “back up” and 
reevaluate proposals if the 
project becomes less and 
less workable. An example 
is the City’s Ewa Villages 
project, where costs seem 
to be escalating far beyond 
original estimates.
Professional market studies 
must be undertaken before 
construction begins.
Project proponents were 
surprised at the lack of 
enthusiasm displayed by 
area merchants to locate in 
the Cultural Plaza after it 
was completed.
Project proponents should 
ensure that detailed market 
studies are done by 
licensed professionals.
Experienced project 
management must be 
committed in advance of 
construction. This 
management team must 
have the authority to 
approve spending and 
determine lessees.
The internal organizations 
of the six groups which 
made up the Cultural Plaza 
were not conducive to large 
scale or fast decision 
making. The final 
organizational structure of 
the project was unwieldy, 
and the individuals who 
would be expected to set 
direction actually had little 
authority. In the Cultural 
Plaza situation, poor initial 
rentals resulted in the loss 
of experienced help. 
Management conflicts 
resulted in a poor tenant 
mix.
Community development 
groups undertaking projects 
should be able to 
demonstrate both a 
workable decision making 
apparatus and access to 
experienced project 
management talent. A list 
of organizations offering 
project management 
assistance, or a list of 
organizations interested in 
similar projects and 
containing such 
management experience, 
would be invaluable to 
community groups 
interested in development.
Table 8.5 is continued on the next page.
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TABLE 8.5. (CONTINUED): THE CULTURAL PLAZA: LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE
Lesson for the Future Detailed Explanation Possible Future Use
Proper capitalization is 
necessary in order to 
prepare for delays and the 
long initial periods in which 
investment is greater than 
returns.
Construction problems and 
other delays are common in 
large projects, and a 
financial cushion must be 
prepared for this possibility. 
This undercapitalized 
project had to utilize other 
funds, including promotion 
monies and personal 
assets, to cover costs of 
delays. Proper 
capitalization must also be 
available for promotion, 
otherwise a vicious cycle 
erupts of declining sales, 
tenants, rents, etc.
Officials examining future
development of City 
property such as the Pali 
Highway-Beretania-Queen 
Emma-Kukui Street block 
must critically examine the 
ability of promoters to bring 
their proposals to fruition.
This includes market 
demand, obligations of 
lenders, and interest rates.
Mixed use projects spread 
risk and provide multiple 
sources of income.
The Cultural Plaza had no
office, hotel or apartment 
component to spread risk, 
help it meet its mortgage 
obligations and provide a 
customer base.
Federal restrictions on the
use of Kukui District lots in 
the area bounded by River 
Street, Kukui Street, Pali 
Highway and Vineyard 
Boulevard will soon expire. 
These lots are currently 
underutilized, and 
developers could benefit 
from mixed use that would, 
for example, include ground 
level shops, parking behind 
or above, and housing 
above that. This would 
provide multiple income 
sources, spread risk, and 
improve the customer base 
for the area.
Commercial activities facing 
the street invite customers 
into retail establishments, 
increase street activity, 
improve security, and 
create a pedestrian 
environment.
The Cultural Center design 
looks inward, turning its 
back on potential 
customers and the 
character of the area.
New Downtown
development should include 
the requirement for street 
level shopping. This 
includes parking structures, 
which otherwise tend to 
create gaps in an otherwise 
“linked” pedestrian 
environment.
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CHAPTER 9. BISHOP SQUARE AND TAMARIND PARK (1972/83)
9.1 GOAL: DEVELOPMENT OF A DOWNTOWN PEDESTRIAN CENTER
This park at the corner of King and Bishop Streets will be almost an acre 
in size and will undoubtedly become Downtown’s pedestrian center, 
comparable in many respects to the skating rink at Rockefeller Center or 
the plaza at Embarcadero Center. While many of us will miss the old 
Alexander Young Hotel Building, a great many more will be able to enjoy 
this splendid new open space.
(Downtown Improvement Association January 1981)
9.2 DESCRIPTION OF THE PROJECT
Tamarind Park is the pedestrian focus of Bishop Square, a complex in the block 
bounded by Bishop, King, Alakea and Hotel Streets. Bishop Square’s buildings contain 
retail and office functions that define Tamarind Park on two sides.
Bishop Square was developed in two phases;
1. The 30 story Pacific Trade Center (1998’s Pacific Tower) and the 1250 stall 
parking garage immediately mauka of it occupy the Diamond Head side of the block. 
The project developer was the Hawai’i Corporation (Daines 1983).
Architect; Lemmon, Freeth, Haines, Jones and Farrell. Contractor; Pacific 
Construction Company. Cost; $19 million. Constructed; 1970-72 (Hawai’i Business 
1971a, 1971b: Honolulu Advertiser 9/16/1983).
2. The 28 story Pauahi Tower and Tamarind Park immediately makai of it 
occupy the Ewa end of the block. The Park contains a series of fountains and pools, 
large trees, and a prominent artwork by British artist Henry Moore. Underground are
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r128 parking stalls. The project developer was the Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance 
Company.
Architect: Franklin Gray in collaboration with Chapman, Desai, Cobine and 
Sakata. Landscape Architect: James Hubbard. Contractor: Pacific Construction. Cost: 
$60 million. Constructed: 1981-83 (Hawai’i Business November 1981, April 1983;
Daines 1983; Ames 1996).
9.3 BACKGROUND OF THE PROJECT
Downtown Honolulu’s Bishop Street originated between Hotel and King Streets, when in 
1900 Alexander Young announced plans to line the Diamond Head side of the new road 
with a series of fireproof first-class buildings provided with all the latest improvements. 
His Alexander Young Hotel (completed 1903 and later known as the Alexander Young 
Building or the Alexander Young) had a height of five stories, over 450 feet of frontage 
along Bishop Street, and extended for over a hundred feet along both Hotel and King 
Streets. The hotel contained 192 rooms, including suites, single and double rooms. The 
Hotel became the premiere business hotel of the City for many years, hosting many 
social events at its rooftop garden (Ames 1996).
The City and County of Honolulu proposed that the Diamond Head side of the 
block be developed as a public parking lot in Honolulu’s Master Plan: January 1941, but 
nothing came of the proposal. In 1962 the Hawai’i Corporation considered erection of a 
new hotel on that site (Hawai’i Business and Industry August 1962).
Demand for hotel rooms, however, had long been shifting to Waikiki. Downtown 
Honolulu’s increasing demands for office space offered the owners of the Alexander 
Young a profitable alternative to hotel rooms. The Alexander Young evolved into a 
professional office center, catering to businessmen, dentists, and doctors. By 1964 the
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owner of the Alexander Young, the Hawai’i Corporation, decided to completely phase 
out hotel operations by converting the remaining 120 hotel rooms into offices (Hawai’i 
Business and Industry December 1964). The success of the Alexander Young as a 
prestigious office center led to extensive interior renovations within the building (Hawai’i 
Business March 1969).
9.4 DIA INVOLVEMENT AND PROJECT EVOLUTION
The success of the DIA supported Financial Plaza of the Pacific, just Ewa and makai of 
the Alexander Young Building, encouraged the Hawai’i Corporation to scrap the hotel 
plan and announce development of the Pacific Trade Center in 1970. The DIA 
supported the development of the Pacific Trade Center (Grant 1998). The additional 
Class A office space and large parking garage facing the designated arterial of Alakea 
Street fit well into the Gruen Plan.
Unfortunately for the Hawai’i Corporation, other developers (Amfac in 1968 and 
1971, and Theo. H. Davies in 1971) were able to develop similar Class A projects ahead 
of the Pacific Trade Center (completed 1972), creating a “buyer’s market’’ for Downtown 
office space. This forced the company to provide inducements for lessees such as 
generous improvement allowances, fully finished space, and turnkey leasing services to 
handle old location leases (Hawai’i Business March 1972).
By 1974 the office rental market had recovered. A quarter of a billion dollars in 
government, commercial and residential construction was then either underway or 
nearing the construction stage (Hawai’i Business March 1974).
In 1974 the Hawai’i Corporation sold the Pacific Trade Center to the 
Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company of Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Northwestern 
Mutual purchased the Alexander Young property two years later (Coppedge 1998).
150
The condition of the 77 year old Alexander Young Building in 1980 was such that 
Northwestern Mutual Life had to weigh the options of extensive additional renovation of 
the structure or demolition and construction of a replacement. The Alexander Young 
had been placed on the State Register of Historic Places. Such designation meant that 
the Building could not be torn down without notifying the State three months in advance 
of demolition, within which time the State could use its condemnation powers to 
purchase the building if it wished to preserve it.
A legal inquiry by Northwestern Mutual into the possibility of tearing down the 
building led to the formation of public opposition groups, the Friends of the Alexander 
Young Building, and the Voice of the Pacific (Honolulu Advertiser 7/30/1980; Engle 
1980).
The potential razing of the Alexander Young was difficult for the DIA because the 
building had many personal ties to the DIA’s membership. For example, the first 
President of the Downtown Improvement Association, R. Alexander Anderson, was the 
grandson of Alexander Young. The Downtown business community had held many 
luncheons at the rooftop garden of the Alexander Young, and many of its members had 
either stayed there over the years, or had offices in the building.
Usual supporters of Downtown renovations such as the artist Ramsey opposed 
the demolition. The proposed replacement for the Alexander Young, a Class A high-rise 
and pedestrian focused park, interested others. The split within the general public 
reached into the DIA, requiring its leadership, which viewed the replacement project as 
preferable, to support the high-rise/park proposal behind the scenes (Grant 1998).
Efforts by Northwestern Mutual to proceed with the demolition resulted in an 
effort by the Voice of the Pacific to require an environmental impact statement (EIS).
The State Board of Land and Natural Resources decided not to require such a study.
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and efforts by the Voice of the Pacific to delay the project in the courts were ultimately 
unsuccessful. Demolition of the Alexander Young Building began on July 7, 1981 
(Gomes 1981).
Once the decision had been made by Northwestern Mutual to go ahead with the 
demolition, the DIA’s Downtowner:
stressed the need to look ahead to the project’s benefits. The long period 
of argument tended to obscure the project’s remarkable gift to the public; 
a magnificent new open space right in the heart of Downtown’s financial 
center.
(Downtown Improvement Association January 1981)
The replacement for the Alexander Young Building, the Pauahi Tower, 
commenced construction as Downtown Honolulu entered an office rental market glut. 
Over one million square feet of new Class A office space was being prepared, including 
such projects as Central Pacific Plaza and Executive Center. The project’s leasing 
manager, T. Clifford Melim, tried to put a positive light on the situation, noting that 
Executive Center’s office space was actually fee simple and not rental, and that, “We’re 
going through the same cycle we’ve been going through the last 20 years’’ (Daines 
1983). Melim was convinced that when the then existing office space surplus was eaten 
up a few years in the future, a new wave of building would be ignited.
The Pauahi Tower was aggressively marketed, beginning during the construction 
phase. Northwestern followed the common practice of providing lessees with incentive 
packages such as several months of free rent, free parking, after-hour air conditioning, 
longer lease terms, etc. Such tactics were preferred by landlords because they did not 
affect long term rental income from the project. Northwestern Mutual went further than 
convention, however, by refusing to hire an exclusive leasing agent, which created
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2Figure 9.1. Tamarind Park undergoing renovations in 1998. The parking garage is on 
the left, and the Pacific Tower (formerly Pacific Trade Center) on the right. Restaurants 
fill the ground level of the parking garage, allowing pedestrians to then take their lunches 
into the Park. Source: Author.
Figure 9.2. Tamarind Park in 1998, looking mauka toward the Pauahi Tower. The 
change in elevation that allows a miniature “river” can be appreciated from this angle. 
Source: Author.
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competition between reality firms. The company also discounted quoted rental rates for 
the less desirable first ten floors of the project that faced the parking garage. The last 
two tactics were unprecedented in Honolulu’s office rental markets (Hawai’i Business 
April 1984).
The Pauahi Tower continued to suffer lengthy vacancy problems. In 1985 the 
building was only thirty per cent leased (Hawai’i Business April 1985). In 1986 full floors 
were still available (Schmicker 1986). Only by 1987 was the building leased to the 
ninety per cent range (Wentzel 1987).
Tamarind Park, however, had “begun to take on a ‘big city’ sophistication and 
ambiance that (real estate) brokers are pleased with’’ (Hawai’i Business April 1984). 
Clever use of walkways, pools and benches, diverse eating opportunities, lunchtime 
entertainment such as the Honolulu Symphony and the Royal Hawaiian Band, evening 
activities such as Ho’olaule’a and First Night, and active participation in the Honolulu 
City Lights Christmas display have made Tamarind Park the pedestrian activity center of 
Downtown.
Tamarind Park/Bishop Square won the City and County of Honolulu’s “Project of 
the Year” award for 1986 (Downtown Improvement Association August 1986).
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9.5 ANALYSIS OF THE PROJECT
9.5.1 ALEXANDER GARVIN ANALYSIS
TABLE 9.1. GARVIN’S BACKGROUND REQUIREMENTS FOR SUCCESSFUL 
PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS
Requirement Evaluation
Effective input from all 
stakeholders
Development within the block was private.
Demolition of the Alexander Young Building was 
a public issue, however. Citizen’s groups, the State 
Department of Land and Natural Resources, and the 
courts all were involved in debate. The issue even split 
the ranks of the Downtown Improvement Association, 
many of whose members had personal ties to the
Duilding. The fate of the structure was sealed by the 
State’s conclusion that it could not afford to condemn 
;he building, and left the decision to the owner to 
replace it.
Understanding what planning 
can and cannot accomplish
Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company, the
owner and developer of both the Pauahi Tower and 
Tamarind Park, wanted both a prestigious business 
address and an attractive people oriented environment.
To create a vision of quality the building and
Park both contain large amounts of imported Italian 
marble (Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company 
7/21/1983). A large statue by noted British artist Henry 
Moore was also installed in the Park.
The Park used design suggestions from William
H. Whyte’s The Social Life of Small Urban Places to 
create what he called “people places” Such areas 
contain good access and views to the street, ample 
seating, trees, water, sunlight, and nearby shops. All of 
these items were provided within or on the perimeter of 
the Park, creating synergy between the Park and its two 
defining high-rises (Honolulu Advertiser 8/20/1983).
The park is private space, and is posted as 
such, even if it is used for a public purpose. Thus the 
owners have the right to monitor an individual’s 
behavior and revoke permission to enter at anytime.
Understanding how physical 
changes to the urban 
environment can improve the 
economy, quaiity of life, and 
city function
Development of Bishop Square provided the Financial
District with two Class A office facilities, a 1,250 stall 
parking garage, and Tamarind Park. The Bishop-King 
Street intersection became the center of pedestrian 
activity in Downtown — where open space from the 
Financial Plaza, Bishop Square, and later First
Hawaiian Center would meet.
Table 9.1 is continued on the next page.
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TABLE 9.1. (CONTINUED): GARVIN’S BACKGROUND REQUIREMENTS FOR 
SUCCESSFUL PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS
Requirement Evaluation
Create positive change and 
prevent negative change
Create Positive Change
Portions of Bishop Square replaced aging structures 
(such as the original power plant for the Alexander
Young Building on the Diamond Head side of the block) 
with modern office facilities. The parking structure 
provided over 1200 highly desirable stalls close to
Bishop Street. Tamarind Park furnished badly needed 
open space and a pedestrian focus in an increasingly 
high density, high-rise environment.
Prevent Negative Change
Making the decision to renovate or demolish the 
existing Alexander Young Building was preferable to 
postponement, because the building was deteriorating 
due to age and change of use. The condition was such 
that Northwestern decided to remove and replace.
Construction of new ground level retail space in 
the Pauahi Tower allowed many of the former
Alexander Young Building tenants (i.e., airline ticket 
offices, bookstore, etc.) to return, thus maintaining the 
character of central Bishop Street as a service center 
for the business community.
The owners did consider the Tamarind Park site 
for development of a multistory shopping arcade which 
would have competed with Fort Street for customers. 
Successful development of the Park made the area 
more valuable to the owners as a central open space, 
rather than commercial use (Daines 1983).
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TABLE 9.2. GARVIN’S FRAMEWORK OF GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS TO 
ENCOURAGE PRIVATE INVESTMENT
Ingredient of Success Evaluation
Strategic investment in 
infrastructure, rather 
than routine capital 
spending
The development of the Hawai’i State Capitol at the Civic
Center site nearby to Bishop Square made the Hawai’i 
Corporation/Northwestern property a prime potential office site.
The Bishop Square site enjoys good access from other 
parts of the island via Pali Highway-Bishop, King, and Alakea- 
Queen Emma Streets.
Hotel Street, frequent site of rapid transit line and 
station proposals and a potential access bonanza, lies 
immediately mauka of Bishop Square.
Regulatory policies 
that set the character 
of an area or lessen 
private investment risk
Character of the Area
The State of Hawai’i courts did not require the 
owner/developer. Northwestern, to develop an environmental 
impact statement study about demolition of the old Alexander 
Young Building. The State also did not purchase the property 
to preserve it. This allowed Northwestern to replace the 
Alexander Young with the high-rise Pauahi Tower and
Tamarind Park.
Lessen Private Investment Risk
The arrival of Statehood in 1959 had allowed life insurance 
companies such as Northwestern to invest in Hawai’i. This 
greatly increased the potential pool of investment capital for 
such projects as Bishop Square (Grant 1998).
Incentives for desired 
private development
Bishop Square was subject to the open space requirements
and height bonuses that were pioneered by the Financial Plaza 
of the Pacific.
The project site was within the area designated for 
developments of up to 350 feet. The City Council later raised 
the limit for Bishop Square and other nearby properties to 450 
feet, encouraging further office development immediately 
adjacent to Bishop Square (Downtown Improvement
Association January 1993).
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TABLE 9.3. GARVIN’S INGREDIENTS OF PROJECT SUCCESS
Ingredient Explanation
Market The market for the high-rise structures within Bishop Square is
businesses seeking Class A space Downtown, especially those 
wanting to be close to both the Capitol and Financial Districts.
The market for Tamarind Park is the Downtown office 
worker. The Park offers sunshine, active and passive areas, and 
includes a variety of restaurants along its perimeter.
Location Inherent Site Characteristics
A nine foot drop in elevation between Hotel and King Streets 
provided the opportunity to create a mini-river within Tamarind Park 
(Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company 9/8/1983).
Proximity
The site occupies the longest block of Bishop Street, and is at the 
main intersection (Bishop and King) in the heart of the Financial 
District. It is within walking distance of all three branches of 
government.
Design Bishop Square has four sections; the Pauahi Tower, the parking
structure. Tamarind Park and the Pacific Tower. The large parking 
structure is mostly hidden away from the Park by the bulk of the two 
Towers and ground level shops built into its base.
Landscape architect James Hubbard designed the Park 
using the ideas of William Whyte to attract people to the Park. It 
was a deliberate attempt to keep the area open to make: 
everyone feel comfortable and safe, even at night.
And we have lots of space for seating, where people 
can meet and talk, eat lunch, enjoy the sun or shade, 
and stretch out on the grass.
(Northwestern Mutual 9/8/1983)
Making use of a change in elevation on the site, Hubbard designed: 
What’s really a man-made river that cascades down 
through the entire park - a corridor of water with 
weirs or small waterfalls. They’re made of Italian 
granite; you can see it by looking through the falling 
water, which acts like a magnifying glass.
(Northwestern Mutual 1983b)
Tamarind Park/Bishop Square won the City and County of
Honolulu’s “Project of the Year” award for 1986 (Downtown 
Improvement Association August 1986).
Financing The first half of Bishop Square (the Pacific Trade Center and
parking garage) began with a $3 million line of credit from the Bank 
of Hawai’i, Bank of America and First Hawaiian Bank. Once the 
project received commitments for sixty five per cent of its space, a 
$16 million dollar loan was arranged with the New England Mutual 
Life Insurance Company (Chapman 1998).
Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company financed the 
second half of Bishop Square using its own funds (Melim 1998).
Table 9.3 is continued on the next page.
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TABLE 9.3. (CONTINUED); GARVIN’S INGREDIENTS OF PROJECT SUCCESS
Ingredient Explanation
Entrepreneurship It was Bishop Square’s misfortune that both phases of the project
entered the office rental market during periods of excess capacity. 
Bishop Square did not have tenants the size of those moving into 
the Financial Plaza of the Pacific, Amfac Center, and the Davies 
Pacific Center, to immediately occupy much of the space in its 
buildings.
The first phase of Bishop Square, the Pacific Trade Center 
and the parking structure, were developed under the leadership of 
Randolph Crossley, Chairman of the Hawai’i Corporation, and Rex 
Kuwasaki, President of American Pacific Group. (The American 
Pacific Group owned a majority of the stock of the Hawai’i 
Corporation, and subsequently merged with it.)
The key individual in the second half of the project was Cliff 
Melim, President of Bishop Square Management Corp., acting as 
agent for Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company of
Milwaukee. Melim oversaw that portion through, planning, 
demolition of the Alexander Young, and construction of the Pauahi 
Tower and Tamarind Park.
Time Immediate
The completed project’s main attraction is the man-made river that 
runs through the Park. After exploring the river, pedestrians are 
offered options to eat at take out or sit down restaurants on the 
perimeter of the complex, to stretch out on the lawn, or sit on 
benches provided both under cover of trees or out in the sun.
The 24 Hour Day
The complex is most active during the daylight hours during 
weekdays, especially at lunchtime. After hour activities include 
special events such as the Ho’olaule’a and First Night block parties 
and the Christmastime Honolulu City Lights program. At night and 
on weekends the area is much less attended, but still provides a 
sense of security due to its openness and private guard service. 
Decades
The project is still quite new, only sixteen years old as of 1998, and 
the only appreciable change is that the Park’s trees have increased 
their canopy size. The complex is extremely well maintained.
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9.5.2 THE “PLANNING” AND “BUILT” LEGACIES
TABLE 9.4. THE “PLANNING” AND “BUILT” LEGACIES
Legacy Explanation
Planning Legacy Bishop Square is another beneficiary of the City and County of
Honolulu’s zoning changes that began with the Financial Plaza 
of the Pacific - provision for ground level open space allowed 
increased building height. Northwestern Mutual went further 
than developing simple open plazas by deliberately creating a 
focused “people place” at Tamarind Park. Tamarind Park was 
designed to create a safe change of pace from the office by 
providing entertainment, privacy, sunlight, food, a bookstore, 
etc.
Tamarind Park also is an example of private space 
used for a public purpose - a place where, unlike the Fort
Street Mall, permission to enter is revocable. This creates a 
somewhat “sanitized” environment.
The completed Bishop Square used one of a limited 
supply of remaining large lots left in Downtown. Future 
development will likely require consolidation of smaller lots, a 
prospect likely to require maximum density brought on by 
consolidation costs. In Hawai’i’s difficult economic climate of 
the 1990s, this makes other downtown high-rises less likely for 
the foreseeable future.
Built Legacy The two high-rises of Bishop Square define the open space of 
Tamarind Park. The Park’s use of flowing water, bridges, 
benches, lawns, and artwork provide a succession of 
microenvironments for different pedestrian tastes. The 
development of the Park, across from Downtown’s original 
open space in the Financial Plaza of the Pacific, encouraged 
the development of further open space at the First Hawaiian 
Center (Ames 1996).
9.6 LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE
TABLE 9.5. BISHOP SQUARE/TAMARIND PARK: LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE
Lesson for the Future Application in the Project Possible Future Use
The impact of architectural 
features and details has a 
major impact on the actual 
use of a facility. People 
want to feel safe in their 
parks, and visibility is their 
first line of defense.
Tamarind Park was 
deliberately designed to be 
open, to allow users to feel 
comfortable and safe, even 
at night. While there are 
numerous seats, nothing 
blocks the view from other 
areas. This is in contrast to 
the City’s original design for 
Kamalii Park at Beretania 
Street and Pali Highway, 
where concrete structures 
blocked views of the 
seating area from the 
street. The City 
subsequently demolished 
the concrete planters and 
walls that blocked views.
Design park facilities in as 
open a manner as possible. 
Light parks from the same 
poles that light adjacent 
streets for easy 
maintenance and increased 
safety.
The draw of such private 
“people places” may 
negatively impact the 
efforts of cities to revitalize 
downtown pedestrian malls.
The Fort Street Mall is too 
narrow to provide the 
sunshine that Tamarind
Park enjoys. Maintenance 
is also superior at the 
Tamarind facility.
Cities should encourage the 
development of “people 
places” along existing or 
planned city redeveloped 
pedestrian malls.
“People places” such as 
Tamarind Park have 
positive effects on 
downtown office 
complexes, bringing 
occupants out of their 
structures to intermingle, 
and lessening the image of 
the typical office building as 
a self contained unit.
Tamarind Park draws 
workers from across 
Downtown to its activities 
and provides an important 
place to socialize.
Creation of similar activity 
sites in areas seeking 
revitalization would be a 
useful patron draw. Lihue 
and Hilo both need a 
central sense of place 
within their downtowns.
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CHAPTER 10. THE FORT STREET MALL RENOVATION
(PHASE II, 1993)
10.1 GOAL: IMPROVE AND REDEVELOP THE FORT STREET MALL
Upgrade the Mall to a private shopping center standard.
(Gushman 1998)
10.2 DESCRIPTION OF THE PROJECT
The Fort Street Mall occupies the original vehicular Fort Street between Nimitz Highway 
and Beretania Street in downtown Honolulu. Plazas occur at Beretania and at King 
Streets. Immediately adjacent to the King Street plaza is a large lava rock fountain and 
a popular Satellite City Hall in the underpass. The 1993 Mall was designed using a 
“Victorian" style of architecture, including black light posts, drinking fountains, and traffic 
barriers, extensive use of palm trees, and earth tone pavers over a sand subsurface.
Architects: Landscape Architects PBR Hawaii, under the direction of the City 
Department of Housing and Community Development (Downtown Improvement 
Association February 1993). Contractor: PPC-Tokyu Joint Venture (Reid 1998). Cost: 
$4,000,000. Constructed: 1992-93 (Downtown Improvement Association September 
1991).
10.3 BACKGROUND OF THE PROJECT
A DIA-City agreement had been instrumental in the development of the original Gruen 
designed Fort Street Mall in 1969. Unfortunately, the parking garages and rapid transit 
components called for in the Gruen Plan were not constructed, creating access 
problems for potential customers from outside of Downtown. Further problems were
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encountered in attempts to operate a regional shopping complex from a public street 
without benefit of coordinated marketing. As a consequence, what regional retailing that 
had remained disappeared from Fort Street.
Fort Street retailing instead evolved to accommodate four growing groups of. 
patrons:
1. office workers
2. bus patrons
3. Hawaii Pacific College/University students
4. area residents.
Fort Street retailing also became very time-dependent. The F.W. Woolworth 
store, for example, in 1987 noted that sixty-seven per cent of its sales occurred between 
the hours of 11:00 a.m.-1:30 p.m. (Loftus 1997).
Pedestrian travel statistics also bore this out. By 1987 the DIA estimated 3,600 
persons per hour passed the Liberty House during the peak lunch period (Downtown 
Improvement Association September 1987).
The environment of the Mall, however, had been deteriorating for some time.
This involved both private and public property.
Within the private sector, some store owners had done little to renovate their own 
buildings since the Mall was built. Reported one store manager, “The trouble is we can’t 
pass regulations on a public mall and control the condition of the buildings the way they 
can in a private shopping center. And the owners are very independent - they aren’t 
getting together” (Gautier 1971).
Within the public sector, while security continued to be a concern, maintenance 
became the dominant issue. The heavy pedestrian use of the Mall and maintenance 
problems were giving the Mail a worn out look.
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1. Irrigation system: The irrigation system was not functioning (Downtown 
Improvement Association September 1987).
2. Landscaping: Many of the original trees planted in 1969 were often 
overgrown, upkempt, or had died (Gautier 1971; Downtown Improvement Association 
September 1987). The original “false olive” trees created a litter and stain problem on 
local retail floors when tracked in on customer’s shoes (Medeiros 1997).
3. Facilities problems included drinking fountains that did not provide cool water 
or any water at all, dirty benches, inoperable overhead audio and light systems, lack of 
restrooms, and deteriorating walking surfaces (especially the brick) (Downtown 
Improvement Association March 1990a; Author).
10.4 DIA INVOLVEMENT AND PROJECT EVOLUTION
While the DIA no longer viewed Fort Street as a major island wide retailing center, the 
DIA wished to promote its specialty functions. As much as possible the DIA wanted to 
upgrade the Fort Street Mall to the facility standards enjoyed by patrons of private 
complexes such as the Ala Moana Shopping Center. This required that the DIA address 
maintenance and security problems in both the public and private sectors along the Mall 
(Gushman 1998).
The DIA publicly pushed private enterprise to improve the image of downtown 
Honolulu. During a DIA Annual Meeting held on March 5, 1970, Castle and Cooke 
President Malcolm MacNaughton stated that Downtown merchants should, “Clean up, 
paint up, modernize and upgrade your merchandise” (Honolulu Advertiser 3/6/1970).
In 1979 Mayor Fasi did indeed appoint a committee of Mall property owners and 
tenants (the Mayor’s Committee on the Fort Street Mall) to meet with City agencies on
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problems of maintenance, operations and security (Downtown Improvement Association 
1990d).
During 1981 Mayor Eileen Anderson named Wade McVay, DIA representative 
and Campbell Estate Trustee, Chairman of the Mayor’s Committee on the Fort Street 
Mall (Downtown Improvement Association November 1981). The City subsequently 
disclosed the maintenance costs for the Fort and Union Street Malls, leading the Mayor’s 
Committee to conclude that private contractors could perform better maintenance at a 
lower cost.
In 1983 Mayor Anderson agreed to the creation of a new improvement district, 
with fifty per cent of the cost to be covered by the City, and fifty per cent by abutting 
landowners, provided the costs were acceptable and the majority of property owners 
approved. The Mayor also agreed to contract maintenance to a private contractor 
(Downtown Improvement Association March 1990c).
The Committee decided in 1984 that a thorough renovation of the Mall was 
necessary, raised $15,000 from private sources and hired four design firms to provide 
ideas. Costs for renovation were estimated at $2.95 million. Seventy five percent of the 
property owners on the Mall agreed to a 50/50 plan using 20 year City bonds provided 
that private maintenance was implemented. The City Council then approved $100,000 
for design (Downtown Improvement Association July 1984b, March 1990a, March 
1990c).
In 1985 re-elected Mayor Fasi selected DIA representative Richard Gushman II 
as Chairman of the Committee.
During 1987 Spencer Mason Architects presented a Preliminary Plan for the 
Renovation of the Fort Street Mall that included the complete repaving of the Mall. A 
separate contract was to be issued to create a large water feature in new Wilcox Park
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Diamond Head of the King Street plaza. Restrooms were proposed as part of a 
development agreement with Pan Pacific Plaza developer FSA Corporation.
No bids were received by the City for use of the King Street underpass as an 
outdoor restaurant, prompting a proposal to fill in the facility.
The year 1988 saw Mayor Fasi prevailing upon the City Council to open a 
Satellite City Hall within the King Street Underpass (Downtown Improvement Association 
December 1988). The City Council also appropriated $2 million as the City’s share of 
renovation costs for the Fort Street Mall (Downtown Improvement Association March
1990a).
By 1989 the plan had reached final stage and approval by the Committee, 
pending missing details. The DIA and landlowners were still willing to contribute fifty per 
cent toward an improvement district provided that the City hire a private contractor, 
creating a Maintenance District. The City felt a maintenance district was impractical, and 
declined. Late in the year the City changed plans, and as the funds were not committed, 
they lapsed.
Mayor Fasi terminated the Committee in 1990.
The City decided to redevelop the Mall on its own in 1991. A new renovation 
plan was prepared by landscape architecture firm PER Hawai’i under the direction of the 
City Department of Housing and Community Development (Downtown Improvement 
Association September 1991).
Construction began in 1992 with all construction costs of $3.7 million completely 
covered by the City (Downtown Improvement Association February 1993).
During this time the DIA joined Downtown merchants and residential groups in 
opposition to the conversion of the former Blaisdell Hotel building into a State shelter for
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Figure 10.1. Fort Street Mall, looking mauka from near Chaplain Lane, 1998 Hawai i 
Pacific University is on the left, and Our Lady of Peace Cathedral on the right. The area 
immediately in front has become the “campus” of HPU, providing space for activities 
such as International Day. Source; Author.
Figure 10 2 Fort Street Mall, looking mauka from Hotel Street, 1998. Gone are the 
New York Dress Shop, Kramers, the Ritz, Sato Clothiers and Kress. Fast food outlets 
and small service businesses now occupy the area. Source. Author.
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homeless persons, fearing negative impacts of the shelter on nearby businesses 
(Downtown Improvement Association December 1992).
In 1993 renovation of the Mall was completed (Downtown Improvement 
Association February 1993). The completed project was a City, and not a DIA, project 
(Gushman 1998).
10.5 ANALYSIS OF THE PROJECT
10.5.1 ALEXANDER GARVIN ANALYSIS
TABLE 10.1. GARVIN’S BACKGROUND REQUIREMENTS FOR SUCCESSFUL 
PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS
Requirement Evaluation
Effective input from all 
stakeholders
The DIA and the City communicated through the
Mayor’s Committee on the Fort Street Mall for eleven 
years.
The DIA represented landowners and 
merchants who had become dissatisfied with the 
maintenance performed by the City, but were willing to 
contribute to the renovation of the Mall in return for a 
private maintenance contractor. They hoped a private 
contractor could be hired to service the area more often 
and do more detailed work than the City was willing to 
undertake. The City felt such a maintenance district 
was impractical, because many different branches of
City government were involved in maintenance of the
Mall, and so true costs would be difficult to ascertain 
(Reid 1998).
The DIA also wanted less extensive Mall 
renovations than those the City proposed. Although the 
DIA and the Mayor’s Committee felt that, “renovation of 
the Mall was needed before any real significant 
improvement in maintenance could be attempted’’ 
(Downtown Improvement Association March 1990a), 
the Committee and DIA preferred a “simple 
contemporary design, (including) uncluttered walkways, 
shade trees and easily maintained street furniture” to 
the Victorian replica streetscape favored by the City 
(Downtown Improvement Association March 1990a).
Table 10.1 is continued on the next page.
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TABLE 10.1. (CONTINUED); GARVIN’S BACKGROUND REQUIREMENTS FOR
SUCCESSFUL PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS
Requirement Evaluation
Effective input from all 
stakeholders (continued)
The DIA did not want a waterfall (developed under a 
separate contract by the City) in adjacent Wilcox Park.
The DIA opposed the water feature because of 
maintenance problems, cost, and concerns about 
homeless people using it as a toilet. The City 
administration wanted the waterfall to soften street 
noise, and viewed the Park as a shaded sitting area and 
overflow dining area for the nearby Executive Center.
The City decided to renovate the Mall on its 
own. “The Committee had to learn that the plans had 
gone out to bid through a legal advertisement and only 
saw the ‘final’ plans when a set was requested just days 
before the bid opening” (Downtown Improvement 
Association March 1990b).
Understanding what planning 
can and cannot accomplish
One major problem for downtown Honolulu is the
homeless. Unfortunately the facilities available for the 
mentally ill, the working poor, and the unemployed 
simply are inadequate in Honolulu for the task. The 
focal point for homeless persons in the City had 
become A’ala Park, just Ewa of Chinatown and the 
Financial District. Fort Street offered the homeless 
proximity to the Edwin Thomas Home, and access to 
both charitable passersby and inexpensive eateries, 
much to the unhappiness of retailers and other 
pedestrians who wished such individuals would “simply 
go away.” In response to this conflict and general 
security concerns, the DIA and the City agreed to close 
the Mall at night. Merchants and the DIA also hoped to 
prevent installation of features that might prove 
attractive to the homeless. This included the 
aforementioned Wilcox fountain, and led to the removal 
of the 1969 era low rise fountains, the children’s 
sandbox, and flat benches (Gushman 1998).
Understanding how physical 
changes to the urban 
environment can improve the 
economy, quality of life, and 
city function
The City rebuilt the Fort Street Mall to upgrade the area,
help invoke a sense of place and reinforce its historical 
character (Reid 1997). The architecture enhances the 
historical buildings on both ends of the Mall, and 
provides an attractive pedestrian portal for individuals 
entering or exiting Downtown from the parking 
structures located in the Kukui district. The fact that this 
important entrance to Downtown is so close to
Chinatown offers economic potential to both the 
renovated Hawai’i Theater and Chinatown itself.
Table 10.1 is continued on the next page.
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TABLE 10.1. (CONTINUED); GARVIN’S REQUIREMENTS FOR SUCCESSFUL
PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS
R©auir6rn6nt Evaluation-------------------------- ----------------------------------
Create Positive Change and 
Prevent Negative Change
Positive Change
The new Mall architecture complements the historic 
architecture makai of Beretania and near Queen Street.
The renovated Mall acts as a central activity area 
for Hawai’i Pacific University (HPU) functions. Each 
week different HPU student organizations conduct 
publicity or membership campaigns from tables set up 
along the Mall. HPU also uses the Mall for pep rallies 
and its International Student Day presentations of 
cultures. -----------------------------
Create Positive Change and 
Prevent Negative Change 
(continued)
- --------------------—---------------------
Prevent negative change
Retention of the worn or broken Mall surfaces and 
equipment would have had a long term negative effect 
upon renovation of existing buildings or new 
construction in the area.
The project has aided in the successful 
expansion of HPU at the mauka end of the Fort Street
Mall, providing landlords with stable tenancy for their 
structures, ensuring renovation and maintenance. HPU 
has been successful enough to invoke imitation - the 
University of Phoenix also located on the Mall, providing 
the same function as HPU on properties makai of 
Merchant Street.
The “Victorian” nature of the street furniture and 
the Wilcox statue at King Street could contribute to 
increased public interest in the untapped historic 
resources of the area. The original DIA plan stressed 
finding ways to encourage tourists into the area. A 
historic marker project as developed in Atlanta,
Savannah and other cities could bring more people 
Downtown and increase Downtown commerce in
Honolulu as it has in those cities.
The quiet nature of the makai end of the 
renovated Mall reinforces maintenance of the 
“residential” nature of the historic C. Brewer compound,
I a complex that unfortunately sits on prime real estate.
TABLE 10.2. GARVIN’S FRAMEWORK OF GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS TO 
ENCOURAGE PRIVATE INVESTMENT
Ingredient of Success Evaluation
Strategic investment in 
infrastructure, rather 
than routine capital 
spending
The City made several efforts to improve the Mall and its 
environs, including:
1. $4,000,000 renovating the Mall to enhance it as a 
Downtown retail and office center (Reid 1998).
2. the opening of a Downtown Police Substation (with 
$155,000 in private contributions toward construction) on 
nearby Nu’uanu Avenue to provide improved security for the 
area (Downtown Improvement Association November 1988).
3. development of a Satellite City Hall in the King
Street underpass (Downtown Improvement Association 
December 1988).
4. development of Wilcox Park and fountain 
(Downtown Improvement Association February 1993; Reid
1998).
Regulatory policies 
that set the character 
of an area or lessen 
private investment risk
Character of the Area
The City’s “Victorian period” renovation of the Mall reinforces 
the historic nature of downtown Honolulu, especially near 
Beretania and Merchant Streets. This ties in well with 
renovations of turn of the century buildings and placement of 
similar street furniture along Hotel Street.
Lessen Private Investment Risk
Changes in federal tax laws have recently lessened interest in 
renovation of historical buildings. The continuance of the City’s 
Improvement District guidelines relaxing parking requirements, 
and placement of historical theme street furniture, encourages 
landowners to continue renovating older buildings or maintain 
the historical theme in new construction.
Incentives for desired 
private development
The City uses two tactics for maintaining Fort Street as a 
desirable location.
The first is continuance of the Improvement District 80, 
which waives standard requirements for parking. This is 
especially useful for small lots or older structures.
Since 1993 larger lots could benefit from the raised 
height limit allowed for new structures within the Downtown 
core. Potential Fort Street heights went to 450 feet between 
Merchant and Hotel Streets, and 400 feet between Hotel and 
Beretania Streets. This followed the DIA policy for high 
densities within Downtown, and directed growth back into the 
Fort Street direction, away from the Capitol District (Downtown 
Improvement Association January 1993).
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TABLE 10.3. GARVIN’S INGREDIENTS OF PROJECT SUCCESS
Ingredient of 
Success
Evaluation
Market The market had been redefined since 1969 to center on four groups;
1. office workers, needing food and engaging in some 
shopping at the noon hour, and purchasing small items to take home 
after work.
2. university students from HPU and the University of
Phoenix, whose mostly foreign student bodies patronize smaller 
ethnic food establishments.
3. City Bus riders, who frequent retailers near bus stops.
4. a small but growing number of nearby residents who live 
in City projects in Chinatown or mauka of Beretania Street.
Location Inherent Site Characteristics
The Mall begins with a small plaza at Beretania Street, and contains 
another on the makai side of King Street. The remainder of the Mall 
is a narrow thoroughfare, with a minimum width of only eighty-eight 
feet. This creates a shadowy, canyon-like effect along most of its 
length. - 
Proximity
Fort Street is no longer as peripheral as it once was. Five large high 
rise residential structures now are located along Beretania, and four 
more are located nearby in Chinatown. These and the construction 
of public parking garages in Kukui Plaza and Chinatown Gateway
Plaza place Fort Street more in the center of Downtown “gravity” 
than it once was. The DIA vision of a rapid transit corridor along
Hotel Street would have a dramatic effect upon Fort Street’s 
potential.
Design The City’s design for the Fort Street Mall included:
1. reconstruction of the Mall using multi-tone brown pavers. 
This was done to ease maintenance of the many underground 
utilities in the area. The pavers are simply pulled up, the work done, 
and the pavers replaced. One problem, however, is unevenness of 
the paver surface, which can trip pedestrians.
2. replacing the false olive trees with palm trees. This 
ie'ssened the mess tracked into stores, but required constant 
vigilance on the part of the City to ensure that palm fronds did not fall 
on passersby.
3. elimination of the sandbox and other hard to maintain 
features.
4. installation of “Victorian” lamp posts and traffic barriers 
intended to reinforce the historical character of the Mall.
The “cobblestone” pavers and increased use of trees make 
the Mall a more attractive place to sit in the afternoons, unlike the 
lighter concrete of the previous Mall, which reflected light and heat.
Financing General obligation bond funding was used to finance the project
(Reid 1998).
Table 10.3 is continued on the next page.
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TABLE 10.3. (CONTINUED); GARVIN’S INGREDIENTS OF PROJECT SUCCESS
Ingredient of 
Success
Evaluation
Entrepreneurship City Managing Director Jeremy Harris was responsible for the Fort 
Street Mall project. The project as built was NOT a DIA project 
(Gushman 1998).
Time Immediate
As was the case with the original 1969 construction, walking through 
different areas of the Fort Street Mall today (1998) invokes different 
personas.
Mauka of Hotel Street, Hawai’i Pacific University is 
increasingly making its presence felt. The University has been 
extending its conversion of office and retail space into classrooms, 
and now occupies part of the First Hawaiian Tower at ground level. 
Ethnic carry out and sidewalk cafes serving Russian, Vietnamese, 
Chinese and other foods cater to the students. General retail, 
however, has never been weaker. The homeless also congregate 
there.
Between Hotel and King, retailing has had a major blow with 
the closure of F.W. Woolworth. The entire Diamond Head side of 
the block is now shuttered, creating a sense of abandonment.
Perhaps the congested Long’s Drugs outlet next door will take some 
of the space before Liberty House, Leeds and Payless Shoes 
become too negatively impacted.
Makai of King Street the Mall dissolves into the Financial and 
Pioneer Plazas, and the Brewer complex. The area serves as a 
nicely landscaped corridor to other activities.
The 24 Hour Day
Except for school hours Monday through Friday, the Mall is busiest 
before 8:30 a.m., during lunch hours, and at about 4:30 p.m., 
reflecting the effects of office workers. Weekend activity lies mostly 
near HPU.
Evening activity at HPU occurs until about 8:30 p.m. when 
classes quit, and at the nearby Merchant Square “saloons” until 
diners retire. The whole of the Mall is deserted later at night.
Decades
The renovated Fort Street Mall is too new to make much of a long 
term prediction, although the removal of features such as the 
sandbox and low fountains should ease long term maintenance 
costs. Provision of adequate maintenance funds will be key, 
however, to providing the character and in turn the private 
investment, of the area.
10.5.2 THE “PLANNING” AND “BUILT” LEGACIES
TABLE 10.4. THE “PLANNING” AND THE “BUILT” LEGACIES
Legacy Evaluation
Planning Legacy The design of the Fort Street Mall developed in 1993 reflects
several trends;
1. recognition of the changing nature of Downtown 
retailing. Gone are the aspirations for continued supremacy in 
commercial activities. Parking was no longer central to the 
program, as it was in the 1969 plan.
2. willingness of the government to take the initiative, 
even if consensus was not reached with all participants. In
1969 the DIA had to convince the City of the necessity of 
building the first Fort Street Mall. In 1991 the City decided to 
“go it alone,” without private financial assistance, because the
City was unwilling to enter into a maintenance contract for 
public property with a private concern (Gushman 1998).
3. use of “theme” architecture in a public project.
Similar “period” architecture was or would be used on other 
public projects in Chinatown, Kakaako and West Loch Estates.
Built Legacy The Fort Street Mall of 1993 arrested the physical decline of 
the Mall itself. The narrow, often shadowy right of way remains 
a pedestrian refuge in the city, made interesting and diverse by 
its length.
The 1993 materials of palms, earth tone pavers and 
“Victorian” lamp posts are more in the character of a tropical 
downtown aspiring to interest tourists than the older brick and 
cement squares of the 1969 design. The Mall today has 
separate characters, depending upon location.
1. At the “top” of the Mall the remodeled Beretania 
plaza has become the activity center for Hawaii Pacific 
University. The area has the ambiance of an urban college 
campus, with students often crowding the area during daylight 
hours. The school uses the Mall for pep rallies and its 
“International Day” festivities. The Roman Catholic Our Lady
Of Peace Cathedral and early 20"’ century buildings dominate 
the immediate plaza. Street furniture consists of metal and 
wooden benches, Victorian period water fountains and lamps, 
and concrete planters mauka of the church.
Small businesses located in the Blaisdell Hotel and 
buildings immediately nearby cater to HPU foreign students’ 
meal requests. Tables and chairs spreading out from the 
shops onto the Mall create a sidewalk cafe atmosphere.
Table 10.4 is continued on the next page.
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TABLE 10.4. (CONTINUED): THE “PLANNING” AND THE “BUILT” LEGACIES
Legacy Evaluation______ S-------- £-----------------------------------------------------------
Built Legacy 
(continued)
2. Further makai, a transition area accommodates long
established small businesses, fast food outlets and ethnic take 
out establishments. The First Hawaiian Bank area is mostly 
vacant, and its separation from street level precludes most 
retail activity from its space. Groups of the homeless often 
occupy the benches here, their first beachhead on the Mall.
3. The character of the Hotel-King Street area is 
changing. This was originally the most traveled area of the
Mall because of its strategic location between two major bus 
stops. The closure of the F.W. Woolworth store, which 
occupied the entire Diamond Head end of the block, has given 
the area a depressed look and encouraged pedestrians to use 
Hotel and Bishop as access to points makai. Campbell Estate 
has apparently postponed its project for the Ewa end. Liberty 
House and the Robins Shoe Store have been joined by a
Payless Discount Shoe Store on the Campbell properties.
Large numbers of retirees who had for decades used benches 
outside the F.W. Woolworth store have been giving way to the 
homeless.
The City’s rebuilding of the King Street underpass as a 
popular Satellite City Hall has helped to maintain the presence 
of office workers in the area. The City closed the escalators 
that once operated there but provided elevator access for the 
handicapped.
4. The Mall takes on an entirely middle class look 
between King and Merchant Streets. As mentioned earlier, the 
Mall is virtually unrecognizable as a separate right of way. The 
mini stage on the Financial Plaza of the Pacific side remains 
unused.
5. Across Merchant, the “office park” atmosphere 
becomes more leisurely due to the introduction of considerably 
more benches than available above Merchant Street. The 
benches, however, are increasingly occupied by the homeless 
on weekends.
10.6 LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE
TABLE 10.5. THE FORT STREET MALL (1993): LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE
Lesson for the Future Application in the Project Possible Future Use
Heavily traveled pedestrian 
corridors need periodic 
extensive renovations or 
wholesale replacement as 
do any other city street, but 
are considerably more 
expensive.
Renovation of the Fort
Street Mall involved 
replacement of plantings, 
light fixtures, fountains, 
water fountains, drains, etc. 
Considerable delays were 
taken before consensus 
was reached to renovate 
the whole Mall extensively.
The “life” of the original
1969 Mall was 23 years 
(1969-1992). The existing 
Mall will probably need 
replacement in a shorter 
period of time, considering 
the even greater pedestrian 
traffic it carries today.
Large stand alone shopping 
complexes have distinct 
retail advantages compared 
to older shopping areas 
composed of downtown 
streets converted into 
pedestrian malls. These 
advantages stem from a 
single
ownership/management 
entity that provides vision, 
organization and 
enforcement. Included are 
the ability to design mutual 
promotions, regulate tenant 
decor, determine product 
mix, remove “undesirables,” 
and negotiate fees from 
their tenants for 
renovations. Downtown 
malls do not have such a 
single organizing entity, 
must rely on cooperation, 
and have, in effect, a 
common landlord 
(government) unversed in 
the needs of retail activities.
Private shopping center 
management such as that 
at the Ala Moana Shopping 
Center control all property 
and make promotion, 
maintenance and security 
decisions. Downtown 
landowners and merchants 
facing public property do 
not have the same control 
over the shopping 
environment.
Downtown merchants must 
recognize that unless some 
accommodation is made 
with their adjoining landlord 
(the City or State), they will 
not be able to compete on 
the same level as a private 
shopping center.
If that is the case, 
merchants should play to 
their strengths created by 
their location. For example, 
this could include 
convenience in a mixed use 
building containing 
residences, or a niche 
market if located in a Class
A business complex.
A historical marker program 
can encourage “cultural 
tourism” and local interest 
in downtowns. The 
additional pedestrian traffic 
generated can contribute to 
the local economy.
The DIA’s original plans 
included enticing more 
tourists Downtown, but a 
historical marker program 
was not begun.
Fort Street could offer a 
“trial” program, having such 
sites as Our Lady of Peace 
Cathedral, the Sacred
Hearts Convent, the first 
shots of the Revolution of 
1891, and Honolulu Fort.
Table 10.5 is continued on the next page.
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TABLE 10.5. (CONTINUED); THE FORT STREET MALL (1993): LESSONS FOR THE 
FUTURE
Lesson for the Future
As the entity controlling the 
unifying factor of a 
downtown mall district, the 
mall itself, government 
determines the character of 
the shopping complex. 
Government has a range of 
choices in handling the 
potential operation of retail 
malls such as Fort Street.
1. Maintain the 
present level of services, 
thus affirming the existing 
Mall environment.
2. Encourage 
nearby merchants and/or 
landlords to “adopt” the 
areas in front of their 
businesses. (This is 
unofficially done now on the 
Mall.)
3. Increase
management, security and 
maintenance, including 
staffing, to approach the 
support enjoyed by facilities 
such as Honolulu 
International Airport.
4. “Privatize” 
(outsource) some services, 
such as trash collection.
5. Lease individual 
street blocks out to nearby 
landlords, tenants, or 
combinations of both. This 
would allow the lessee to 
determine its own security, 
maintenance and other 
policies. Although this has 
not been done on a City 
owned street. State 
property such as the Aloha 
Tower Marketplace does 
this.
Application in the Project I Possible Future Use
The City decided not to hire
a private contractor and 
instead continued with the 
existing maintenance 
system. The City 
renovated the Mall on its 
own initiative.
Periodic evaluations of 
important retail areas 
fronting City owned streets 
in Waikiki, Downtown and 
other locations are 
important to maintaining 
those areas as attractive 
centers of mercantile 
activity. Such evaluations 
may determine what 
renovations and/or a 
changed level and/or type 
of maintenance may be 
necessary.
Table 10.5 is continued on the next page.
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TABLE 10.5. (CONTINUED); THE FORT STREET MALL (1993); LESSONS FOR THE
FUTURE
Lesson for the Future Application in the Project Possible Future Use
Proper documentation of 
underground utility lines 
should be required to 
prevent accidental 
severance, costly plan 
rewrites or construction 
delays.
It is interesting to note that 
Hawaiian Dredging and 
Construction Company 
complained that lack of 
adequate documentation of 
utility placement resulted in 
extensive delays in the
1969 project. The same 
problem occurred in 1992 
(Reid 1998).
Extensive use of detailed
Geographic Information 
Systems to map utility lines 
as they are placed 
underground can prevent 
these problems in the 
future.
CHAPTER 11. THE ALOHA TOWER MARKETPLACE (1994)
11.1 GOAL: REDEVELOP THE WATERFRONT AS A “PEOPLE PLACE”
The Downtown Improvement Association strongly urges that the State of 
Hawaii take action, in a joint venture with private enterprise, to redevelop 
the underutilized maritime terminal area along the Waterfront adjacent to 
the Aloha Tower. The object of redevelopment should be to restore the 
Waterfront as a “people place”, while preserving its maritime uses, 
beautifying its general appearance, and retaining low development 
density... Publicly acceptable redevelopment must be of lasting first class 
architectural quality.
(Downtown Improvement Association 1975d)
11.2 DESCRIPTION OF THE PROJECT
The Aloha Tower Marketplace is a 185,000 square foot tourist oriented retail project 
centered on the Aloha Tower complex (Piers 8-11) and adjacent Waterfront areas.
Developer; Aloha Tower Associates. Architects: D’Agostino, Izzo, and Quirk of 
Boston, Massachusetts in conjunction with Aotani and Associates of Honolulu, Hawai i. 
Contractor: U. S. Pacific Builders (Hulihee-Carstensen 1998). Cost; $125 million 
(Hawai’i Architect May 1994). Constructed: 1993-94 (Pacific Business News 
2/17/1997).
11.3 BACKGROUND OF THE PROJECT
Two factors within the mid 20*'’ century changed the character of Honolulu Harbor.
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The first was the arrival of the “jet age,” which drastically cut travel time between 
Honolulu and the rest of the world. Honolulu Airport became the dominant passenger 
travel center, removing that function from its historical ship pier location at the foot of 
Downtown.
The second major change was containerization, which allowed faster loading and 
unloading of ships, but which required acres of open space for container handling and 
storage. Such large open areas were simply not available immediately adjacent to 
Downtown, and those activities moved to Piers 1 and 2 near Fort Armstrong, or onto 
Sand Island. The result was that the area immediately adjacent to Downtown, long 
bustling with activity and congestion, became underutilized.
The decline of activity at the wharves of Aloha Tower and the economic 
stagnation facing Downtown brought two reactions from the State government.
The State began renovation of the antiquated pier complex itself. Constructed in 
1963-65, the $3 million dollar project created a ground floor freight area and a second 
floor passenger deck in the center of the original pier area. The top passenger level was 
connected to Inwin Park via escalators, and via a vehicle ramp to Piers 5, 6, 7 and 8 
(Hawaii Business News 6/25/1963; Honolulu Star Bulletin and Advertiser 11/15/1964).
The State also considered a freeway along the Nimitz Highway right of way to 
route through traffic around Downtown.
11.4 DIA INVOLVEMENT AND PROJECT EVOLUTION
The Downtown Improvement Association originally did not pay much attention to the 
harbor area. Instead the DIA initially concentrated on developing and executing its three 
point plan for the core Downtown area. It was the O’ahu Development Conference, with 
its island wide perspective, that involved the DIA with harbor development.
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The O’ahu Development Conference (of which the Downtown Improvement 
Association was a member) opposed the State’s Waterfront freeway project. Aaron 
Levine, Executive Vice President of the ODC, feared that the Nimitz corridor freeway 
would “wall off” Downtown from the Waterfront, as the Embarcadero Freeway separated 
much of San Francisco from that city’s wharves and bay. The Waterfront freeway 
opposition succeeded in locating an alternative freeway route mauka of the original 
alignment. That freeway route became the Lunalilo Freeway (O’ahu Development 
Conference 1967; Levine 1998).
In January 1968 the O’ahu Development Conference unveiled its Urban Design 
Project (UDP), a “three dimensional approach” using drawings to dramatize how 
different development schemes might interact and affect the area between Honolulu 
Airport and Waikiki. The Urban Design Project was meant to encourage public 
discussion of development proposals. Included in the Honolulu Harbor segment was a 
high-rise luxury apartment complex, a pedestrian bridge from Aloha Tower to the Fort 
Street Mall, a public promenade, small boat marina, an inter-island ferry terminal, and 
even landscaping on Sand Island. The UDP was a joint project of the O’ahu 
Development Conference and the State Foundation on Culture and the Arts, and 
featured Aaron Levine (President of the ODC) and Planner William Grant (later 
Executive Director of the DIA) as author and graphics artist on the report (Cook 1968; 
Hawai’i Business and Industry March 1968b).
The April 1968 DIA-inspired Gruen Plan included several harbor activities with 
direct ties to Downtown:
1. a hotel/convention complex along Nu’uanu Stream near the Waterfront 
between King Street and Nimitz Highway.
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2. a hydrofoil transportation island to provide direct water-oriented transportation 
to Downtown from Waikiki. A ramp would carry pedestrians over Nimitz Highway into 
Downtown.
3. a ship museum /restaurant/commercial complex to create interest in the 
Waterfront.
4. views such as that of the Aloha Tower from Fort Street should be preserved.
5. another ramp to carry pedestrians between the Fort Street Mall and the Aloha 
Tower piers. Most importantly, “The existing functionally obsolete pier buildings of 
massive scale for the waterfront should be progressively removed for a new, small scale, 
water-oriented development of greater public use” (Gruen 1968).
In August 1968 the DIA’s Position Paper No. 8-68, entitled “Honolulu Harbor and 
Downtown,” supported the use of Honolulu Harbor for “clean” (non-toxic) industries and 
promptly endorsed the Gruen Plan’s harbor features (Downtown Improvement 
Association 1970e). The DIA newsletter, the Downtowner, would subsequently make 
periodic reports on maritime activities (and the Aloha Tower area in particular) to keep 
the DIA membership informed.
The Hawai’i State Legislature, at the urging of Governor John Burns, in 1970 
appropriated $100,000 for concept studies on a world trade center by the Department of 
Planning and Economic Development (DPED) (Legislative Auditor of the State of Hawai’i 
1979). A world trade center was viewed as a means to attract international business to 
Honolulu, create new industry, provide employment, and increase the tax base (Sutton 
1998). Similar projects had been developed by governments in Baltimore, Maryland; 
Houston, Texas; Seattle, Washington; and New York City, New York. Private concerns 
had developed world trade centers in Dallas, Texas and New Orleans, Louisiana (State 
of Hawai’i, Legislative Auditor 1979).
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The DPED in 1972 conducted a site study for an international or “Pan-Pacific” 
trade center, placing the underutilized Aloha Tower complex as its first choice. The 
international trade center was conceived as an office building, a conference and 
information center, and an exhibition hall. Further development would lead to training, 
research, and scientific/technical exchange programs associated with international trade 
(State of Hawaii, Legislative Auditor 1979).
In 1973 Harold Spector, Vice-President of ex-DIA President Clarence Ching’s 
Loyalty Mortgage Company, announced preliminary discussions with the State 
Department of Transportation and DPED officials for development of a foreign trade 
center at Aloha Tower. The architectural firm of Boone and Brooks had been retained to 
design the project in conjunction with the existing foreign trade zone at Pier 39. 
Apartments could be constructed to help offset the initial costs of the project. 
Refurbishment of the Aloha Tower would be followed by construction of new commercial 
buildings to provide space needed by the trade center. The nearby existing Oceania 
floating restaurant and the Falls of Clyde museum ship would also be attractions for the 
project. Whether or not this “exploratory proposal” actually had the support of the DIA 
leadership. State Department of Transportation officials contacted by the Honolulu Star 
Bulletin at the time intimated that space was already difficult to obtain at Aloha Tower 
(Honolulu Star Bulletin 5/22/1973). Nothing came of the proposal.
The Hawaii International Services Agency (HISA), a part of the State 
Department of Planning and Economic Development, in 1973 hired the architectural and 
engineering consulting firm of Charles R. Sutton and Associates to conduct a physical 
requirements/cost analysis of a proposed Hawaii International Trade Center (HITC) to 
be located at Aloha Tower. The resulting report entitled Feasibility Study, Hawaii 
International Trade Center Located in Aloha Tower Complex (1974) determined that the
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pier buildings at Aloha Tower were structurally sound and renovation was feasible. Two 
alternatives were offered for redevelopment:
1. renovation of the pier buildings, to include exhibit space; a conference center; 
offices, meeting rooms, commercial space; and a pedestrian bridge across Nimitz 
Highway. Costs were estimated at $10,231,340.
2. demolition of Piers 8 and 9, construction of a five story building and a 250 
room hotel. Cost estimates were $28,811,900 (Charles R. Sutton and Associates 1974).
In 1975 DIA Position Paper 1-75 put the Downtown Improvement Association on 
record promoting redevelopment of the Aloha Tower area as a low rise “people place” 
(Downtown Improvement Association 1975d). The DIA also formed a Waterfront 
Redevelopment Committee, chaired by Harold Eichelberger (Downtown Improvement 
Association February 1981c).
In 1976 the DIA issued a generalized plan for Waterfront redevelopment entitled 
Waterfront Design Concept for Honolulu Harbor. The plan sought to:
1. reduce the effect of Nimitz Highway and Ala Moana Boulevard as a physical 
and psychological barrier.
2. establish an urban character in the Waterfront area by intensifying and mixing 
compatible “people activities,” while preserving maritime uses.
3. provide maximum opportunity for pedestrian access at water’s edge along its
entirety.
4. establish an orderly sequence of open spaces for both pedestrian and 
motorist, and to integrate buildings and spaces through the inter-relationship of scale, 
materials and vistas.
5. establish the Aloha Tower as the focal point of converging pedestrian ways 
and harbor views (Downtown Improvement Association 1976).
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The general design called for twin elevated access bridges across Nimitz 
Highway, and a “horseshoe” design of “people activity generators” around a “Marine 
Activity Zone.” Renovation of the Aloha Tower itself was part of the plan.
A second DPED-financed study by Charles R. Sutton and Associates, initiated in 
1975 and released in 1979, was charged with examination of the demand for a world 
trade center, analyzing other potential sites, completion of another structural review (to 
include Piers 10 and 11), examination of parking and access needs, preparation of a 
project development schedule, estimation of revenues and costs, and exploration of 
financing alternatives. The second Sutton report also endorsed the expanded (Piers 8 
through 11) Aloha Tower site, and called for demolition of all existing pier structures. 
Increment I would include an eight story office building; commercial areas, shopping 
arcades, and a pedestrian overpass to Fort Street; and renovation of Pier 11. Increment 
II would double the base eight-story world trade center building and potentially contain 
an additional 20 story structure. Increment III would contain a 400-720 room hotel and a 
completely redeveloped maritime terminal at Pier 11. The Increment I cost was 
estimated at $49,697,000 (State of Hawai’i, Legislative Auditor 1979).
DPED Director Hideto Kono on August 10,1976 appointed an Advisory 
Committee for the Aloha Tower Plaza (ACATP) to provide HISA with citizen input. 
Included in this group were Clare Beck, Executive Director of the DIA, Aaron Levine of 
the ODC, and representatives from the Chamber of Commerce, U. S. Department of 
Commerce, and the Hawai’i State DOT.
The DPED Advisory Committee in September 1978 issued Aloha Tower Plaza 
and the Hawai’i World Trade Centertor HISA, based upon information developed for the 
soon to be released second Sutton report. The Advisory Committee endorsed the 
Sutton conceptual plan recommending that the trade center be located at Aloha Tower
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and be the focal point of a single progressive renewal project that should ultimately 
include Piers 2-18. The Committee envisioned an Aloha Tower Development Authority 
organized to manage a joint public-private development program to integrate the area 
“functionally, organizationally, and architecturally” with Downtown. Other specific 
recommendations included making the Aloha Tower a freestanding structure by 
removing the buildings at its base; creating a plaza, fountain and makai park of over 
three acres focused on the Tower; development of commercial and public exhibit space 
between Piers 8 and 9; renovation of the passenger terminal at Pier 11; removal of 
automobile storage from Irwin Park; construction of new bus, taxi and automobile access 
at the foot of Fort Street; and provision for additional maritime use of Pier 8 (Advisory 
Committee for the Aloha Tower Plaza 1978).
The State Department of Transportation published a harbor report of its own in 
September 1978 to complement the work done at Aloha Tower by DPED, HISA and 
ACATP. Entitled Conceptual Planning Study: Piers 2 to 18, Honolulu Harbor, the study 
was done by EDAW Inc., and involved creation of a Downtown Waterfront 
Redevelopment Team that included the DIA, ODC, Chamber of Commerce and Outdoor 
Circle. The study recognized the effects that technology had had on the harbor area 
immediately adjacent to Downtown.
Matching the future maritime requirements with the facilities available or 
planned, it became apparent that the harbor interface with the City of 
Honolulu might better serve the community, oriented toward the needs of 
the city rather than the Harbor.
(State of Hawaii, Department of Transportation 1978)
The report recommended;
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1. pedestrian overpasses be built over Nimitz Highway at Bishop, Fort and 
Smith Streets to create better access between Downtown and the Waterfront.
2. a continuous pedestrian promenade be constructed along the water’s edge.
3. Pier 2 be developed as a foreign trade zone.
4. Pier 4 continue with Coast Guard use.
5. Piers 5 and 6 be extended for additional parking and improved atmosphere 
for the Falls of Clyde and Oceania Floating Restaurant.
6. Pier 7 become a promenade with space for parking and moorages for cruise 
boats and a ferry system.
7. Piers 8-11 would be under the administration of DPED, with the ground level 
remaining in maritime use.
8. Pier 12-14 buildings would be replaced by promenades, landscaping and 
parking with the piers themselves available for maritime use when needed.
9. Pier 15 remain as the harbor firehouse; and Piers 16-18 contain the 
commercial fishing fleet (State of Hawai’i, Department of Transportation 1978).
Questions about the financial feasibility of the proposed world trade center, 
including potential costs to the State of Hawai’i and the willingness of private enterprise 
to invest in the project, surfaced in the Hawai’i State Legislature in 1979. The State 
Administration asked for an $8.5 million dollar appropriation toward establishment of the 
trade center and redevelopment of the area piers. The Legislature instead instructed the 
Legislative Auditor to evaluate the Administration’s proposals and present a report back 
to the Legislature. Only then would a reduced appropriation of $500,000 for design be 
released (Altonn 1979).
The resulting Legislative Auditor report found that the project would not be self
supporting. After construction of Increment I the project was estimated to have a
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negative cash flow of $1 million a year, and later project increment liabilities had not 
been determined (State of Hawaii, Legislative Auditor 1979).
The Legislative Auditor also had several serious questions about the international 
center’s suppositions.
1. It found no firm correlation that international business corporations would 
locate in a city because of a particular office complex.
2. The amount of commercial space planned for the project was greater than 
the adjoining office complex could support. Potential local customers to make up the 
difference would have to cross the Nimitz Highway barrier from Downtown. Tourists 
would require bussing or ferries to the Aloha Tower, but there were few attractions in the 
complex that would entice tourists away from similar shops in Waikiki.
3. The second Sutton report had established that in 1976 a harbor side first 
class hotel was not economically feasible. Should the condition change, it was possible 
that private developers might erect such a complex closer to the central Downtown area.
4. The isolation of the Aloha Tower across Nimitz Highway required 
development of enough “critical mass” to draw people from Downtown across the 
barrier. This required consideration of increment size, timing and staging that, in the 
Legislative Auditor’s view, had not been adequately addressed.
5. No information as to projected future increment costs was present in the 
second Sutton report. Development of Increment I, however, would commit the State to 
engage in subsequent increments, for which no costs were known.
The Legislative Auditor concluded that any authorization for demolition or 
construction was premature, that establishment of an independent authority was likewise 
best postponed, and more definitive studies would need to be undertaken (State of 
Hawai’i, Legislative Auditor 1979).
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In July of 1979 it was disclosed that the DPED had hired American Cities 
Corporation, a subsidiary of the Rouse Companies, for $83,333.00 to do a more detailed 
marketing and feasibility study of the proposed Hawai’i Intemationai Trade Center (Woo 
7/24/1979). The Legislative Auditor questioned the legality of the study when it was 
disclosed that the new study had itself not been authorized by the Legislature (Woo 
7/27/1979).
Meanwhile, the success of the Baltimore, Maryland’s Inner Harbor project, and its 
potentiai parallels to Honolulu Harbor’s Aloha Tower were being publicized in Honolulu’s 
newspapers. Both cities, for example, had historical ships and were considering or had 
placed floating restaurants. “Baltimore Has Inner Harbor Triumph: A Lesson for 
Honolulu’’ in the Star Bulletin on August 6, 1979 detailed how Maryland State funds were 
used to build a new World Trade Center and the role of the Rouse Company in 
developing a maritime marketplace (Altonn 1979).
Public interest in the harbor and ocean formed the basis for the Aloha Tower 
Marine Information Education Center and Maritime Museum Group. This organization, 
the forerunner of the Hawai’i Maritime Center, was founded with the realization that 
many local residents were mostly unaware of the sea around them and the tremendous 
effects that the Pacific Ocean exerts upon Hawai’i. The group began by sponsoring a 
highly successful lecture series in cooperation with the University of Hawai’i Marine 
Advisory Program and the Chamber of Commerce of Hawai’i held on the 9*^ floor of 
Aloha Tower (Downtown Improvement Association October 1979).
The 1980 Hawai’i State Legislature authorized $225,000 towards site 
engineering, site planning, financial planning and preparation of alternative management 
plans for the Aloha Tower Plaza/World Trade Center project. The DIA spent
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considerable amounts of time lobbying at the Capitol for the project (Downtown 
Improvement Association July 1980).
On November 21, 1980 James Rouse, Board Chairman of the Rouse 
Companies, addressed the Downtown Improvement Association about downtown 
revitalization and the role of public-private partnerships. Rouse was the developer of the 
new city of Columbia, Maryland; the Boston, Massachusetts’ Quincy Market; Baltimore, 
Maryland’s Harbor Place and other festival marketplaces across the United States.
On February 25, 1981 the DIA hosted Leo Molinaro, President of the American 
City Corporation, which had the previously mentioned State contract to investigate the 
feasibility of the Aloha Tower project. The DIA was one of the members of the Advisory 
Committee for the Aloha Tower Plaza, now called the Aloha Tower Advisory Committee, 
which had input on the project (Downtown Improvement Association January 1983).
The American City Corporation report, entitled The Aloha Tower Plaza, was 
issued in March 1981. The design plan continued the ideas of restoration of Irwin Park, 
and a large central open space at the base of the Aloha Tower through to the harbor. 
New maritime facilities, office and restaurants were to be developed along Piers 10 and 
11, and maritime, shops and hotel use along Pier 8. Also included were to be a Nimitz 
Highway pedestrian overpass, continued use of the three story Harbors Division Office 
Building along IMimitz Highway, and one thousand parking spaces.
The American City Corporation report set out to detail its proposals in order to 
address Legislative concerns about timetables, revenues, and liabilities.
Project development was divided into three phases: ten months for planning, 
demolition and clearance; eighteen months for construction of the public areas; and 
eighteen months for construction of private space.
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Revenue calculations did not include income from existing DOT operations 
because such funds were not considered available to repay new project debts. Project 
repayment revenues were estimated from hotel land lease, office land leases, and 
parking operations. Such funds were expected to be collected by a new State 
authorized development corporation for repayment of bonds issued by the said 
corporation. Over a thirty year period, revenues were estimated at $197,696,000 and 
expenditures at $45,320,000 netting cash of $152,376,000. Financing bonds would total 
$33,260,000, with repayment at $87,256,000. The total net after financing estimate was 
$98,380,000.
The development entity was recommended as a not for profit State created 
development corporation governed by a board of directors to include the DPED, DOT, 
Hawai’i State Department of Land and Natural Resources (DLNR), and appointed 
business community leaders. The development corporation would have the following 
responsibilities:
1. overall direction of the project
2. coordination of services
3. direction of staff consultants
4. daily project review
5. legal coordination
6. selection of developer and subsequent negotiations
7. architectural review
8. public relations
9. issuance of revenue bonds
10. any other necessary activities (American City Corporation 1981).
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The Hawaii State Legislature in 1981 passed Act 236 that created the Aloha 
Tower Development Corporation (ATDC). The Act authorized the Corporation to issue 
up to $33,260,000 in revenue bonds for the public portions of the complex. One 
stipulation, however, was that no demolition or site development could proceed until 
contractual commitments had been made with a developer.
Governance of the Corporation is through a Board of Directors. The Board 
consists of the four government officials, the Directors of DPED, DOT, DLNR, and the 
Mayor of Honolulu; and three members appointed by the State Governor from the public 
at large. The first three appointees by then Governor George Ariyoshi were Aaron 
Levine of the ODC, Thomas Trask of the International Longshoremen’s and 
Warehousemen’s Union, and Donald Kuyper, President of the Hawaiian Telephone 
Company and the DIA (Aloha Tower Development Corporation 1981, Downtown
Improvement Association September 1981).
The first year of operation for the ATDC was slowed by financing. The legislation 
that allowed the Aloha Tower Development Corporation to raise funds for planning and 
construction did not contain any money for operations. The ATDC was forced to return 
to the State Legislature in 1982 to seek $500,000 for pre-development costs (Oshiro 
1982).
American City Corporation; Architects Hawai’i Ltd.; Arthur Young and Company; 
Graham Wong-Hastings-Martin-Chew Group 70; Peat, Marwick, Mitchell; and ROMA 
Architects submitted written and oral presentations for the position of pre-development 
consultant. This consultant was slated to work on the design manual, prospectus and 
draft lease agreement (Hawai’i Business August 1982). The ATDC Board unanimously 
voted to award the contract to ROMA Architects on October 12,1982 (Pacific Business 
News 10/18/1982). The basis of the decision was “broad experience in mixed use
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development, public and private joint development, waterfront renewal projects, and their 
experience in Hawai’i” (Aloha Tower Development Corporation 1982).
ROMA included in its design team Donald Wolbrink for planning and landscape 
design; Williams Kubelbeck and Associates for real estate economics and public 
finance; Sam Hirota, Inc., for civil engineering; Moffatt and Nichol, as maritime 
engineers; and Parsons Brinckerhoff Quade and Douglas for traffic and parking (ROMA 
Architects 1982).
On January 11, 1983 the ROMA proposals were presented to the ATDC. Major 
elements included a five hundred room hotel along Pier 8; an office building adjacent to 
Pier 10; and retail, Restaurant and new maritime facilities. Heights for new structures 
would be limited to 65 feet, compared to that of the Aloha Tower at 180 feet. Ail existing 
buildings would be demolished except for the Pier 9 passenger gallery and the former 
Matson Building (then occupied by the DOT). The Aloha Tower itself would thus be 
uncluttered by other structures, and would be the beginning of a pedestrian walk to Fort 
Street. Irwin Park would continue as parking, and lose additional space to an access 
road.
The “ROMA Plan” contained a number of changes from the preceding American 
Cities proposal.
1. The office complex would be reduced by two-thirds.
2. Retail and restaurant areas would be reduced by twenty per cent.
3. Maritime and sheltered pier areas would be diminished.
4. Parking would be halved.
5. No pedestrian bridge would be constructed across Nimitz Highway to Fort 
Street. Only an at-grade crossing would be provided.
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6. Irwin Park would not be returned to green space, but instead would continue 
as a parking lot.
The DIA expressed concern that the low rise nature of the ROMA Plan, designed 
to make the Aloha Tower the dominant feature of the area, would cost the project 
productive floor area, parking and maritime space. The DIA also noted that the proposal 
mixed pedestrians and vehicles at grade on Nimitz Highway (Downtown Improvement 
Association February 1983b, May 1983).
The DIA and others’ voiced concerns about the safety of pedestrians crossing 
Nimitz Highway resulted in reinstatement of the pedestrian overpass by the ROMA team. 
Criticism of the ROMA Plan came from the Outdoor Circle over the permanent use of 
Irwin Park for automobile storage, from the Chamber of Commerce Maritime Committee 
over the maritime facilities, and the DIA about the “critical mass” necessary to draw 
patrons and finance the improvements (Downtown Improvement Association May 1983).
The ATDC made a request for proposals in May, 1983 to 450 different 
development groups based on the ROMA recommendations (Aloha Tower Development 
Corporation 1983). Potential bidders had to make note that, unfortunately, 1983 was a 
period of economic downturn in Hawai’i (Hawai’i Business April 1983). Also 
complicating the financial picture was the announcement by the Office of Hawaiian 
Affairs (OHA) that part of the proposed Aloha Tower development occupied ceded lands 
and that OHA would thus be eligible for part of the project revenue. The result was that 
only five organizations submitted expressions of intent to bid in the first round of 
negotiations with ATDC (Holman 1998). These were:
1. Aloha Tower Associates of Honolulu, consisting of principals Peter S. Smith 
and U. J. Rainalter, Jr. Trust House Forte of London would be the hotel operator, and 
the firms of Frizzel, Hill, Moorhouse, Beaubois and Ernest Hara would handle design.
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2. Hawaii Waterfront Partners of Honolulu, with principals Graham Wong 
Hastings and Sanford Murata, Inc. Three firms would collaborate on design: Gale, 
Kober; Wudke, Watson, Davis; and Engstrom, Garduque.
3. Carley Capital Group of Madison, Wisconsin had David Carley of 
Washington, D. C. and Sol S. Shye of Los Angeles as principals. The hotel operator 
would be Mariner Corporation of Houston, and the design firm ELS Design Group.
4. International Land, Inc./Calishun of San Francisco. Ramada Inns would be 
the hotel operator, and Daniel, Mann, Johnson and Mendenhall the architects.
5. Southern Pacific Land Company (SPLC) of San Francisco. No hotel operator 
was listed. John Carl Warnecke and Charles R. Sutton were listed as architects 
(Downtown Improvement Association August 1983).
Based on the information submitted by the potential developers to the ATDC, the 
ATDC determined that only the Aloha Tower Associates and Southern Pacific Land 
Company had the financial resources necessary to complete the project. Both 
developers were then asked to submit more detailed proposals.
The ATDC Board of Directors felt that the ROMA guidelines, based on 
consultation with DOT, DPED, harbor users. Legislative leaders, the Governor’s office 
and private business, offered the best chance of satisfying all parties and ensuring 
project success. Thus the final choice of developer was structured upon compliance 
with the ROMA guidelines, submitted financial statements and proposed implementation 
plans (Holman 1998). On November 22,1983 ATDC announced that Southern Pacific 
Land Company of San Francisco had won the competition (Aloha Tower Development 
Corporation 1983).
SPLC’s $91 million proposal included a 411 room hotel and 170,000 square feet 
of commercial and office space (Pacific Business News 11/28/1983). The SPLC Plan
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followed most of ROMA’s guidelines, with the hotel at Pier 8, the Fort Street Mall 
extended to Aloha Tower, and the office structure at Pier 10-11. The exceptions to the 
ROMA Plan was removal of a hotel west wing facing the plaza, which was done to 
improve views and open the hotel pool area, and placement of all parking underground. 
Other design concepts included replicating the Aloha Tower’s classical archway entry 
along the entire fagade of each building. Exterior finishes were to be the same light- 
colored concrete/plaster look of the Tower. Two financing schemes were offered, one a 
conventional plan with a seventy-five/twenty-five per cent debt/equity ratio. A second 
plan would have a eighty/twenty per cent debt/equity ratio. Debt for this second option 
would be split into two segments: forty per cent reserved for qualified development 
elements for which tax-exempt bonded financing would be pursued, and the remaining 
fifty-five per cent using conventional financing (Southern Pacific Development Company 
1983).
The ATDC, meanwhile, had been busy on other fronts.
1. An Environmental Impact Assessment, based on the ROMA Plan, was 
conducted, public comment solicited, and then completed. The Governor accepted the 
EIS on September 15, 1983.
2. The ATDC applied for and received a Certificate of Appropriateness from the 
Hawai’i Capitol Historic, Cultural and Scenic District.
3. A zoning change from B-2 to B-4 was also requested and approved by the 
Honolulu City Planning Commission and presented to the City Council.
4. The ATDC arranged an Exclusive Right to Negotiate with the SPDC, listing 
issues to be resolved.
Unfortunately for the Aloha Tower Development Corporation, in 1984 the 
Southern Pacific Railroad, parent corporation of the Southern Pacific Development
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Corporation, merged with the Santa Fe Railroad. The new corporation determined that 
the Aloha Tower project did not meet its “risk and reward” criteria and announced its 
intention to leave the project. Southern Pacific did, however, offer to help ATDC find a 
new developer, and strongly recommended that John Carl Wamecke and Associates be 
allowed to continue with the project (Aloha Tower Development Corporation 1984).
Working in conjunction with Carl Wamecke and Associates, the ATDC in 1984 
examined the possibility of increasing the “critical mass” of the amount of rentable floor 
space from 160,000 to 350,000 square feet, reached agreement with the Peninsular 
Hotel Group to manage a 415 unit hotel, and obtained all additional necessary 
governmental approvals for the project (Aloha Tower Development Corporation 1984).
Carl Wamecke and Associates’ Wamecke Development Corporation also began 
negotiations with several companies for a new development partner. Included was the 
Carley Capital Group from the original set of developers, and American Hawai’i 
Cruises/Island Navigation Corporation (Realty) Ltd. of Honolulu; Cordish, Embry and 
Associates of Baltimore, Maryland; and Watson-Casey/Halcyon Ltd. of Hartford, 
Connecticut and Austin, Texas (Aloha Tower Development Corporation 1984).
In early 1985 Kenneth Brown, architect, local businessman, first Chairman of the 
State’s Kakaako Development Authority, and President of the Hawai’i Maritime Center, 
asked the ATDC to reconsider the idea of a festival marketplace. Brown questioned the 
economics of the ROMA Plan.
ATDC in 1983 had maintained its ROMA guidelines by voting for the Southern 
Pacific Development Corporation proposal, rather than Aloha Tower Associates’ festival 
marketplace concept. The Aloha Tower Associates (ATA) plan de-emphasized the 
office and hotel portions of the ROMA Plan, and placed the Maritime Center Museum 
near Aloha Tower. The ATA group had included James Rouse’s Enterprise Corporation,
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a subsidiary of the Rouse Corporation, which had an impressive track record as 
developer of Boston’s Faneuil Hall, Baltimore’s Harborplace and Philadelphia’s Galleria 
(Downtown Improvement Association February 1985).
Instead of following Brown’s suggestion and initiating discussions with Aloha 
Tower Associates, the ATDC declared in April 1985 that it was negotiating exclusively 
with Cordish Embry and Associates, American Hawai’i Cruises, and Island Navigation 
Corporation (Realty) of Honolulu (Pacific Business News 4/15/1985). (American Hawai’i 
Cruises and Island Navigation Corporation (Realty) of Honolulu subsequently withdrew 
when it was determined that the initial $33 million in tax-exempt revenue bonds would 
not be enough to sustain the project.) Negotiations between Cordish Embry and 
Associates and the ATDC would become increasingly strained due to competing DPED 
and DOT space needs at the Tower, and the resulting effects on project size and 
financing.
In 1986 the State DOT issued a new Year 2010 Master Plan for Honolulu Harbor. 
Items relating to Downtown and the Aloha Tower area would include:
1. the Aloha Tower Piers 8-11 continue as Honolulu’s passenger ship facilities. 
Interisland ferry berths probably would be located there also.
2. Piers 5-6 be utilized by charter and cruise boats.
3. Pier 7 be occupied by the Maritime Museum.
4. Piers 6-7 and 12-13 be developed into uses deemed compatible with 
activities at Aloha Tower and the Downtown area.
5. Piers 13-14 be available for expansion of commercial, fishing, cruise, charter
or ferry operations.
6. Piers 15-18 be designated for commercial fishing operations.
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7. pedestrian overpasses across Nimitz Highway be constructed at Fort and at 
Smith Streets.
8. no petroleum or other flammable storage facilities be constructed within the 
Harbor, and existing facilities relocated to Barber’s Point.
DIA representatives participated in drawing up the harbor Master Plan 
(Downtown Improvement Association November 1986b).
Unfortunately for the ATDC planners, the DOT’S space requests for ship 
berthing, baggage handling and customs needs at the Aloha Tower were increasing 
rapidly. Such requests grew from 44,000 square feet in 1983 to 248,000 square feet in 
1986 - larger than the five acre area under negotiation between Cordish Embry and 
Associates and the ATDC. The ATDC was required by law to reimburse the DOT for 
any lost revenues caused by redevelopment, and replacement of any maritime facilities. 
These costs would be passed on to any Aloha Tower developer. The only means to pay 
such additional costs would be a corresponding increase in commercial space. Cordish 
Embry indeed did ask to increase the amount of commercial space to 750,000 - a vast 
increase in density compared to the earlier ROMA Plan (Kresnak 1987).
The lack of concrete progress at Aloha Tower prompted Legislative Auditor 
Clinton Tanimura in February 1987 to declare the project unworkable. Noting that 
nothing had been built since the ATDC was authorized in 1981, the Auditor listed several 
major problem areas in the ATDC organizational setup. These included:
1. conflicts between maritime and commercial uses over limited spatial 
resources.
2. unrealistic commercial space requests by the developer that dwarfed 
previous plans and which would result in a project comparable to only the largest 
Downtown projects.
201
3. jurisdictional conflicts between the DOT and ATDC, with the DOT retaining 
control of the site.
4. requirements that the State not contribute any financial assistance to the 
project had led to inappropriate and unworkable financial strategies.
The Auditor recommended that any planning of the Aloha Tower be part of a 
Waterfront design for the area between Ala Moana Park and Sand Island, and that the 
ATDC be disbanded (Kresnak 1987; Honolulu Advertiser 2/20/1987).
Governor John Waihee subsequently suggested that the project not be 
abandoned but be transferred to the Hawai’i Housing Development Authority, the State 
agency responsible for redevelopment of Kakaako (Downtown Improvement Association 
March 1987).
The DIA strongly suggested in its March 1987 issue of the Downtowner that the 
project continue as planned with private financing, but that design guidelines be more 
“realistic” and that ATDC Board members be more experienced in real estate 
development (Downtown Improvement Association March 1987).
The Aloha Tower Development Corporation, meanwhile, had broken off relations 
with Cordish Embry and Associates and declared that no agreements existed between 
them. The ATDC announced that it would concentrate its efforts in dealing with maritime 
needs, financing and ceded lands issues (Downtown Improvement Association March 
1987).
ATDC felt compelled to go to the courts in September of 1987 to declare any 
previous agreements between itself and Cordish Embry and Associates as no longer 
binding. Cordish Embry countersued. The object of contention was a one year “interim 
development agreement” signed between the ATDC and Cordish Embry in April 1975, 
and subsequently extended to July 7, 1986 (Andrade 1987).
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Governor Waihee called on renewed citizen participation in Waterfront renewal, a 
call taken up by the Hawai’i Community Development Authority (HCDA) and the 
American Institute of Architects in studying the area between Kewalo Basin and 
Honolulu Harbor. The result, entitled A Reawakening: The Honolulu Waterfront, was 
released on December 28, 1987. The document centered most of its design proposals 
in the Kakaako-Kewalo area, but offered three scenarios for the Aloha Tower area.
1. Entitled Pacific Gateway, scenario number one contained the office and hotel 
ideas of earlier Aloha Tower proposals. Additional features included depressing Nimitz 
Highway through Downtown to Kakaako to remove it as a physical barrier to the 
Waterfront. Financial burdens would be lessened by the sale of air rights over the 
roadway. Removal of the Hawaiian Electric power plant Downtown, development of 
mixed use apartment buildings over the present Nimitz corridor, and creation of a large 
new urban park makai of the Federal Building would substantially change the character 
of the area immediately adjacent to Aloha Tower, provide it with potential new 
customers, and integrate it with Downtown.
2. Noho Kai (To Live by the Sea) called for development of an elevated 
pedestrian overpass at Fort Street to the Aloha Tower Complex, use of Piers 1 and 2 for 
cruise ships as demand warrants, and generous landscape treatment of Nimitz 
Highway/Ala Moana Boulevard.
3. The Gathering Place would also utilize Piers 1 and 2 as overflow cruise ship 
locations should the Aloha Tower complex be unavailable. A hotel was recommended at 
Pier 5, a ferry terminal and maritime museum at Piers 6 and 7, and inter- and intra-island 
ferry terminals and a hotel at Pier 8. Parking would be underground. Piers 10 and 11 
would continue as cruise ship locations. Nimitz Highway would be depressed, the
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Hawaiian Electric Company power plant removed, and a shoreline walkway built from 
River Street to Kakaako (American Institute of Architects 1987).
The Office of State Planning commissioned Helber, Hastert and Kimura and R.
M. Towill Corporation to study much the same area (Kewalo to Nu’uanu Stream). The 
resulting proposal called for;
1. cruise ship berthing a Piers 1 and 2. A tunnel between the two piers would
connect Ward Avenue to Sand Island.
2. dinner cruise boat berths between Piers 4 and 5.
3. a commercial marketplace at Piers 5 and 6.
4. removal of the Hawaiian Electric Company power plant and its replacement
with a festival market and parking.
5. an interisland ferry complex centered around Piers 6 and 7.
6. a maritime museum on Pier 7.
7. a hotel and cruise ship terminal at Aloha Tower’s Piers 8 and 9.
8. offices and a cruise ship terminal at Piers 10 and 11.
9. fishing/commercial activities at Piers 13-14.
10. a floating restaurant at pier 15.
The plan also called for five pedestrian bridges across Nimitz Highway between 
River Street and the Federal Building. Parking requirements were dependent upon the 
development of a rapid transit system by the City along Nimitz Highway (Downtown
Improvement Association February 1989).
The plan raised a number of concerns from the maritime community, due to its 
relocation of container activities from Piers 1 and 2. The DIA voiced concerns due to its 
ambitiousness: the plan depended upon the cooperation of all State departments, the 
City, and private sector when smaller projects (such as the Aloha Tower renewal)
204
requiring similar participation had been unsuccessful (Downtown Improvement 
Association February 1989). It should also be noted that the DIA had actively opposed 
a rapid transit Nimitz Highway alignment upon which the Office of State Planning 
proposal depended.
The Aloha Tower Development Corporation itself raised controversy in 
September 1989 by proposing the expansion of its development area 473 feet makai 
into the harbor turning basin. Maritime interests immediately complained of potential 
safety infringement (Smith, Rod 12/25/1989).
The ATDC, under new Executive Director Randall Iwase, had determined that 
the best means to renew developer interest in potential Aloha Tower development was 
to lessen restrictions on what could be built, and make a new request for proposals 
(Grant 1998).
Having learned from the past, we felt it was better to have the private 
sector come up with a design proposal and let the state set up a 
development proposal that was flexible...and workable for the team that 
was chosen.
Randall Iwase, Executive Director, ATDC (Kaplanek 1990) 
Evaluation of proposals would be made with the help of a professional Evaluation 
Committee recommended to the Board by Iwase and hired by ATDC (Kaplanek 1990). 
Included were a planner, harbor planner/engineer, architect, traffic engineer, financial 
analyst and an attorney (Aloha Tower Development Corporation 1989). The 
recommendation to the Board of the ATDC was to be based upon the developer s 
qualifications, overall merit of the proposal and its benefits to the state” (Kaplanek 1990).
The final decision, however, was to be made by the Board of Directors. As 
prescribed in the Corporation’s rules, the public was not allowed to see the proposals
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\prior to the final selection. Losing proposals would only be disclosed by their sponsors 
(Downtown Improvement Association September 1989; Kaplanek 1990).
Iwase justified the secrecy on several grounds.
1. Previous development attempts had led to litigation between the developer 
and the State. The concern was that many developers and architects would not want to 
be involved with the project publicly.
2. Release of a developer’s confidential internal information could preclude 
bidding. Thus only the winning developer would be required under the rules to divulge 
such material.
3. A public hearing on the development rules, conducted December 1, 1988, 
had received no public comment against the confidentiality provisions.
4. Designs of proponents not selected could be used elsewhere (Kaplanek
1990).
This lack of public input clouded all the ATDC’s actions. The Hawai i Chamber of 
Commerce charged that it had been “shut out” of the planning process. The Chamber’s 
Maritime Affairs Committee wrote Iwase asking for information and the “opportunity to 
offer constructive comments” on the impact of various development plans.
We, the harbor users, would like to share our insights regarding the
design concepts proposed for the development of the Aloha Tower area.
We are not asking for a say in who develops; we are asking for a say in
what happens to Honolulu’s working Waterfront.
Ace Clark, Chairman, Maritime Affairs Committee, Chamber of 
Commerce (Smith, Rod 10/2/1989)
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Iwase replied asking for details about issues affecting the maritime industry, to 
which the Committee responded that it could not give details because the State had 
given it “nothing specific to comment on” (Smith, Rod 10/2/1989).
Aaron Levine of the ODC called this secretive decision making a “flawed 
process” that would create a lack of public confidence in the developer selection 
procedure. “This decision and the way it was made sets the tone for the way the 
Waterfront development will proceed. Who knows what the secrets are?” (Smith, Rod 
12/25/1989a).
Although as many as nine bids were expected, only four corporations actually 
produced proposals. These included:
1. Christopher Hemmeter/Tokyu Corporation’s $1.35 billion bid, which included 
a $125 million sports complex, an $80 million cultural park, a 430 unit hotel, 375 housing 
units, realignment of Nimitz Highway, and a Chinatown revitalization project.
2. The Myers Corporation’s $1.1 billion proposal, which included a world class 
hotel, two residential projects, two office developments, a theme retail center and 
maritime facilities.
3. The Hawaiian Waterfront Connection Consortium’s $1.1 billion plan, which 
contained a Hawaiian cultural center; a 600 suite hotel; 2,000 units of affordable 
housing; 759 condominium apartments; Waterfront promenade; mass transit station; and 
5,000 parking stalls (Hawaiian Waterfront Connection Consortium 1989; Rognstad 
1998).
4. Aloha Tower Associates’ $ 600 million bid, which included a 380,000 square 
foot “festival marketplace,” two 350 foot condominium towers of 270 units makai of 
Chinatown; a round 340 foot office tower; a 500,000 square foot maritime building with 
berths for two large cruise ships; a 109 unit seven story business type hotel; 3,700
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underground parking stalls; and annual payments of five per cent of the developer’s 
income into an Enterprise Foundation trust fund for affordable housing (Smith, Rod 
12/25/1989a, 12/25/1989b; Downtown Improvement Association January 1990a, 
December 1990; Kaplanek 1990c).
The Evaluation Committee recommended the Aloha Tower Associates. Aloha 
Tower Associates (ATA) was a partnership of Enterprise-Hawai’i, Inc., chaired by James 
Rouse; and Aloha Tower Hawaiian Partners, consisting of Robert Gerell, George Hutton, 
Glenn Okada, U. J. Rainalter, Jr., and Peter Smith (Smith, Rod 12/25/1989a). The ATA 
proposal was recommended by the Evaluation Team because of developer experience, 
the plan’s respect for the character of the site, realistic financial strategy, construction 
timetable and attractive passenger ship facilities, and pedestrian and vehicle access 
(Aloha Tower Development Corporation 1989).
The ATDC Board of Directors subsequently awarded the exclusive right to 
negotiate a long term lease and development agreement to ATA in December of 1989 
(Smith, Rod 12/25/1989a).
The Downtowner happily noted that “the State’s Aloha Tower Development 
Authority selected a top team of developers to proceed with the large, long-delayed 
projecf (Downtown Improvement Association December 1990).
Negative effects caused by the secrecy of the developer selection process was 
immediately apparent after the announcement. Hemmeter declared that he had not 
been informed of the direction that the Board wanted to take the project.
If I’d known that the process was to create a project with the least impact,
I would have started out with three palm trees and a dollar bill.
Christopher Hemmeter, 1989 bidder (Smith, Rod 12/25/1989a)
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Galen Fox, the City’s representative on the Board, said he had favored the 
Hemmeter/Tokyu proposal for its sports complex and sound financial backing. Even 
Board Chairman Roger Ulveling acknowledged potential negative public response from
two high rises proposed makai of Chinatown.
Local planner Mark Hastert, who headed the evaluation team, noted that final
negotiations had to be worked out with ATA. He pointed out that the ATA proposal had 
far fewer residential units than any other; the hotel lacked many facilities that Downtown 
groups had sought; and no grade separation (overpass) was provided across Nimitz 
Highway (Smith, Rod 12/25/1989a).
Former City Councilman Kekoa Kaapu, a member of one of the development 
teams, contested in court the closed developer selection process. The State’s Office of 
Information Services had upheld ATDC (Pacific Business News 1/29/1990). The lawsuit
was later dismissed (Pacific Business News 3/5/1990).
The DIA, which at different times had had some of its membership sit on the 
ATDC Board of Directors (Downtown Improvement Association November 1985), found 
itself in the uncomfortable position of defending a selection process that had also chosen 
the project of Robert Gerell, a DIA member (Downtown Improvement Association May 
1986). In a January 1990 editorial in the Downtowner, the DIA noted that
Charges that the ALOHA TOWER DEVELOPMENT CORP was illegally 
secretive in its selection of a Waterfront developer seem odd. The City 
uses virtually the same process in order to attract good developers and
has never been challenged...
(Downtown Improvement Association January 1990)
In an effort to blunt criticism, ATA issued a number of press releases in January
1990.
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1. The ATA announced detailed plans for a new “world-class” passenger 
terminal at Piers 5 and 6 to be developed as part of the Aloha Tower Project. Included 
would be offices for the DOT and other maritime office space. The plan would not 
infringe on the harbor’s turning area, an important concern in the maritime community. 
Passenger use of Piers 5 and 6 would allow other changes at Aloha Tower itself. Pier 8 
would be reserved for a high speed ferry service and dinner catamarans. Pier 9 could 
accommodate small power craft and major transient vessels. Piers 10 and 11 (including 
a new terminal) would still be available for large cruise vessels (Smith, Rod 1/1/1990).
2. The ATA released details about its two million square foot retail, office, hotel 
and parking proposal for the area between Piers 9 and 14. Included would be 120 
restaurants and shops, eight movie theaters and an entertainment center. The hotel 
would be part of a low rise structure at Piers 10 and 11. A high rise office tower was 
designed to be as close to Downtown as possible to integrate it with nearby buildings, 
and to maintain the separate character of the Aloha Tower itself. Residential 
condominiums, including 270 luxury units, would be located at Piers 13 and 14 (Smith, 
Rod 1/8/1990; Downtown Improvement Association January 1990).
3. The developers also tried to portray themselves as community minded 
citizens, promising an additional $2 million grant to the previous five per cent pledge of 
profits for the Enterprise Foundation. Development of a historical park focusing on the 
nearby site of Honolulu Fort planned for Pier 12 was announced. Developer team 
member U. J. Rainalter’s personal ties to the Waterfront (his grandfather, John Walker, 
had developed the original Pier 11 passenger facility and the Aloha Tower itself) were 
publicized (Smith, Rod 1/15/1990, 1/22/1990).
Conflicts between the DOT and the new developer began almost immediately. In
March 1990 it was reported that the ATA wanted cruise ships to temporally berth at Piers
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Figure 11.1. Aloha Tower World Trade Center proposal made by Charles Sutton and 
Associates. Source: Advisory Committee for the Aloha Tower Plaza 1978.
Figure 11.2. Aloha Tower winning proposal 1989. The low rise structures on the right 
are the “festival marketplace” to be built by the Rouse Company. The overall complex 
would later be scaled back due to economic difficulties. Source: Downtown 
Improvement Association January 1990a.
211
39 and 40 while reconstmction of the Aloha Tower complex was underway. DOT 
officials, stressing the remoteness of the site and the condition of its facilities, 
recommended completion of new facilities at Piers 5 and 6 before work began at Aloha 
Tower (Smith, Rod 3/12/1990).
The ATDC Board of Directors voted 5-0 to accept the development agreement 
between ATDC and ATA on June 13,1990. Galen Fox, representative of the City and 
County of Honolulu, abstained due to concerns about the two proposed residential high 
rises on Nimitz blocking views from Chinatown (Kresnak 1990). The actual development 
agreement between the ATDC and ATA was signed June 20,1990 (Pacific Business 
News 6/25/1990).
The agreement required a “holding period rent” of $25,000 a month from signing 
of the master lease, $212,000 a month during development, and double that during the 
first year of operation (Andrade 6/24/1990).
Throughout 1991 the Aloha Tower project suffered delays. ATA was unable to 
receive permits from the Army Corps of Engineers and the State Land Use Commission 
required for demolition and construction on the site (Pacific Business News 12/2/1991). 
Postponement due to market conditions of up to two years for the festival marketplace 
itself was announced in late 1991(Smith, Rod 09/09/1991).
This turn of events led the Aloha Tower Development Corporation to actively 
renegotiate the contract with Aloha Tower Associates. The original secrecy rules were 
still in force, prompting Aaron Levine, retired President of the ODC, to comment that 
such policies created “an unnecessary aura of suspicion” on the entire project (Smith, 
Rod 10/14/1991). Rumors of changes to the development agreement, meanwhile, 
filtered out as State agencies contacted maritime and other principals for input.
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In an effort to cut costs, ATA offered in early 1992 to contribute $7 million dollars 
for a new cargo-handling facility. ATA was hoping to convert the Pier 2 cargo area into a 
cruise ship terminal as a alternative to constructing a new cruise ship terminal at Piers 5
and 6 (Pacific Business News 1/27/1992).
The difficulties faced by the developer were well understood by June of 1992. 
Pacific Business News noted that ATA had received a $100 million financial commitment 
from C. Itoh & Company of Japan just two days before a $60 million lease payment 
deadline. The State also granted a 50 day extension for ATA to execute its master lease 
agreement. Construction was now to commence in mid-1994 for a 200,000 square foot 
festival marketplace; renovation of Aloha Tower; general improvements to the area 
between Piers 8 and 11; and added facilities for cruise ships, an interisland ferry, and 
dinner boats. All other facilities were to be postponed (Pacific Business News 6/1/1992).
A new publicity brochure produced by ATA listed parking at Piers 5 and 6, the 
existing Maritime Museum at Pier 7, dinner boat berths at Pier 8, and cruise ship use of 
Pier 10. A festival marketplace would be located between Piers 8 and 9, and Pier 10 
would be renovated. Irwin Park would continue as a parking lot. Aloha Tower would be 
surrounded by a small plaza and connected to Fort Street (Aloha Tower Associates 
1992).
As late as October 1992 ATA was asking for further extensions before beginning 
work. The State then announced in December that it would terminate the development 
agreement if construction did not begin by the following 30"’ of September (Thompson 
12/21/1992).
Meanwhile, the State was trying to address the critical issue of parking. The 1989 
plan had called for underground parking at Ifwin Park, but the developer had 
subsequently found that plan to be economically and structurally unfeasible. The State,
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Figure 11.3. The Aloha Tower Marketplace at the makai end of Fort Street, 1998. At the 
left is the festival marketplace; immediately ahead, kiosks and the Aloha Tower, and to 
the right, remaining terminal buildings. Source: Author.
F’lgurTTlA. Aloha Tower Marketplace, looking Ewa-makai. 1998. Restaurants occupy
the area immediately adjacent to the pier. Source: Author.
in early 1993, proposed to borrow $40 million to build its own 800 to 1,000 stall, three 
story parking building in Irwin Park (Thompson 2/22/1993).
The DIA opposed the State parking structure idea, noting that “the proposal was 
characterized by one Legislator as a ‘bailout’ for the developers (Downtown 
Improvement Association April 1993). The DIA April 1993 Downtowner went on to note 
that the park had been a gift from philanthropist William G. Irwin given to the State in 
1930. The gift had had stipulations that if the land was not used for public park 
purposes, the heirs of Irwin could reclaim the land. The State was already using the 
property for an at-grade parking lot, despite censure from the Outdoor Circle and others. 
The DIA went on to criticize the developer’s proposal for use of Amfac Center, 
Grosvenor Center and Harbor Court parking for the Marketplace. The DIA referred to 
the mostly offsite parking plan as “poorly located and insufficient” (Downtown 
Improvement Association April 1993).
The DIA also criticized a suggestion by the State to finance and build a 
pedestrian overpass over Nimitz Highway at Bishop Street rather than the original 
proposal for a developer financed overpass at Fort Street.
The Downtowner article ended with the following:
Because building a parking garage in Irwin Park is not possible and 
obtaining the use of the existing parking in office buildings mauka is 
unrealistic, the developers of the Aloha Tower project will need to find 
some way to provide adequate parking on-site, as originally promised.
(Downtown Improvement Association April 1993)
The DIA’s opinion of Aloha Tower was important enough for U. J. Rainalter to 
attend the April 1993 DIA Board of Directors meeting, seeking support. The DIA voted 
to support the revised plans but continued to oppose the use of Irwin Park for parking
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(Downtown Improvement Association May 1993).
The Pacific Business News announced that the State was subdividing the Aloha 
Tower property to reflect the phasing of the project, and to allow for other developers to 
take over future work if the existing team could not fulfill its contractual obligations 
(Thompson 4/19/1993).
July 9, 1993 marked the ground breaking for the Aloha Tower project (Downtown 
Improvement Association August 1993). Demolition work was well underway by October 
(Thompson 10/18/1993). The rebuilt Pier 11 passenger terminal was dedicated in 
January 1994, when the Queen Elizabeth I, SS Constitution and SS independence all 
berthed alongside Aloha Tower (Downtown Improvement Association February 1994). 
The project officially opened November 19,1994 (Pacific Business News 10/20/1994).
Figure 11.5. Aloha Tower Marketplace, 1998. The Festival Marketplace and Aloha 
Tower are on the left, a passenger liner’s funnel can be seen over the active piers at th 
far center, and Irwin Park is marked by trees to the right. Source: Author.
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11.5 ANALYSIS OF THE PROJECT
11.5.1 ALEXANDER GARVIN ANALYSIS
TABLE 11.1. GARVIN’S BACKGROUND REQUIREMENTS FOR SUCCESSFUL 
PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS
Requirement Evaluation
Effective input from all 
stakeholders
Originally both the DPED and DOT organized citizen 
advisory panels to discuss potential use of the Aloha 
Tower area. DPED Director Hideto Kono on August 10, 
1976 appointed an Advisory Committee for the Aloha 
Tower Plaza (Advisory Committee for the Aloha Tower 
Plaza 1978). The State Department of Transportation 
in 1978 created a Downtown Waterfront
Redevelopment Team that included the DIA, ODC, 
Chamber of Commerce and Outdoor Circle (State of 
Hawai’i, Department of Transportation 1978). The 
secrecy provisions of the ATDC were bitterly criticized 
by organizations such as the O’ahu Development 
Conference and the Hawai’i Chamber of Commerce 
Maritime Affairs Committee (Smith, Rod 10/2/1989,
1/25/1989a). Developer Christopher Hemmeter 
obviously misunderstood the criteria that projects such 
as his would be evaluated on (Smith, Rod 1/25/1989a). 
ATDC Executive Director Randall Iwase justified the 
rules as necessary to protect the developers’ 
proprietary information, shield developers from negative 
publicity, and a lack of public interest displayed in the 
past. Iwase, however, noted that “in retrospect, we 
probably should look at other avenues to secure public 
input” (Kaplanek 1990).
Thus the ODC’s Aaron Levine was correct in 
criticizing the ATDC for rules that barred the release of 
project proposals and failed to conduct public input 
hearings prior to the ATDC decision. Such rules did 
damage public confidence in the selection process.
It should be noted that the developer selection 
process for a subsequent State project, the Hawai’i 
Convention Center, was deliberately left open to public 
scrutiny to avoid such concerns (Sutton 1998).
Understanding what planning 
can and cannot accomplish
Both the Legislative Auditor and the DIA questioned 
whether the project had enough “critical mass” and 
attractions to entice tourists away from similar shopping 
complexes closer to tourist hotels in Waikiki. Thus no 
matter how well designed the facilities of the Aloha
Tower complex might be, there had to be a reason for 
people to come there.
Table 11.1 is continued on the next page.
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TABLE 11.1. (CONTINUED): GARVIN’S BACKGROUND REQUIREMENTS FOR 
SUCCESSFUL PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS
Requirement Evaluation
Understanding how physical 
changes to the urban 
environment can improve the 
economy, quality of life, and 
city function
The project was a deliberate attempt to better use 
unique assets along the Waterfront. Passenger ship 
traffic had been in decline since the 1960s, and the area 
had been virtually abandoned. It was hoped that the 
festival marketplace would return pedestrian access to 
the Waterfront and reinforce Downtown as a place to 
live and work. Aloha Tower itself was to become a 
more effective landmark within the city.
The Aloha Tower Marketplace has made the 
Waterfront more attractive within the complex, brought 
more downtowners across Nimitz Highway, and 
increased popular awareness of the Tower itself as a 
landmark. The complex does offer residents and 
tourists another entertainment option.
The project will, however, need to improve its 
parking situation to make it easier to visit. A parking 
garage has been suggested on the Diamond Head end 
of the Hawaiian Electric generating plant. This project 
should not block any mauka-makai views on Richards 
Street.
The project also badly needs to improve the 
initial view it gives of itself. This refers to Irwin “Park”, 
which is really a nondescript “parking” lot complete with 
non-functioning fountain. The land is State 
administered, and until World War II was an attractive 
backdrop to the Aloha Tower. The Aloha Tower 
Associates once planned to restore the Park and make 
it a green entrance to the complex, attracting potential 
customers with cultural activities on the grass. The 
intertwined parking and Park problems should be 
remedied as soon as conditions allow, to create the 
attractive entrance that the complex deserves.
Examination of how the 
project or program in question 
has created positive change 
and prevented negative 
change
Create Positive Change
The project replaced poorly maintained storage sheds 
and pier structures, and an unpopular automobile ramp 
that blocked the view makai from Bishop Street.
Prevent Negative Change
The project as built represented a more human scale 
development than some of the previous proposals, 
which could have created densities rivaling those of the 
largest Downtown developments (Kresnak 1987).
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TABLE 11.2. GARVIN’S FRAMEWORK OF GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS TO 
ENCOURAGE PRIVATE INVESTMENT
Ingredient of Success Evaluation
Strategic investment in 
infrastructure, rather 
than routine capital 
spending
The State of Hawai’i had made investments in capital
improvements between 1963-65 to remake a declining
Waterfront. Three million dollars was spent to a ground floor 
freight area and a second floor passenger deck in the center of 
the original pier area. The top passenger level was connected 
to Inwin Park via escalators, and via a vehicle ramp to Piers 5,
6, 7 and 8 (Pacific Business News 6/25/1963; Honolulu Star 
Bulletin and Advertiser 11/15/1964).
The State then changed tactics. Studies by or for the
State on the practicality of harborside urban renewal were 
conducted in 1970, 72, 73, 78, 79, 81, 83, 87, and 89. The
State chose to offer private developers exclusive rights to the 
harborside if the developers would finance the project. The
State’s unwillingness to directly contribute money to the project 
put the whole development into question (State of Hawai’i 
Legislative Auditor 1979; Kresnak 1987; Honolulu Advertiser 
2/20/1987).
The City’s proposed rapid transit line would have 
operated on Nimitz Highway, directly in front of the Aloha
Tower complex. -------------------
Regulatory policies 
that set the character 
of an area or lessen 
private investment risk
Character of the Area
One of the major sources of delay in development of the Aloha 
Tower project was the poor coordination (if not outright 
competition) between the DOT 3rid DPED. Conflicts over 
control of space and compensation helped derail the Cordish 
Embry and Associates’ proposals and ended in court (Kresnak 
1987; Honolulu Advertiser 2/20/1987).
The Aloha Tower as developed completely changed the 
area’s character from one of crowded and nearly abandoned 
warehouses to a tourist retail destination. The architecture of 
the original Tower is replicated throughout the complex.
Removing the buildings at the base of the Aloha Tower and the 
1960’s era vehicle ramp restored vistas from both Fort and
Bishop Streets toward the Waterfront.
Lessen Private Investment Risk
Executive Director Iwase’s decision to allow experienced 
entrepreneurs to make their own development proposals 
encouraged those entrepreneurs to do what they did best. 
Granting exclusive development rights, government assistance 
in necessary zoning changes, and use of tax exempt bonds 
were intended to lower the developer s risk and costs.
Incentives for desired 
private development
The State offered a long term exclusive lease on a well known 
site that possessed cachet with the public. Access to tax 
credits for historical renovation purposes was possible on at 
least part of the project. ----------------------- 1
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TABLE 11.3. GARVIN’S INGREDIENTS OF PROJECT SUCCESS
Ingredient Explanation
Market The market evolved from a focused group of international business 
corporations; to a mixed group of tourists and businesses needing 
hotels, attractions and office space; into tourists (and some local 
residents) seeking entertainment in the form of a festive 
marketplace. The project still hopes to gain office, hotel and 
residential patrons at a later date.
Location Inherent Site Characteristics
The ultimate development area includes a series of piers and small 
peninsulas jutting into Honolulu Harbor. The most important are:
Piers 5 and 6, a roughly triangular area, currently used for 
parking.
Pier 7, used for the Maritime Museum.
Piers 8-11, best known for the Aloha Tower, contains the 
majority of the land under development consideration.
Pier 12, a very small protrusion partially built with coral blocks 
from the original Honolulu Fort.
Piers 13-14 share a common peninsula.
Pier 15 is roughly parallel to Nimitz Highway.
Proximity
Piers 5 -6 lie near downtown Honolulu and the Hawaiian Electric 
power station.
Pier 7 is also close to the power station, just on the Diamond 
Head side of the foot of Bishop Street.
Pier 8-11 dominate the harbor at the foot of Downtown, with 
the Aloha Tower directly makai of Fort Street.
Piers 12-15 immediately abut Nimitz Highway.
Design The reorganized and downsized Aloha Tower complex occupies only 
Piers 5 through 12.
Piers 5 and 6 are used for surface parking.
Pier 7 is occupied by the separate, but complementary. 
Maritime Museum.
Pier 8 was built to accommodate larger vessels than the plan 
calls for. Along Pier 8 is the festival marketplace, four two story 
structures architecturally patterned after the Aloha Tower.
Pier 9 on its Ewa end is now open space adjacent to the 
restored Aloha Tower.
Pier 10 has been renovated as a cruise ship terminal and 
parking.
Piers 11-12 are used for parking.
Piers 13-14 are occupied by a maritime activity warehouse.
Pier 15 houses the harbor fire department.
Aotani and Associates/D’Agostino Izzo Quirk Associates won 
the American Institute of Architects’ Honolulu Award of Excellence in 
Office, Commercial and Institutional Design for the Aloha Tower 
project (Hawai’i Pacific Architecture November 1995).
Table 11.3 is continued on the next page.
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TABLE 11.3. (CONTINUED): GARVIN’S INGREDIENTS OF PROJECT SUCCESS
Ingredient Explanation
Financing The project was initially hobbled by the refusal of the State to commit 
funds to the project, provisions in ATDC’s organization that required 
the developer to reimburse DOT for lost revenue or facilities, and 
restrictions on what kind of project would be developed.
It was unfortunate that the ATA project was approved just as 
Hawai’i and Japan were entering a prolonged period of economic 
stagnation and depression. This forced a major scaling back of the 
first part of the project, slowed the leasing of retail space, postponed 
subsequent expansion, and created difficulties in releasing promised 
funds. The primary lender, C. Itoh and Company of Japan, granted 
ATA a $100 million commitment just two days before a deadline for 
lease payments to the State (Pacific Business News 6/1/1992). The 
State subsequently postponed collection of $60 million in advanced 
lease payments until “substantial” construction of the project was 
complete, or September 30, 1996 (Thompson 10/26/1993).
Mechanics liens were the subject of litigation in July 1995 (Kamhis 
1995).
Entrepreneurship The project had no single entrepreneur during its 20+ year gestation 
period, as the DOT, ATDC, DPED and numerous developers each 
pushed their own agendas. The catalyst of the present facility, 
however, would be Randall Iwase, Executive Director of the ATDC 
(Grant 1998). Iwase and the ATDC Board of Directors made the 
critical decisions to allow potential developers to make their own 
design proposals for the property and to include professional 
planners in the team that evaluated those proposals. This meant 
that the project was more realistically geared to the existing market.
Time Immediate
The festival marketplace as built can be walked in approximately 
twenty minutes. Major activities such as shopping, eating, harbor 
watching and the Maritime Museum next door can add considerably 
to the amount of time spent, depending upon personal taste.
The 24 Hour Day
The festival marketplace stores are geared to mostly daylight and 
early evening shopping by tourists. Theme restaurants and bars 
cater to a lunch and dinner crowd consisting of tourists and
Downtown high rise office workers. Students from the local 
universities also join in the evenings.
Decades
The complex is too new and incomplete to give a fair appraisal. 
Harborside maintenance will be expensive, and additional activities 
will be essential for the project to reach full potential. This, however, 
will require an improved local economy and additional financing.
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11.5.2 THE “PLANNING” AND “BUILT” LEGACIES
TABLE 11.4. THE “PLANNING” AND “BUILT” LEGACIES
Legacy Explanation
Planning Legacy The Aloha Tower development represents three planning 
themes;
1. The project is a prime example of evolution in 
thinking what Honolulu Harbor should be. The original concept 
of a strictly maritime district was supplanted by joint 
maritime/urban uses.
During the early 1960’s the State DOT still hoped to 
retain passenger ship use of the Aloha Tower complex, and 
built the 1965 two story complex similar in design to airports of 
that period.
The 1968 Gruen Study rekindled interest in the
Waterfront as a site for pedestrian and commuter activity. A 
museum would be located at seaside, and a hotel on the
Nu’uanu Stream.
HISA’s 1974 Feasibility Study, Hawaii International
Trade Center Located in Aloha Tower Complex investigated 
commercial use of the Aloha Tower area itself.
The DIA’s 1976 Waterfront Design Concept for
Honolulu Harbor detailed the need for reducing Nimitz Highway 
as a pedestrian barrier to the Waterfront.
The DOT’S 1978 Conceptual Planning Study: Piers 2 to 
18, Honolulu Harbor officially recognized the Aloha Tower 
complex as multiuse - both commercial and maritime.
The DPED 1981 Aloha Tower Plaza envisioned an 
integrated commercial, hotel and maritime facility operated by a 
special development corporation separate from the DOT.
The 1983 ROMA Plan still represented an effort by the 
State to narrowly define what would be built by the private 
sector.
The 1989 bidding process that allowed developers 
latitude in their proposals resulted in a diverse selection of 
possible futures: sports complexes, hotels, cultural centers, 
subsidized housing, etc.
2. The Aloha Tower project also personified increasing 
public demands to be included in the planning process.
When it was announced in 1963 that the DOT planned 
to build a vehicle ramp at Aloha Tower which would block the 
makai view of Bishop Street, public protests were in vain 
(Pacific Business News 7/3/1965).
In 1979 the State Legislature put conditions on funding 
to be used by the Administration for a world trade center at
Aloha Tower (Altonn 1979).
Table 11.4 is continued on the next page.
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TABLE 11.4. (CONTINUED): THE “PLANNING” AND “BUILT” LEGACIES
Legacy Explanation
Planning Legacy 
(continued)
In 1989 Aaron Levine criticized the “flawed process” 
that precluded the public from viewing project proposals before 
a winner was chosen (Smith, Rod 1/25/1989a).
The resulting public controversy encouraged a more 
open developer selection process for the Hawaii Convention 
Center (Sutton 1998).
3. The Aloha Tower project represents evolution of 
public-private partnerships. The earliest proposals detailed 
what developers would be allowed to do and included no public 
financing.
The 1983 ROMA study even dictated where individual 
components would go.
The 1989 bidding allowed developers greater latitude in 
what they could propose. This allowed developers to use their 
individual talents to produce a wider range of choice for the 
community.
In 1993 the State proposed to finance a parking garage 
in Irwin Park and a pedestrian overpass over Nimitz Highway. 
These were meant to address the “Achilles heel” of the scaled 
back project - parking - which threatened its viability (Grant 
1998).
Built Legacy 1. The festival marketplace has reinforced and 
restored the architecture of the Aloha Tower. Many proposals 
offered throughout the years were incompatible with the Tower 
architecturally.
2. The project as developed retained the integrity of 
the harbor itself. Several project proposals, such as that of the 
Myers Corporation, had proposed filling in large segments of 
the harbor. Such work would have reduced the harbor turning 
basin, vastly decreasing the facility’s ability to be a true working 
harbor (Smith 1989b).
3. Along with the smaller Merchant Square 
redevelopment, it has created a small night life component to 
Downtown where none existed before. The area could 
otherwise have gone high rise or remained neglected.
11.6 LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE
TABLE 11.5. ALOHA TOWER MARKETPLACE: LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE
Lesson for the Future Application in the Project Possible Future Use
Public hearings have an 
important role in legitimizing 
the planning process. Even 
if there are members of the 
general public in the 
decision making body, 
public hearings are 
necessary to include all 
relevant data and to make 
the public feel it had its say. 
The public must feel that 
decision makers are 
approachable and open.
The ATDC Board of
Directors had seven 
appointed members, of 
which four were 
government officials, and 
three from the general 
public. This was not 
enough broad based input 
to quell dissatisfaction over 
the process chosen for 
such a politically sensitive 
project. Although the 
system was common to 
local government, even the 
Executive Director admitted 
other mechanisms of public 
input needed to be 
employed.
Extensive publicity and 
public hearings should be 
conducted on all upcoming 
major public projects, 
including new rapid transit 
proposals, residential 
developments, road 
widenings, etc.
The value to community 
organizations of having 
regular staff monitor 
development proposals and 
publicize their potential 
impacts. Having a 
systematic examination and 
evaluation of proposals, 
and subsequent notification 
of the results, is the “first 
line of defense” to 
encourage desired change 
and prevent unwanted 
change.
The DIA staff monitored 
and publicized the activities 
of both the State and 
private developers during 
the long gestation period of 
the Aloha Tower complex.
As this happened over a 
twenty year period, such 
monitoring would be very 
difficult for individuals, 
community organizations or 
companies to do.
Provide a staff member to 
the Neighborhood Board 
Commission whose job is to 
gather and organize 
information by 
neighborhoods for 
dissemination to individual 
neighborhood boards.
Community and public 
officials must understand 
the importance of “market 
timing” and capitalization. 
Too often “red tape” can 
slow development projects, 
making the market analysis 
upon which a project 
depends no longer relevant.
The Aloha Tower Project 
was delayed by required 
permits for demolition, 
rezoning, and other issues 
while the local economy 
continued to deteriorate.
Government planners could 
examine preliminary project 
proposals and begin 
submission of general 
applications before final 
developer selection. Thus 
projects would have a 
“head start” towards 
completion, while market 
relevancy and official 
oversight were maintained.
Table 11.5 is continued on the next page.
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TABLE 11.5. (CONTINUED): ALOHA TOWER MARKETPLACE: LESSONS FOR THE 
FUTURE
Lesson for the Future Application in the Project Possible Future Use
Legislation creating an area 
of responsibility must also 
provide the authority to 
meet that mandate.
The organization of the
Aloha Tower Development 
Corporation was such that 
for most of its existence the 
DOT rather than the ATDC 
controlled the Aloha Tower 
complex. This slowed the 
development process.
The Department of Parks 
and Recreation of the City 
and County of Honolulu 
could be allowed to set its 
own fees, much like the 
Board of Water Supply, 
allowing better budgeting, 
facilities and service. 
Minneapolis, Minnesota 
does this.
Legislation must be written 
to avoid creating conflicts 
between agencies. 
Agreements must be 
detailed to avoid “open 
ended" situations.
The ATDC legislation 
stipulated that the DOT be 
compensated for loss of 
income or facilities. As no 
agreed upon amount of 
wharf space was stipulated, 
this encouraged the DOT to 
ask for as much space as 
possible, thus providing 
additional revenue and new 
facilities to the DOT at no 
investment Cost to the DOT.
Reuse and redevelopment 
of the Barber’s Point Naval 
Air Station will require 
coordination between 
various State agencies, 
particularly DBED and the 
DOT. Responsibilities and 
lines of authority should be 
detailed in advance to avoid 
similar situations to Aloha 
Tower.
Allowing developers to 
make their own proposals 
for a generalized project 
provides creativity and 
increased developer 
interest.
The original 1983 ROMA 
guidelines had limited the 
density and type of 
development that would 
have been built.
Developers such as ATA 
submitted their own ideas 
anyway, and others such as 
Southern Pacific were later 
cancelled because the 
principals felt that 
opportunities were better 
elsewhere. The 
development proposals in 
1989 became more 
“concrete” because the 
developers were able to 
literally “build” upon their 
expertise.
Hawai’i’s housing crisis 
needs imaginative 
solutions. Both public and 
private lands might be 
developed with low cost 
housing if developers could 
compete using their own 
project proposals and 
government provided 
financial assistance.
Table 11.5 is continued on the next page.
TABLE 11.5. (CONTINUED): ALOHA TOWER MARKETPLACE: LESSONS FOR THE 
FUTURE
Lesson for the Future Application in the Project Possible Future Use
Joint public-private projects 
need more than just asset 
contributions from 
government as incentives. 
Actual financial 
contributions by the State 
or City lessen developer 
“equity,” making such 
projects more attractive.
While the ATDC could offer 
exclusive development 
rights to a site with cachet, 
the lack of actual monetary 
support by the State meant 
that the developer was still 
personally heavily exposed. 
This led to financial 
schemes openly questioned 
on two occasions by the 
State auditor.
Government could protect 
its own exposure by more 
infrastructure investment.
For example, as Barber’s 
Point Naval Air Station is 
returned to State control, 
and as the State sells off 
parts of the area to private 
redevelopers, the State 
could provide upgraded 
roads, utilities, etc., whose 
value will be returned in the 
final purchase price of the 
property.
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CHAPTER 12. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
12.1 INTRODUCTION
For a student of urbanism interested in fostering community input into the planning 
process, a walk through downtown Honolulu must be a positive experience. If he should 
happen to have an old copy of the DIA’s prescription for revitalizing Downtown, the 
student would be heartened to see how much of the plans had been implemented and 
the success rate of those recommendations.
12.2 CONCLUSIONS
The Downtown Improvement Association, as any organization, had its successes and 
disappointments when seeking to accomplish its vision of Downtown.
Within Chapters 3 through 11 were detailed evaluations of both the DIA and eight 
projects representative of its Downtown economic revitalization efforts. Evaluations 
were done on a project by project basis in order to better illustrate how the conclusions 
were reached. Such conclusions could then be used as a helpful guide to citizens 
organizing themselves for their own economic revitalization programs, and to give them 
a better understanding of what constitutes individual project success.
Based upon the chapter evaluations, the DIA was successful in four of the 
projects examined.
1. Hawaii State Capitol: The placement of the Hawaii State Capitol literally 
brought politicians and the business community closer together than anywhere else in 
the United States. This placement helped to make government decision makers such as 
Mayor Neal Blaisdell more aware of the Downtown business community and provided
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Downtown with a market for services and office space. (Evaluation details may be 
accessed in Chapter 4.)
2. The Financial Plaza of the Pacific removed any concerns that Downtown 
might no longer be the center of business activity in the State, and provided the model 
for numerous similar projects. (Details are located in Chapter 5.)
3. Kukui Gardens provided badly needed additional “gap group” housing near 
Downtown. This low rise development of clustered apartments included a large number 
of family sized units, community facilities and even boasted individual addresses. The 
project provided an expanded customer base for Downtown retailers, helped dispel 
popular misconceptions of what “public housing” was all about, and ensured (along with 
the Queen Emma Gardens project) that Downtown residents would be a mixed income 
group. (Details are in Chapter 7.)
4. Bishop Square and Tamarind Park are outstanding examples of urban 
congregation points, providing activities, socialization opportunities, and even a bit of 
sunshine in an increasingly high-rise environment. (Details are located in Chapter 9.)
Two other projects have been moderately successful or are as yet too limited in 
length of operation and scope to warrant a final grade.
1. The Fort Street Mall (Phase II, the 1993 renovation) has been much more 
successful catering to its niche markets (office workers, university students, nearby 
residents) than were the original Mall’s efforts in maintaining a regional retail presence. 
The government’s rebuilding of the original deteriorating Mall prevented blight from 
spreading as quickly as would otherwise have occurred (Gushman 1998) and helped 
encourage expanded use by Hawai’i Pacific University. Problems, however, had 
occurred in the government’s handling of stakeholders (property owners represented by
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the DIA). Problems remained in retailing within the center Mall area and with security 
during evening hours. (Details are in Chapter 10.)
2. The Aloha Tower Marketplace is an attractive addition to the Waterfront and 
creation of a “people place,” but continues to struggle due to market timing, financing 
and weak “critical mass.” (Details are in Chapter 11.)
Two projects emerged as disappointments in the DIA’s effort to promote 
revitalization.
1. The original Fort Street Mall project (Phase I, 1969), did provide an escape 
for pedestrians from automobile congestion. Unfortunately, the project was 
unrealistically optimistic about the ability of the area to maintain its perceived regional 
retail market. Failure to include all political stakeholders led to the effective cancellation 
of the parking garages upon which the overall plan depended. Subsequent maintenance 
was also inadequate. (Details are in Chapter 6.)
2. The Cultural Plaza, organized to provide a new location for the six Chinese 
cultural groups, did not adequately address stakeholder, market, financial and 
administrative concerns, and has not been a financial success capable of renewing area 
retailing. (Details are in Chapter 8.)
12.3 RECOMMENDATIONS
The following is a list of major recommendations surmised from this study of the 
Downtown Improvement Association.
1. The promotion of economic revitalization must be viewed as a perpetual 
effort, the details of which are constantly undergoing evolution.
Internal organization is the key to success. Citizens wishing to organize 
themselves into effective associations must plan their organization and program to
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survive for an extended period of time. This includes providing stable funding, hiring a 
professional staff person, creating extensive networks and building coalitions, 
dissemination of information, creation and adherence to a long term plan, and training of 
the next generation of association leaders.
The Downtown Improvement Association did most, but not all, of these things.
The organization was formed by mostly landowners who had invested in Downtown for 
the long haul, could not easily leave, and were well aware that there were no “quick 
fixes” available. Its long term planning has left its mark upon types of economic activity, 
transportation systems, building density, and housing. Unfortunately Robert Midkiff and 
others were not able to convince the existing management of the DIA to continue after 
1996. A walk down Fort Street today near the old F.W. Woolworth location should 
convince area proponents that Downtown needs another advocacy organization.
2. Organizations engaging in economic revitalization need a professional staff 
person who can “talk shop” with government officials and other planning and 
development experts. Such a person furthers stability, gives a voice of authority to 
policy positions, implies credibility, creates a contact center, provides information, and 
organizes volunteers.
William Grant performed these functions at the DIA, advising members of 
development rules and procedures, for example. Aaron Levine provided similar services 
at the ODC in an island-wide planning context.
3. Any community organization program for area revitalization must contain 
ongoing membership education about planning, economics, finance, and the 
development process.
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Planning issues encountered by the DIA included stakeholder participation, 
consensus building, conflicting land uses, budget priorities, difficulties in obtaining plan 
adoption, and “just plain old politics.”
Project developments uncovered problems in decision making processes, lease 
agreements, underfunded obligations, market studies, regulations and unanticipated 
costs. This occurred in projects at least partially assisted by professional developers.
Thus it must be recognized by a community association that after initial 
organization, it must engage in a comprehensive education program for both its 
leadership and general membership.
4. Such educational programs should include the pivotal role of government in 
shaping the development process, the resources that government can provide, and the 
value of public-private partnerships.
Government support was critical to much of the DIA’s program. Examples of this 
included the City of Honolulu’s commitment to the Fort Street Mall which made the 
Financial Plaza of the Pacific possible, federal government financial support for Kukui 
Gardens, and use of State of Hawai’i properties for the Aloha Tower Marketplace.
Community organizations should thus prepare themselves to become partners 
with government in the redevelopment process.
5. Based upon the skills and resources available, the organization must 
determine whether it intends to become a project facilitator or a developer in its own 
right.
The DIA chose the facilitator route, helping the principals of the Financial Plaza 
of the Pacific organize using the new condominium law, assisting businesses dislocated 
by construction of new municipal parking structures to find new locations, promoting 
increased development height limits at government hearings for its members, etc.
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In contrast, the Hawai’i Council for Housing Action became a developer of low 
cost housing in the Kauluwela area.
It should be noted that the facilitator route allows the organization to develop a 
broader spectrum of experience, requires less resources, and does not tie the 
organization to any single project.
6. Development of a long term, multifaceted plan, and adherence to its outline, 
must be viewed as essential.
A long term, multifaceted plan begins with an inventory of an area’s strengths, 
weaknesses and opportunities. It then seeks to exploit those opportunities, recognizing 
that economic revitalization will be a cumulative, synergistic process, created one 
complementary project at a time. The plan’s framework will guide the organization to 
grasp previously identified large scale opportunities while providing flexibility to exploit 
unanticipated situations as they arise. These activities can be organized by the 
association’s standing and special projects committees, respectively, as was the case 
with the DIA. ^
As part of the plan, the organization should examine promising themes in 
downtown economic revitalization that were identified by DIA activities.
Locating government services as a means of directing economic growth is a 
useful tool that could be used in downtowns such as those of Hilo and Lihue. 
Government services attract patrons who can also engage in commerce at nearby 
stores. The DIA illustrated this when it pushed for the Civic Center location for the new 
State Capitol. The Capitol created a market for Downtown services and office space. A 
similar effect occurred with the Nu’uanu Avenue-Hotel Street Police substation, which 
improved safety in that area and thus encouraged patronage of the renovated Hawai’i 
Theater.
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Development of a historical marker program and organized or self-guided 
walking tours of such sites can increase civic pride and cultural tourism. Many mainland 
cities such as Philadelphia, Savannah and Boston benefit economically from 
considerable numbers of pedestrian visitors exploring their historic districts. Downtown 
Honolulu is compact enough to allow similar programs. Hawaii’s geographical, ethnic 
and royal history is a unique asset that could similarly contribute to the area.
Promotion of a downtown residential population of mixed incomes can provide 
diversity of use, extended activity hours, and broadens the area economy. Many 
American downtowns have been stereotyped as devoid of residents or as enclaves of 
the poor, resulting in a self-fulfilled prophecy that damages tax revenues, erodes 
government services, and stigmatizes residents. In contrast, downtown Honolulu has 
residential condominiums and rentals spread across the area, and even more 
significantly, many of the individual apartment towers themselves contain a mixture of 
income groups. This eliminates much of the potential for social discrimination, and 
provides local retail merchants with a potential diverse market of customers.
Mixed use projects can allow the community association or its member 
organizations as developer to spread risk among several markets. For example, a 
project may contain residential condominiums, rental apartments, commercial, office or 
hotel space. The more profitable elements can then subsidize that part of the 
development for which there is weaker demand. This is particularly effective if 
government subsidized housing is built as part of a project, and market priced units are 
needed to help increase project income to replenish a development fund.
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GLOSSARY
The City of Honolulu developed within a narrow coastal band of land that lies 
roughly northwest by southeast.. Due to this layout, directions within the city are usually 
given in terms of directions toward prominent topographical features, utilizing mostly 
Hawaiian terms.
TABLE 13.1. DIRECTIONAL TERMS USED THROUGHOUT THE THESIS
Hawaiian Terminology Prominent fopograj^ic Fea^re iHiiiiil birectioh
Ewa Village near Pearl Harbor Northwest
makai Pacific Ocean Southwest
Diamond Head Promontory near Waikiki Southeast
mauka Koolau Mountains behind Honolulu Northeast
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